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 It seems a fact that a dissertation just defended brings the least satisfaction to the 
one who wrote it.  This at least has been the general tenor of most of the words of 
congratulations and encouragement I have received since the defense.  It is not easy for 
me to look at the result of several years’ work without misgivings and second thoughts, 
nor to feel only the greatest impatience to begin dismantling the dissertation and revise its 
parts into better pieces of scholarhsip.  To write these acknowledgements is a rare 
opportunity to reflect only on the positive aspects of completing this work. 
 The patient and productive mentoring of my chair, Andreas Gailus, has garnered 
me the envy of many of my graduate student colleagues.  I am grateful to him and to the 
members of my committee, Vassilios Lambropoulos, Alex Potts, and Helmut Puff, for 
frequent readings of successive drafts, for general encouragement of my ideas, and for a 
defense that has directed my research into new and promising terrain.  Needless to say, 
faults in this work are entirely my own invention.  Fred Amrine, Julia Hell, Scott Spector, 
and Silke Weineck played crucial roles in the life of this project at its early stages.  I am 
indebted to Johannes von Moltke for guidance through the institutional intricacies of 
graduate school; to Kerstin Barndt and Victor Rosenberg for general support beyond the 
call of duty; and to Marga Schuhwerk-Hampel and Kate Ballentine for helping me to 
manage the bureaucracy of the life of the candidate.  The graduate students of Germanic 
Languages and Literatures have been an excellent community of friends and intellectual 
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confidants for seven years – among them, I mention especially Ela Gezen, Seth Howes, 
Jonah Johnson, and Simon Walsh for their particularly helpful interests in my work. 
 Numerous other events and institutions have been part of the life of this 
dissertation since its inception.  Colleagues at the Klassik Stiftung Weimar, where I held 
an internship in 2005 with the support of the University of Michigan Museum Studies 
Program, still today remind me why I am so drawn to Weimar.  During my year as an 
assistant diplômé at the Université de Lausanne I enjoyed the opportunity to discuss the 
prospectus at a colloquium under the direction of Christiaan L. Hart Nibbrig.  The Goethe 
Society of North America permitted me to workshop my first chapter draft at the 2008 
conference workshop “Writing a Goethezeit Dissertation.”  And the University of 
Michigan 2010 German Studies Colloquium under the direction of Vanessa Agnew was 
an extremely productive venue to present my work at a more advanced stage. 
 It is from my parents and grandparents that I have gained that conviction of the 
essential dignity of hard work absolutely necessary to continue with research and 
teaching when their value seems most doubtful.  Jeff Ramone, Pir Rothenberg, and 
Therese Thompson remained intimate sources of support and comradeship to me during 
the darkest days of my candidacy.  Late working evenings would have been intolerable 
without the quiet presence and patience of Boris and Béla.  And for all my happiness 
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Introduction: History and Weimar Classicism 
 
 
History as visual experience 
 This dissertation concerns the visual representation of history in the aesthetic 
theory and practice of Weimar Classicism.  I argue that Weimar Classicism responded to 
a discomfort with history, generated by the perceived historical crises of the French 
Revolution and Revolutionary Wars, by formulating an aesthetic geared toward the 
stabilization of the experience of time and an idealized representation, in the work of art, 
of the moment in historical time. 
 Scholarship on European historical thought and culture in the period around 1800 
has emphasized the perception of a break or transformation in historical consciousness 
following the political and social devastation of the French Revolution and the ensuing 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.  Studies in the language of historical narrative, in 
the emergence of new cultural practices and institutions including museum and 
preservation culture, and in memory and historical consciousness in a more general sense, 
identify new developments that do not merely emanate from the revolutionary period and 
wars of 1789 to 1815, but also refer back to this period with a sense of loss and a desire 
to recuperate the now distant and vanishing past for the benefit of a historically rootless 
present. 1
                                                             
1The transformation of historical writing between the 18th and 19th centuries is discussed in Hayden White, 
Metahistory: The Hisotrical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1973), specifically 1-162; and F. R. Ankersmit, “The Dialectics of Narrativist Historism,” 
  But the stress placed on the years immediately around 1800 and on the 
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watershed effect of the French Revolution and Wars upon the experience and 
representation of history, and foremost the persistent scholarly return to after-effects 
played out over the 19th century, also pique the curiosity about what went on before.  I do 
not question the perception of a transformation or break in the consciousness of history, 
nor do I dispute the observation of effects upon thought and culture in the early 19th 
century.  But I do wish to focus more attention precisely on the period of transition just 
around 1800 in order to gain a better understanding of how changes in thinking about 
history manifest themselves. 
 Reinhart Koselleck’s research into the transformation of fundamental concepts of 
historical experience beginning in the mid-18th century offers productive insight into the 
nature of a change of consciousness before the French Revolution and Napoleonic 
conquest unleashed history upon an emerging national and then European stage.  
Koselleck isolates a series of important changes concerning the fundamental 
understanding of what history is, how it might operate, and how it is to be represented.  
Foremost, over the course of the latter half of the 18th century history comes to be 
understood no longer as a closed past containing a limited set of universally valid lessons 
and policy possibilities for the present and immediate future.  Koselleck locates the 
causes for this change in the gradual decoupling of history from various institutional 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
in Historical Representation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 123-148.  For a discussion of the 
memory crisis engendered by the transformations of the revolutionary period, with specific reference to 
France in the 19th century, see Richard Terdiman, Present Past: Modernity and the Memory Crisis (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1993), 3-4.  Peter Fritzsche takes up the issue of a new consciousness of history 
and of the feeling of disconnection from the past in 19th-century Europe and America in Stranded in the 
Present: Modern Time and the Melancholy of History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 5.  
The influence on collecting practices is assessed by Susan A. Crane in Collecting and Historical 
Consciousness in Early Nineteenth-Century Germany (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 7.  On the 
level of historical thought and the practice of the historian, see the general overview in Ernst Breisach, 
Historiography: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 199-
247; and for the development of historicism between the 18th and 19th centuries, see George G. Iggers, The 
German Conception of History: The National Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present 
(Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1983), 3-43. 
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guarantors such as the Catholic Church (which lost its unique authority during the 
Reformation); and the absolutist regime that also suffered a loss of authority owing to 
increasing political and social criticism throughout the 18th century.2  The result was an 
unmooring of history from exclusive institutional frameworks of interpretation and its 
emergence as a problem of thought and an a mode of experience no longer bound to the 
content of that past but rather with a life of its own.  Those who concern themselves with 
history at mid-century and after – university scholars, to be sure, statesmen, literary and 
cultural critics – increasingly understand history after 1750 as a temporal dynamic 
encompassing the past, present, and future.  A crucial implication of this change of 
understanding is that, with the rise of philosophy of history, the content of the future is no 
longer limited by a series of probabilities to be drawn from the past, as if historical time 
admitted only a limited variety of changes over time; nor must it be subject to a prophetic 
legacy remnant from an age when a single Church was the universal guarantor of world 
history.  In the latter half of the 18th century the future is understood to be open for the 
making, and therewith the present becomes the critical location for historically 
meaningful action.3
 The challenge of this new expansiveness of history is reflected in changed 
thinking about the representation of history.  Here Koselleck points to two significant 
transformations.  The first concerns the etymology of the word Geschichte and its gradual 
replacement of Historie as a preferred term in historical discourse.  Both the German 
 
                                                             
2Koselleck lays out the framework for these transformations in “Vergangene Zukunft der frühen Neuzeit,” 
Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1985).  
For a more in depth analysis specifically of the relationship between historical thought, political and social 
criticism, and the loss of absolutist authority, see also Reinhart Koselleck, Kritik und Krise. Eine Studie zur 
Pathogenese der bürgerlichen Welt (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1976).  
3Koselleck, “Vergangene Zukunft der frühen Neuzeit,” 34-35.  
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Geschichte and the borrowed term Historie had referred variously both to the event of the 
past and to its report.  But Geschichte gradually assumed the exclusive referential role for 
both event and representation.  With this linguistic concentration, the specific content of 
history (the event) elided with its formalization (the history as report or representation of 
events), rendering Geschichte both as the knowledge of the past and of its 
representational demands.  Geschichte, history, becomes more than the sum of its 
constituent past events – the term Geschichte now signifies the totality of history, 
wherein the event is but a manifestation of historical time in the world.  Moreover, the 
term Geschichte eventually collapses the singular das Geschicht and the plural die 
Geschichten into a collective noun (die Geschichte) suggesting the multitude of events, 
experiences, and stories that only begin to constitute history as such.4
 For Koselleck, this etymological shift accompanies another transformation: 
recognition of the sheer subjectivity of the report of the historical event.  The 
acknowledgement of the particularity of the individual’s perspective, as witness to the 
event, entails a limitation of the historian’s task to provide a mirror of the past, to render 
naked and reveal the truth of history.  Such visual metaphors for the knowledge to be 
gained from history operate in a mode of transparency, whereby the work of the historian 
is simply to show – the essence of history thereby becomes visible.  But the particularity 
of the historian’s perspective entails a shift from the potential extreme visibility of history 
to the spectatorship of the historian.  Detached from the interpretive framework of 
 
                                                             
4Koselleck, “Historia Magistra Vitae. Über die Auflösung des Topos im Horizont neuzeitlich bewegter 
Geschichte,” Vergangene Zukunft, especially 47-56.  Koselleck cites the observations of Johann Martin 
Chladenius concerning the role of the spectator in the generation of historical knowledge and the report 
about history.  Chladenius himself focuses on the eye and on vision as the foremost sense associated with 
the embodied viewpoint on history.  See Johann Martin Chladenius, “Vom Zuschauer und Sehepunckte,” 
Allgemeine Geschichtswissenschaft [1752] (Vienna: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1985), 91-115.  I 
discuss Koselleck and Chladenius on the subject of historical point of view in greater detail in Chapter 4.  
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traditional institutional guarantees; recognized as a distinct temporality and mode of 
experience; regarded more as a problem of thought and representation than as a 
management of facts for practical application – history now also becomes a matter of 
sensory reception.  Knowledge of history begins with visual experience. 
 I do not want to think about history merely as visual experience, though.  Rather, I 
want also to consider how aesthetics – in particular, theories and practices of visual 
representation – are recruited for the task of historical representation and the associated 
challenge of thinking through the meaning of history, even of formalizing the present 
experience of history in order to render it more manageable.  This entails two inquiries 
into aesthetics.  One concerns aesthetics in terms of theory of the work of art – in relation 
to my argument, this inquiry also concerns how the work of art functions as a device for 
the representation of history and the provision of knowledge about history.  The other 
concerns the acts of sensory perception that constitute the initial core of the philosophy of 
aesthetics.  Alexander Baumgarten (1714-1762) articulated his foundational philosophy 
of aesthetics as a science investigating perception and the possibilities for its perfection in 
his 1735 Reflections on Poetry (originally titled Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis 
ad poema pertinentibus).  Aesthetics are distinguished from logic, which concerns the 
perfection of thought.  While retaining the distinction of sense perception from thought, 
Baumgarten elevates the study of perception’s cognitive possibilities to more equal status 
with logic.  Moreover, he uses the work of art – foremost poetry – as the means to 
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explicate how sensate ideas can be rendered more clearly.  The work of art functions as a 
device to sharpen and strengthen the cognitive potential of the senses.5
 The return to the body as the site for the production of knowledge in experience in 
the eighteenth century, implied by the elevation of sensory cognition alongside logic, 





  The body and the senses, above all vision, become sites of engagement with the 
experience of the passage of time and of the change.  This, at least, is the relationship I 
pursue in this work: the aesthetic as the honing of sense perception with regard to the 
sensory experience of history, and the use of the work of art as a means to sharpen the 
senses for the perception of history. 
Weimar Classicism: the production of the historical image 
 I regard the aesthetic theories and practices of Weimar Classicism as attempts to 
deal directly with the experience of the passage of time.  But my assertion of a specific 
historically-oriented project under the name of Weimar Classicism touches directly upon 
the question of whether and under what circumstances one may even speak of Weimar 
Classicism as a discrete cultural entity.  Because the body of this work deals in greater 
detail with specific aspects of Weimar Classicism – aesthetic theory, theater, art-
historical writing – I prefer at the outset to provide only the broad contours of Weimar 
                                                             
5 Alexander Baumgarten, Reflections on Poetry: Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s Meditationes 
philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus, Karl Aschenbrenner and Willam B. Holtner, Eds. 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), 1-32.  
6For an argument about aesthetics as a return to the body, see Martin Jay,  “Returning to the Body through 
Aesthetic Experience: From Kant to Dewey,” in Martin Jay, Songs of Experience: Modern American and 
European Variations on a Universal Theme (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 131-169. 
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Classicism as a historical and cultural phenomenon before discussing its relevance as a 
study in the visual representation of the experience of time and history. 
 The two most prominent figures of Weimar Classicism are Johann Wolfgang 
Goethe (1749-1832) and Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805), whose collaboration from 1794 
until Schiller’s death has often been received as the foremost and defining gesture of 
Weimar Classicism.  But Goethe and Schiller also worked with a host of associates – to 
name but the few who appear in this work: the artist and art-historian Johann Heinrich 
Meyer (1760-1832), the art scholar and librarian Carl Ludwig Fernow (1763-1808), and 
the linguist and diplomat Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835).  The collective 
Weimarische Kunstfreunde (Weimar Friends of Art) is also periodically used to refer to a 
core group around Goethe, Schiller, and Meyer.  The period of Weimar Classicism may 
be said to begin with Goethe’s voyage to Italy in 1786 and end with Schiller’s death.  It 
reaches a high point in 1797 in the intense theorization about genre, poetry and the visual 
arts, centered on the vigorous promotion of aesthetic models drawn from European and 
foremost Greek antiquity; and in the publication in 1798 of its programmatic organ  
Propyläen, in which Goethe and Meyer presented their views on antique and 
contemporary art.  It waned as the German public increasingly failed to demonstrate 
receptivity to Goethe’s opinions concerning the arts, apparently preferring the early 
Romantic.7
 Distinctions between Weimar Classicism and early Romanticism are perhaps a 
helpful – if not the single best – way to grasp the essential cultural and aesthetic concerns 
of the former.  In short, Weimar Classicism has been received as a project to restore the 
 
                                                             
7For a general review of the chronology, figures, and central concerns of Weimar Classicism, see for 
example Simon Richter, “Introduction,” The Literature of Weimar Classicism, Simon Richter, Ed. 
(Rochester: Camden House, 2005), 3-44. 
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essential integrity of sensual perception, a reaction to the rationalism of the German and 
European Enlightenments on the one hand and on the other to the more spiritual bent of 
Romanticism.  I believe it would be inaccurate to distinguish Weimar Classicism from 
such other traditions on grounds that Weimar alone cared for the restoration of a whole 
individuality (regarded as necessary in view of the alienating, fracturing pressures of 
social and political transformation on the eve of the 19th century).  For distinction, one 
must look rather to Weimar’s manner of positing a source and a possibility for restored 
wholeness: in the adherence to a model of antiquity based in the idea that the Greeks had 
achieved a creative and healthy harmonization between the individual and society; in a 
cultural project geared toward the purification of the arts and their reactivation in public 
life on a more interventionist and energetic scale; and (at least in the realm of the visual 
arts) in the advocacy of an essentially sculptural work of art that would itself reintroduce 
into daily experience the variety of whole, sensually fulfilled presence that could 
reinvigorate human perception.  One need of course not take Goethe at his word 
regarding his famed maxim that the Classical is the healthy and the Romantic is the sick, 
but the gesture of the maxim pinpoints the difference as the Classicists themselves saw it: 
Weimar Classicism focused its energy on the discovery, creation, and celebration of the 
complete, the perfect, the antique Classical, the universal, and the cosmopolitan; 
Romanticism, by contrast, turned toward the incomplete, the otherworldly, the mystical, 
the medieval, the Christian, and the German.8
                                                             
8I borrow, and build upon, the idea of Weimar Classicism as an effort to reevaluate and elevate sensual 
perception from the commentaries “Die Wiederherstellung der Wirklichkeit. Goethes Kunstanschauung 
1771-1805,” FA I, 18:1007-1048 and “Die Ästhetik des Selbstseins. Goethes Kunstanschauung 1805-
1816,” FA I, 19:727-757.  On distinctions between Weimar Classicism and Romanticism, as well as some 
commentary on the tensions in Weimar Classicism between cosmopolitanism and a German-specific 
project of cultural renewal, see Andreas Beyer, “Klassik und Romantik. Zwei Enden einer Epoche,” in 




 Goethe and Schiller and their collaborators were operating at the intersection of 
time-specific concerns about culture and politics and various traditions that extended far 
beyond the city walls of Weimar and Jena (the central locations, along with Rome, for 
Weimar Classicism).  On the one hand, their respect for the ancients, specifically the 
Greeks, was a legitimately European cultural phenomena – thus, Weimar Classicism is by 
all means kin to German and European Classicism.  The Weimar Classicists also 
concerned themselves with questions central to German cultural identity (or, at least, 
high-cultural identity) since the time of Gottsched’s theater reforms in the 1730s: 
questions into the possibility of a unique German literature and of German as a literary 
language; of the proper concerns for a German theater; of the status of the visual arts in 
Germany.  But the events of the 1790s – the French Revolution and the Terror, the 
Revolutionary Wars and eventual Napoleonic Conquest (stretching of course into the 19th 
century), and their ensuing political and social transformations – also elicited from the 
Weimar Classicists a very particular concern for the status of the aesthetic and of art in 
their own time.  Their relative traditionalism and their wholesale universalism are 
stamped by very contemporary historical pressures. 
 Weimar Classicism has been received as a flight from such pressures of historical 
change into the utopian embrace of art and antiquity.  To be sure, there is a jarring 
disparity in the presence, on the pages of a single letter from Goethe to Meyer, of intense 
discussions of the theoretically strategic collecting of art objects and the latest news of 
the French military advances in Germany.  Indeed, Goethe’s words in one such letter 
from Weimar to Meyer in Florence seem a striking confirmation of a gesture of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(Munich: Prestel Verlag, 2006).  Goethe’s maxim, HA 863, reads:”Klassisch ist das Gesunde, romantisch 
das Kranke.” W, 487. 
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avoidance of the problems of the time: “bleiben Sie ruhig am Arno, wie ich an der Ilm 
und Saale auszuharren denke, bis die Weltangelegenheiten sich einigermaßen aufklären” 
(“just wait patiently on the Arno, as I plan to wait it out on the Ilm and the Saale, until 
world events clear up somewhat”).9  It is not difficult to read into these lines a flight from 
the vagaries of history into the timelessness of art, referenced by the aesthetic refuges of 
Italy, Weimar, and Jena.  But recent work on Weimar Classicism has sought to reread 
Classicism’s rhetoric about itself, indeed to read beneath the surface or along the edges of 
such rhetoric and to establish the presence and power of instabilities in Weimar’s 
aesthetic consciousness – concerns about the representation of pain, suffering, violence, 
motion – that it seeks to contain in its art and theory.10
                                                             
9A criticism of Weimar Classicism’s utopianism may be found in Heinz Schlaffer, Faust zweiter Teil. Die 
Allegorie des 19. Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1981).  For the letter, see 
Goethe to Meyer, September 15, 1796, in Goethes Briefwechsel mit Heinrich Meyer erster Band: Juli 1788 
bis Juni 1797, Max Hecker, Ed. (Weimar: Verlag der Goethe-Gesellschaft, 1917), 332-333. 
  For my part, I do not question 
Classicism’s earnest promotion of an autonomous and universalizing aesthetic of 
wholeness, harmony, even beauty as the highest standard for the work of art.  Rather, I 
read this aesthetic also as a response to an awareness of historical change, and as a 
strategy for the isolation and control of the moment and its subjection to a structural 
investigation in the interests of understanding motion through time and within the space 
of immediate experience. 
10 Two works I have in mind, which have productively influenced my own thinking about Weimar 
Classicism, are Martin Dönike, Pathos, Ausdruck, Bewegung. Zur Ästhetik des Weimarer Klassizismus 
1796-1806  (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2005); and Simon Richter,  Laocoon’s Body and the Aesthetics of 
Pain: Winckelmann, Lessing, Herder, Moritz, Goethe (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1992).  
Dönike, building upon scholarship challenging the notion of Classicism as centered on an aesthetic best 
encapsulated by Winckelmann’s  “edle Einfalt und stille Größe,” reads Classicism’s work as essentially 
driven by the concepts of Widerstrebung and das Gewaltsame, which latter he understands as vehemens, to 
move beyond rhetorically established boundaries isolating the object as complete, at rest, or beautiful 
(Dönike, 2-9).  Richter argues that Classicism’s aesthetic of beauty is balanced by an equally present and 
influential aesthetic drawn from the expression of pain (Richter, 11). 
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That Weimar Classicism should betray a concern for history is not an innovation 
in reception.  One can easily find a high degree of self-reflexivity regarding the presumed 
historical timeliness of the endeavor of Weimar Classicism in some of the public 
statements of Goethe and Schiller.  Schiller’s journal Die Horen, for example, announced 
itself in 1794 as a supra-political project dedicated to liberating the mind and reuniting 
the world “beneath the banner of truth and beauty” (“unter der Fahne der Wahrheit und 
Schönheit”).  And Goethe’s own Propyläen formulated the modest proposal in 1798 of 
promoting discussion of the arts among friends of art at time when the “art body” 
(Kunstkörper) of Italy was suffering the violent loss of those objects constituting the 
model for contemporary visual art – the assembled legacy of European antiquity that was 
being transported to Revolutionary Paris.11
In fact, these two statements bookend the publication in installments, in Die 
Horen, of Schiller’s Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen (On the Aesthetic 
Education of Humanity, 1795).  In this series of letters Schiller explicitly promotes the 
engagement with art and beauty for the purpose of recalibrating the relationship between 
the fundamental drives of the human mind and reactivating its potential for judgment. 
Schiller admits, however, that he projects a very utopian future in which humanity has 
regained its potential for wholeness both on the individual and social levels.  Goethe may 
  To judge from these statements alone, the 
actual project of Weimar Classicism might be too easily understood entirely as the open-
ended and hopeful promotion of a cultured public sphere, upheld by the conviction that 
the aesthetic offers a necessary remedy for the imbalanced human psyche of the modern 
age. 
                                                             
11Schiller, “Ankündigung der Horen” [1794], SW, 5:870-873; Goethe, “Einleitung” [1799,] Propyläen. 
Eine Periodische Schrift herausgegeben von Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Erster, zweiter und dritter 
Band.  Wolfgang Frhr. von Löhneysen, Ed. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1965), 7-42. 
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have had a similar notion of the utopian unlikelihood of success in real transformation of 
the public sphere and human psyche when he remarked of the title Propyläen that it 
references merely an entrance (propylaia) to the temple: “Stufe, Thor, Eingang, Vorhalle, 
der Raum zwischen dem Innern und Aeussern, zwischen dem Heiligen und Gemeinen 
kann nur die Stelle seyn, auf der wir uns mit unsern Freunden gewöhnlich aufhalten 
werden” (“Step, gate, entrance, forecourt, the space between the interior and exterior, 
between the sacred and profane can be the only place where we will meet with our 
friends”). 12
Indeed, Schiller constructs his utopian theory of the aesthetic education upon the 
idea that humanity’s earliest recognition of the distinctness of the self vis-à-vis others, its 
first aesthetic act, occurs in the visual observation of self and other as distinct. 
  The project of Propyläen may occupy the heady aesthetic environment 
midway between the profane and the sacred, a slightly more interior space than what is 
common, a step closer to an inner sanctum, and thus also an elite space – but it can never 
fully enter the sacred space, it remains suspended.  The historically-oriented project of 
Weimar Classicism appears in this light rather more as a cultural holding pattern, a 
preservative fluid for the wounded art body until it returns to consciousness.  Another 
possibility is that, in pointing directly to the very median and anticipatory space occupied 
by Classicist public discourse, Goethe directly invites the reader to move beyond such 
rhetoric into the interior depths of the Classicist mind. 
Solange der Mensch in seinem ersten physischen Zustande, die Sinnenwelt 
bloß leidend in sich aufnimmt, bloß empfindet, ist er auch noch völlig eins 
mit derselben […] Erst wenn er in seinem ästhetischen Stande sie außer 
sich stellt oder betrachtet, sondert sich seine Persönlichkeit von ihr ab, 
                                                             
12Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Propyläen, 7.  
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As long as the human being in his first, physical state merely passively 
receives the world of the senses, merely feels, he is still fully one with the 
world […]  Only when the human being in his aesthetic condition places 
the world of the senses outside of himself or contemplate it, does his 
personality separate itself from the world – and it appears to him as a 
world because he has ceased to be one with it. 
 
Admittedly I take the situation Schiller describes very much out of its context in his 
thought in order merely to highlight that the foundational aesthetic act of the individual, 
in which the individual distinguishes the self from the surrounding world and begins to 
regard the world with a formalizing eye, occurs in a moment of considerable 
improbability.  “Erst wenn, ”Schiller writes – “only when, not until, only if” – aesthetic 
consciousness as the essential balancing of the drives of the human psyche almost does 
not occur.  Its success is a matter of hypothesis.  Regardless of the hope for success of the 
remedy of art, the very idea that the aesthetic is a basic and necessary category for human 
experience is grounded in a simple act of looking that might not happen.  The 
contingency of this sensory act, its equal likelihood not to occur, is the source of an 
instability at the heart of Weimar’s aesthetics, a threat to the open-ended project of 
aesthetic public discourse, and the object of a strategic aesthetics intended to regulate 
visual experience. 
This disparity between the open-ended aesthetic consciousness espoused in 
rhetoric and the more desperate search for stability and the production of an image 
presupposing a particular visual prowess is most apparent in the review of works 
submitted to the Weimarer Preisaufgaben, competitions organized and judged by Goethe 
                                                             




and Meyer between 1799 and 1805.  Two stated purposes of the competitions were to 
cultivate and positively direct the talent of young German artists while demonstrating an 
unprecedented judgment of the real aesthetic quality of the work of art, and to submit the 
theory of the visual arts to a practical test.14  Underlying these stated aims, however, is 
another concern: to cultivate the production of very controlled images of time.  I take the 
1800 Preisaufgabe as an example.  The proposed subjects were drawn from Homer’s 
Iliad: the first, from Book VI, concerns Hector’s departure from his wife and child prior 
to fighting Achilles; the second, from Book X, concerns Ulysses’ and Diomedes’ attack 
on a Trojan camp to steal horses.  “Es ist hier um mahlerische Wirkungen zu thun,” notes 
the announcement: “It is a matter of painterly effects” – the production of an image that 
does not merely visually reproduce the content of the epic narrative, but rather reorders 
the content in a matter appropriate for visual representation by capturing the essence of 
the moment heavy with transition and evanescence, yet therewith also consolidating the 
particular context of the epic narrative into a singular visual impact.15
                                                             
14 Goethe, “Nachricht an Küntler und Preisaufgabe,”Propyläen, 524-532 and “Preisertheilung und 
Recension der eingegangenen Concurrenzstücke,” Propyläen, 842-846. 
  Working through 
the review of the 1800 submissions, and specifically the commentary on submissions of 
Abschied des Hectors (Hector’s Departure, the theme that received the larger number of 
entries), one finds a consistent return to positive characteristics: a pyramidal composition 
of closely grouped figures suggesting unity of motion; clarity of character; distribution of 
light and shadow highlighting the central figures; architectural and archaeological 
accuracy; the presence of “invention” (Erfindung), the artist’s own original method of 
handling the scene; and the proper indication of the “pregnancy” of the moment, and 
15Goethe, “Preisaufgabe fürs Jahr 1800,” Propyläen, 879-880.  
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therewith of the temporal stream in which such a moment emerges as both logical and 
graceful.16
These various individual criteria are employed by Meyer and Schiller, in their 
respective reviews of the submitted works, to define roughly a paradigmatic image.  I use 
the term “roughly” because, as Meyer and Schiller move from the most lowly ranked to 
the winning submission, they find occasion to fault and praise all entries, even those 
among the best submissions.  Accuracy in clothing and architecture, for example, might 
somewhat compensate for a flawed composition of figures.  Works are good for varying 
reasons.  But the overarching paradigm that emerges is of an image displaying a scene 
from history that is subtly noticeable.  The comments on two versions of Der Abschied 
des Hectors – one highly ranked, the other the winning submission – suggest that these 
images’ depictions of the very intimate passage of a moment in time is well conceived.
 
17
                                                             
16See Meyer’s review, “Abschied des Hectors,” Propyläen, 1013-1043, and Schiller, “An den Herausgeber 
der Propyläen,” Propyläen, 1044-1061. 
  
In each of the two, Heinrich Kolbe’s well-received version (ill. 1) and Johann August 
Nahl’s winning version (ill. 2), the figures are group centrally facing the viewer.  Hector 
raises his son Astyanax into the air, commending him to the protection of the gods and 
also achieving a pyramidal composition that helps to mark these figures as at the center 
of an action.  Nahl’s version is placed in a context indicative of the next moment: 
Hector’s departure from Troy to fight Achilles.  Schiller writes of Nahl: “man sieht den 
Wagen Hectors, der Führer hält die Pferde an, ein Krieger ist näher getreten und setzt die 
Hauptscene mit der Handlung des Hintergrundes in Verbindung” (“on sees Hector’s 
17Two or three submissions.  The winning version by Johann August Nahl is numbered 26 in both Meyer’s 
and Schiller’s reviews (and Nahl’s name is given – which is not the case with every review).  The other 
submission must be by Heinrich Kolbe, given the two descriptions, but Meyer refers to it as number 25 and 




chariot, the driver holds the horses, a soldier has stepped closer and connects the main 
scene with the background”).  Kolbe, by contrast, errs in placing his group outside the 
city walls, to which Meyer responds that it is only through well-conceived additional 
figures (“Nebenfiguren”) that the work can be elevated to self-sufficiency 
(“Selbstständigkeit”).  The specifics of the depicted moment – Hector’s imminent 
departure and death – are not properly referenced in Kolbe’s version: it remains unclear 
why the family would be outside the city walls acting as it does. 
Meyer and Schiller concentrate on a specific and very precariously depicted 
moment – Hector’s departure, his death, yet not an ostentatious occasion.  Rather, the 
intimacy of the family scene should retain its capacity to be noticed within the context of 
a subtly referenced story.  The presence of soldiers, the chariot, the horses, Hector’s arms 
at his feet, the restrained emotionalism of the figures tell the looking eye that something 
is happening, that the opened gate in the background marks the immediate arrival of the 
next moment.  But only if the eye is looking – the image, the action, cannot call attention 
to itself.  Thus, while Meyer criticizes Kolbe’s too emotional, pleading Andromache as 
theatralisch (theatrical), Schiller also praises his depiction of the nurse with her back 
turned to the viewer.  She remains part of the central composition, focused on the central 
action as a spectator within the image, and a counterweight to Andromache.  But with her 
back turned she also undoes the theatrics of Andromache gesturally: as she turns away in 
grief (her face remains unseen), she suggests that there is nothing there to be seen.18
                                                             
18As I have suggested, the praise and criticism of submissions is not always consistent.  Thus, despite that 
Kolbe’s Andromache is found too emotionally conceived for a figure of such central importance in the 
composition and story, Nahl’s nurse – on her knee, hands clasped in despair – fails in Schiller’s opinion to 




I believe that the aesthetics of Weimar Classicism – that is to say, the varieties of 
aesthetic thought and of theory concerning the work of art – are concerned with the 
representation of the moment in time in such a subtle, intimate, almost non-noticeable 
fashion.  On the one hand, this aesthetic theory (to speak collectively for a moment) seeks 
to integrate the compelling moment in time into its theory of representation – the visual, 
the dramatic, and the epic operate, according to Goethe, Schiller, and Meyer, with 
different notions of temporality.  My own argument is that, on the other hand, visual 
works of art are geared in various ways (the painting or sculpture, the drama) toward the 
nearly unremarkable visual sign of time’s passage.  With this effort, Goethe, Schiller, and 
Meyer posit an ideal beholder of the work of art – indeed, they play the part of their ideal 
beholder, whose eye is trained in the recognition or even, if it is called for, the avoidance 
of signs of the passage of time and the presence of history in the gesture, the detail, the 
finely calibrated interrelation of parts of the work of art.  Therewith an idealized 
historical image also takes shape: the action that it very much there to be seen and that 




 In the three chapters that form the body of this work I will follow the traces of an 
aesthetic of historical representation through several Weimar Classicist works.  My 
                                                             
19My thinking on this matter is greatly influenced by Jonathan Crary and Michael Fried.  From Jonathan 
Crary I am inspired (perhaps by a selective reading of his work) to pay attention to how the body and, most 
importantly, the position of the beholder of the work of art is present in aesthetic writings as a matter of 
concern.  See Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth 
Century (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992), especially 1-66.  Michael Fried’s concepts of absorption and 
theatricality, applied to French painting of the 18th century, have been an equally productive instigation to 
thinking about the theatrical effects of the works of art described, idealized, and even created by the 
Weimar Classicists.  See Michael Fried, Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of 
Diderot (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988).  
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method is largely inductive – to read into texts an argument about the experience and 
visual representation of historical time that is, I believe, present if not always the manifest 
first concern of the texts’ authors.  I have chosen to organize these readings as a thematic 
unfolding of the project of Weimar Classicism roughly chronologically from its 
conceptual beginnings in the mid-1790s to its perceived end midway through the first 
decade of the 19th century. 
 Thus, Chapter One does not start with Goethe’s return from Italy in 1788 but 
rather with his visit to Frankfurt, the city of his youth, in 1797.  It is here that Goethe first 
articulates the concept of the symbolic as a mode of experience occurring in the 
encounter with objects from the past and objects in time.  The experience is fortuitous, 
for Goethe, Schiller, and Meyer had been devoting attention to the nature of 
representation, the limits and proper scope of the genres, and the choice of objects for 
representation.  Accordingly, Goethe elaborates the symbolic into a representational 
mode for the visual arts that transforms particular temporality into a generic, idealized 
experience of time.  The symbol is then taken up by Heinrich Meyer who, in his 1797 
Über die Gegenstände der bildenden Kunst (On the Objects of the Visual Arts) makes it 
the pinnacle of an expansive, hierarchized categorization of objects for a visual 
representation that is based foremost in visual communication, less in generic 
representation and visual pleasure; and in which a more precise place is accorded the 
representation of time.  Finally, Goethe’s 1798 essay Über Laokoon offers a symbolic 
reading of the work of art yet that unwittingly reintroduces temporal particularity into the 
ideal moment of representation. 
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 Chapter Two focuses exclusively on Schiller’s work over the course of the 1790s 
and on his own visual engagement with history.  This engagement begins with the 
narrative history Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Kriegs (History of the Thirty Years 
War, 1791-1792), over the course of which Schiller’s approach as historian changes from 
one of a highly visual rhetoric to an increased perceptual reliance on great historical 
individuals whose actions seem to bring coherence and  transparency to the content and 
meaning of history.  The failure of this perceptual approach to make sense of the Imperial 
General Wallenstein leaves Schiller eager to take up the subject of Wallenstein’s 
assassination in drama.  In his subsequent aesthetic writings and in correspondence with 
Goethe and Meyer on the problems of representation and genre, Schiller develops or 
outright adopts techniques that assist in organizing the content of history for the purposes 
of dramatic reorganization.  It might strike the reader as strange that I include a chapter 
on theater in a dissertation that concerns the de-privileging of ostentatious depiction.  But 
my interest in Schiller is precisely the balance he attempts to strike in his drama between 
the demonstrative artifice of tragedy and the more discreet visual and gestural 
characterization of Wallenstein as a tragic figure.  As a series of dramas that lay out and 
explore the dynamics of the historical moment both verbally and visual, Schiller’s 
Wallenstein trilogy is also an exercise in retuning the beholder’s (i.e. Schiller’s) 
perceptivity to the subtle signs of a transformative moment in time. 
 Chapter Three takes up an issue studiously avoided in Chapter One and called 
into question in Chapter Two: the writing of historical narrative.  The art-historical 
writing produced by the Weimar Classicists around 1805, when the project of Weimar 
Classicism had assumed a defensive posture against the rise of Romanticism, accordingly 
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undertakes in various ways to historicize the Classicist project while also still upholding 
the integrity of Classicism’s approach to art.  The major piece of work in this vein is the 
jointly composed Winckelmann und sein Jahrhundert (Winckelmann and His Century, 
1805) – a multi-authored work that assesses the place of Winckelmann in the recent 
history of art in terms of his legacy as art-historian and as a model of human creativity.  
My intention here is to use the focus on how Weimar Classicists write the history of art – 
from Winckelmann’s life (and death in 1768) to the death of the promising artist Asmus 
Jakob Carstens in 1798 – also as a history of Classicism, thereby narrating over a series 
of works their own concern for the future of Classicism as a variety of visual experience. 
 In conclusion I return to the issue of Weimar Classicism’s discomfort with history 
and anxiety about change, and reflect on how this emotional charge manifests itself in 











This chapter inquires into the status of the visual representation of time in the 
concept of the symbol developed by Goethe in the 1790s in conversation and 
collaboration with Friedrich Schiller and Johann Heinrich Meyer.  Goethe attempts to 
compress the particularity of temporal context and cause into an idealized moment of 
visual apprehension in the work of art conceived as symbol.  I argue that his attempt at 
compression bespeaks a desire to control the experience of time aesthetically.  Yet a 
temporal tension remains even in Goethe’s reading of the work of art, signaling its 
reopening to a more particularized reading in which narrative context and detail are of 
utmost importance in terms of the information mediated visually. 
The symbol is a fraught category in Goethe’s oeuvre, and the attempt at a 
straightforward definition risks damage to its many valences in varying contexts over the 
course of several decades of his work.  Among three of Goethe’s Maximen und 
Reflexionen that explicitly address the symbol, for example, one finds the following 
definition that originally appeared between 1818 and 1827 in the journal Über Kunst und 
Altertum: “Das ist die wahre Symbolik, wo das Besondere das Allgemeine repräsentiert,  
nicht als Traum und Schatten, sondern als lebendig-augenblickliche Offenbarung des 
Unerforschlichen” (“This is the true symbolism, where the particular represents the more 
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general, not as dream and shadow, but as a living and momentary revelation of the 
unfathomable”). 1   Although this maxim postdates the foremost productive period of 
Weimar Classicism by more than a decade, it offers a preliminary foothold on the rich 
terrain of the Goethean symbol.  We might understand the symbol as a particularized, 
sensually perceptible or even material instantiation of the general, the universal, or the 
ideal.  To the receptive intuition, the symbol mediates between the empirical and those 
otherwise inaccessible laws or ideas that operate at the core of phenomena.  Crystallizing 
out of Goethe’s thought on the value of experience and intuition in reference to both the 
fine arts and the natural sciences in the 1780s and early 1790s, the symbol was mobilized 
over the course of the 1790s also as a conceptual defense of a classicist aesthetic favoring 
the sensual, material, or worldly experience. 2   Specifically in the realm of visual 
representation the symbol was opposed to allegory.  For allegory was regarded as a mode 
of representation in which content referred to a conceptual source beyond the boundaries 
of the work of art and appealing to the intellect; the symbol, by contrast, was favored as a 
self-contained and sensually appealing representation of the ideal.  In the mode of the 
symbol, the supersensual would become perceptible to the senses.3
                                                             
1Maxim 752, according to the organization of the Hamburg Edition, which also indicates that the maxim 
first appeared in print in Über Kunst und Altertum between 1818 and 1827.  Maxims 749 and 750, from 
Goethe’s unpublished papers, also address the distinction between symbol and allegory.  See Johann 
Wolfgang Goethe, Maximen und Reflexionen, W, 12:470-471.  This and all translations hereafter are my 
own unless otherwise noted. 
 
2Some brief examples relating to the natural-scientific work include the famous 1817 autobiographical 
essay “Glückliches Ereignis,” [W, 10:538-543] in which Goethe relates his 1794 demonstration of the 
symbolic plant to a skeptical Schiller; Maxims 746 and 747, [W, 12:470], both from the Nachlass, in which 
Goethe describes the appearance of natural law and its relation to beauty with the example of the bloom of 
the rose as exemplary of the “vegetable” law.  Traces of a symbolic thinking about experience and 
knowledge are clearly evident already in Goethe’s descriptions of his travels in Italy: for an example 
concerning his natural-scientific inquiries, see the entry “Auf dem Brenner, den 8. September, abends”; for 
his reaction to Rome, see “Rom, den 7. November.”  Goethe, Italienische Reise [W, 11:15-22, 130-131]. 
3Given its centrality to Goethe’s thought, specifically concerning the visual arts, the symbol is defined and 
discussed at varying lengths in many works on Weimar Classicism and Goethe’s conception of art.  A basic 
contextualization of the role of the category of the symbol in Weimar Classicism may be found in Helmut 
23 
 
My interest in this chapter is to focus on the period from mid-1797 to 1798, 
during which time Goethe initially isolates the symbol as an intuitive category and 
proceeds to incorporate it into an aesthetic and visual program.  In the first section I focus 
on Goethe’s development of the concept of the symbol specifically as a category 
influenced by temporal experience yet increasingly stripped of its particular temporal 
register.  Here I read his symbol against Schiller’s concept of the sentimental; alongside 
symbolic representation in the epic Hermann und Dorothea (Hermann and Dorothea, 
1797); and specifically as a variety of visual representation in his short 1797 essay Über 
die Gegenstände der bildenden Kunst (On the Objects of the Visual Arts).  In the 
following section I turn to Johann Heinrich Meyer’s longer 1798 treatise, also titled Über 
die Gegenstände der bildenden Kunst, in order to follow Meyer’s extension of Goethe’s 
thought on symbolic and visual representation.  Here I hope to recuperate from Meyer’s 
controversial work a more refined understanding of the possibilities and limitations of the 
visual representation of time.  Finally, I return to Goethe’s essay Über Laokoon (On 
Laocoon, composed in 1797, published in 1798).  In this essay Goethe attempts to 
demonstrate the quintessentially atemporal and ideal nature of the sculpture Laocoon – 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Pfotenhauer, “Weimar Classicism as Visual Culture,” The Literature of Weimar Classicism, Simon Richter, 
Ed. (Rochester: Camden House, 2005), 265-293.  I have found those sources most productive that provide a 
more complex perspective on what, to my mind, is otherwise an elegantly simple concept – the symbol.  
Thus, I have relied foremost on S. Heidi Krueger, who carefully distinguishes between varieties of 
symbolic representation in Goethe’s work; Jürgen Fohrmann, who posits the symbolic as a mediating 
device between the ideal and the empirical; and the historical commentary of the entries “Symbol” in 
Ästhetische Grundbegriffe and Goethe-Handbuch.  See Jürgen Fohrmann, Schiffbruch mit Strandrecht. Der 
ästhetische Imperativ in der ,Kunstperiodeʽ  (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag 1998), 136-137; Heinz Hamm, 
“Symbol,” in Ästhetische Grundbegriffe. Historisches Wörterbuch in sieben Bänden volume 5, Karlheinz 
Barck, Martin Fontius, Dieter Schlenstedt, Burckhart Steinwachs, and Friedrich Wolfzettel, Eds. (Stuttgart: 
Verlag J.B. Metzler, 2003), 805-839; S. Heidi Krueger, “Allegory and Symbol in the Goethezeit: A Critical 
Reassessment,” in The Age of Goethe Today: Critical Reexamination and Literary Reflection, Gertrud 
Bauer Pickar and Sabine Cramer, Eds. (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1990), 50-68; and Robert 
Stockhammer, “Symbol,” Goethe-Handbuch volume 4/2, Hans-Dietrich Dahnke and Regine Otto, Eds. 




without naming it explicitly as such, he clearly treats the Laocoon in a manner 
conforming to his later delineation of the symbolic.  Yet he unwittingly also reveals how 
the visual work of art may be read as precisely the representation of time in a manner 
operating contrary to aesthetic convention, even as a template for the sensual recognition 
of the historical particularity of the event. 
Some clarification of conceptual organization is in order at the outset.  The thrust 
of this chapter is an examination of the symbol as a visual category.  Of course the 
Goethean symbol is not an exclusively visual category, but also applies to verbal 
representation.  That said, as I will demonstrate, a visual dimension is retained even in the 
verbal symbolic.  Additionally, my argument centers on the persistence of time in a 
concept that otherwise often bespeaks the timeless or atemporal, and which at the same 
time functions as an idealized organizational corrective to the particular, the contingent, 
or the manifold of experience.  Time in this discourse figures variously as the experience 
of time, as history, as narrative, even as longing.  Thus, throughout this examination I 
will attempt to balance the visual, my primary focus, and its relation to time, in some 
instances alongside other organized conceptualizations of time and experience (epic and 
dramatic narrative, the sentimental); and always in contradistinction to varieties of 
empirical chaos that are the object of an aesthetic effort to control. 
 
Goethe: symbolic vision and the reduction of time 
Goethe’s concept of the symbol originates in what he initially refers to as a kind 
of sentimentality.  Goethe raises this issue of sentimentality in a letter written to Schiller 
during his travels through Frankfurt, the city of his youth, in August, 1797. 
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Ich habe indem ich meinen ruhigen und kalten Weg des Beobachtens, ja 
des bloßen Sehens ging, sehr bald bemerkt daß die Rechenschaft, die ich 
mir von gewissen Gegenständen gab, eine Art von Sentimentalität hatte, 
die mir dergestalt auffiel daß ich dem Grunde nachzudenken sogleich 
gereizt wurde und ich habe folgendes gefunden: das was ich im 
allgemeinen sehe und erfahre schließt sich recht gut an alles übrige an, 
was mir sonst bekannt ist und ist mir nicht unangenehm, weil es in der 




As I went along my way of calm and cold observation, indeed of mere 
seeing, I noticed very soon that my account of certain objects had a kind 
of sentimentality so striking to me that I was instantly moved to consider 
its cause, and I have found the following: what I generally see and 
experience connects quite well with everything else that is already familiar 
to me, and it is not unpleasant, because it accrues to the entire mass of my 
knowledge and helps to increase its capital. 
 
He suggests that the sentimental feeling aroused in him by objects he encounters owes to 
their connection to everything he already knows – as if these objects stimulate a psychic 
capital already in Goethe’s possession.  But this experience of connection also instigates 
a shift in Goethe’s mode of perception.  In his own words, he overcomes “calm and cold 
observation […] mere seeing” by discovering that what he sees has personal meaning to 
him, indeed that it somehow already may be accounted for in the sum of experiences that 
constitutes his knowledge.  This sentimental experience connects Goethe to the world 
around him. 
Yet, after some examination of the sentimental feeling aroused in him, he 
concludes that the objects are in fact symbolic. 
Ich habe daher die Gegenstände, die einen solchen Effekt hervorbringen, 
genau betrachtet und zu meiner Verwunderung bemerkt daß sie eigentlich 
symbolisch sind. Das heißt, wie ich kaum zu sagen brauche, es sind 
eminente Fälle, die, in einer charakteristischen Mannigfaltigkeit, als 
Repräsentanten von vielen andern dastehen, eine gewisse Totalität in sich 
schließen, eine gewisse Reihe fordern, ähnliches und fremdes in meinem 
                                                             
4Goethe to Schiller, August 16-17, 1797, FA, 31:388-389. 
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Geiste aufregen und so von außen wie von innen an eine gewisse Einheit 
und Allheit Anspruch machen.5
 
 
Thus, I closely observed the objects that elicit such an effect, and noticed 
to my astonishment that they are actually symbolic.  That means, as I 
hardly need say, they are eminent instances that, in a characteristic 
manifold, are present as representatives of many others, comprise a certain 
totality, summon a certain series, excite the similar and the strange in my 
spirit and thus, from without as from within, claim a certain oneness and 
allness. 
 
It is clear that the symbolic object is the material crystallization in a single instance of a 
type, the particular that contains the print of the general, indeed a mediator between the 
manifold and the ideal.  It is the present and “noticeable” (Goethe’s terms in the letter are 
genau betrachtet/bemerkt) representative of a totality.  Moreover, Goethe’s narration of 
his discovery of the symbolic object is a compelling example of such an object’s capacity 
to excite, as he notes: for in his descriptions of the sentimental and the symbolic he also 
narrates his own transformation from perceptive coldness to an empirical and cognitive 
emotion that entails a confusion of time (his customary cold observation is “soon” 
interrupted by the sentimental) and an ability to objectify mental processes (he is 
astonished to discover that the sentimental is actually the symbolic).  The symbolic 
implies a space of experience, constituted between Goethe and his intellectual, emotional, 
and physical objects, and a temporality of perception. 
The “space” (Raum) of his grandfather’s house, one of two examples Goethe 
provides in the letter, assumes symbolic significance through its capacity as a conduit for 
the experience of historical time.  Once the modest home of a Schultheiß, transformed by 
the industry of successive inhabitants into a market place and warehouse, eventually 
                                                             
5Goethe to Schiller, August 16-17, 1797, 389. 
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valued at several times its original worth, at the time of Goethe’s writing, the location is 
largely in ruins following a bombardment of the city by the French in 1796. 
In so fern sich nun denken läßt daß das Ganze wieder von einem neuen 
Unternehmer gekauft und hergestellt werde, so sehn Sie leicht daß es, in 
mehr als Einem Sinne, als Symbol vieler tausend andern Fälle, in dieser 
gewerbreichen Stadt, besonders vor meinem Anschauen, dastehen muß.6
 
 
To the extent we can imagine that the entire thing will be bought and 
restored by a new entrepreneur, you can easily see that it must stand there 
especially before my eyes in more than one sense, as a symbol of many 
thousand other instances in this industrious city. 
 
The house attains the status of symbol as a space suggesting the passage of time and 
resonating with personal experience; and even, technically speaking at least, as a spatial 
object that may be entered and investigated from within – much as the city of Frankfurt, 
where Goethe announces his initial awareness of the symbolic object, is a larger site of 
personal past and present experience.  Moreover, Goethe’s ability to read the site of his 
grandfather’s house symbolically owes to his own intuitive act (Anschauen – “viewing,” 
also “intuition”7), by virtue of which he is able to penetrate beyond the site’s present 
condition to imagine it objectively as residing at the juncture of past and future and 
within a nexus of commercial and productive activity (“in dieser gewerbreichen Stadt” – 
“in this industrious city”) suggesting regeneration and motion across space.8
                                                             
6Goethe to Schiller, August 16-17, 1797, 390. 
 
7I have chosen to translate “meinem Anschauen” as “my eyes” in the quoted passage largely in order to 
render it more fluidly in English.  I mean it in the sense of “my eyesight, my viewing.”  
8 Heinz Schlaffer discusses these passages at length and, leveraging his argument on their implicit 
observation of the transformative processes of industrialization and the proliferation of abstract exchange 
value, concludes that Goethe’s symbolic ruminations indicate a willful regression to a classical poetics 
severed from modern experience.  He reads in the attempt to formulate a symbolic category the latent 
operations of the allegorical, which, he believes, Goethe brings to open fruition only decades later in Faust 
II as a general commentary on the historical and economic transformations bridging the 18th and 19th 
centuries.  See Heinz Schlaffer, Faust zweiter Teil. Die Allegorie des 19. Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart: J.B. 
Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1981), 1-38.  For my part, I wonder whether a reading is secure that 
takes the ambivalences and unrevised theorizations of Goethe’s transformative symbolic experience in 
Frankfurt more or less sincerely at their word with little recourse to Goethe’s subsequent attempts to work 
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In this initial incarnation, the symbol is a device for organization and 
concentration.  Goethe immediately concludes that in future it will be worth the 
experimental effort to pay attention not merely to remarkable or curious (merkwürdig) 
objects, but rather to significant (bedeutend) objects, objects pointing to something else; 
and that these latter ones seem to reconcile that contradiction that had reigned between 
his own nature and immediate experience – indeed, that the symbolic dimension of 
objects promises to render them as so many illuminating guideposts to the profound 
meaning at the basis of the empirical chaos of the world (in his letter Goethe resorts to 
the aggressive expression “der millionfachen Hydra der Empirie” – “the million-headed 
hydra of the empirical”).9
This symbolic object, moreover, has emerged from sentimental experience.  
Indeed, the initial determination “sentimental” reveals a significant temporal register to 
the symbolic.  In Schiller’s response to Goethe, for example, he declares Goethe’s to be a 
case of a sentimental manner of feeling or experiencing the world (sentimentalische 
Empfindungsweise), the very example of what the two had previously been discussing.
  The symbolic object functions for Goethe not merely as a 
point of concentration of sentimental energy, even as its resolution; but also as the long 
desired principle by which to organize the manifold of experience. 
10
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the experience into an aesthetic category.  Moreover, as I will argue, the rejection of the instability of 
modern experience is more or less the point of Goethe’s category of the symbol. 
  
Additionally, Schiller observes that the significance of the object resides rather in the 
mind (Gemüth) receptive to meaning, not in the object itself.  Indeed, whereas Goethe 
moves from the sentimental to the symbolic, Schiller develops his concept of the 
sentimental from a theory of the symbol.  Yet this otherwise rather topographical 
9Goethe to Schiller, August 16-17, 1797, 390-91. 
10Schiller to Goethe, September 7-8, 1797, WuB, 12:318. 
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distinction marks the beginning of an increasing reduction in the temporality of Goethe’s 
symbol. 
Schiller had written of the “symbolic act” in his 1794 review of the landscape 
poetry of Friedrich Matthisson. 11   His review is preceded by an exposition of the 
phenomenon of the poetic treatment of nature as an object possessing an interior life and 
purposiveness, as beseelte Natur (“animated nature”), and he wonders why the ancients 
had no such poetry.  His conclusion is that the ancients did not poetize the natural world 
because they did not perceive in it the same operations of necessity and purposiveness 
they observed in the human world.  The argument of the later Über naive und 
sentimentalische Dichtung (On Naive and Sentimental Poetry) is anticipated ex negativo: 
Schiller distinguishes between the ancient and modern poetic perceptions of nature, yet 
does not explain why the moderns persist in their investment of nature with the interior 
life, experience, and purposiveness of the human soul.  He merely explains how the 
moderns accomplish this through the concept of the symbolic act.  In the symbolic act the 
poet renders the incomprehensible and closed natural world with a unity and necessity 
that it seems to lack, thereby elevating the aesthetic dignity of nature and (by suggesting a 
harmonization between the operations of nature and those of human reason) providing 
moral pleasure.  Schiller’s terms are both Symbol (and the related symbolisierend and 
Symbolik) and variants of Sinn (versinnlichen, Sinnbild – these latter containing the 
German root Sinn, “sense”).12
                                                             
11Friedrich Schiller, Über Matthissons Gedichte [1794], SW, 5:992-1011. 
  His vocabulary underscores the nature of the operation he 
describes as the active investment (“vermittelst jenes symbolischen Akts – “by means of 
that symbolic act”) of material and sensual experience with symbolic import, the creation 
12See for example Schiller, Über Matthissons Gedichte, 998-1000. 
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of a class of objects that will resonate sensually with our own expectations and thereby 
allow the mind to construct its own bridge to a natural world charged by human 
intellectual and emotional need.  
Schiller omits the symbolic act, and therewith also its sensual register, to focus 
rather on humanity’s investment in the concept of the natural in Über naive und 
sentimentalische Dichtung.  Written in 1795/96, this treatise is directly referenced in the 
August-September 1797 correspondence with Goethe.  The naive, as Schiller determines 
it, is the natural, the unaffected, the honest.  The sentimental is not the opposite of the 
naive – rather, the naive distinguishes itself from the artificial, the cultivated, the 
restrictive forces culture brings to bear upon the individual.  The sentimental is the 
quality of awareness of a lost natural state.  Schiller’s language invests sentimental 
perception with a consciousness not merely of time past, but of time initiated (in the 
development of civilization over the course of historical time) and of lost timelessness: 
Wir sehen alsdann in der unvernünftigen Natur nur eine glücklichere 
Schwester, die in dem mütterlichen Hause zurückblieb, aus welchem wir 
im Übermut unserer Freiheit heraus in die Fremde stürmten. Mit 
schmerzlichem Verlangen sehnen wir uns dahin zurück, sobald wir 
angefangen, die Drangsale der Kultur zu erfahren, und hören im fernen 
Auslande der Kunst der Mutter rührende Stimme. Solange wir bloße 
Naturkinder waren, waren wir glücklich und vollkommen; wir sind frei 
geworden und haben beides verloren. Daraus entspringt eine doppelte und 
sehr ungleiche Sehnsucht nach der Natur; eine Sehnsucht nach ihrer 
Glückseligkeit, eine Sehnsucht nach ihrer Vollkommenheit.13
 
 
We see then in irrational nature only a happier sister who has remained in 
the maternal house from which we stormed away with the excessive 
courage of our freedom.  We long painfully to return the moment we begin 
to experience the pressures of civilization, and in the distant country of art 
we hear the moving voice of our mother.  As long as we were merely 
children of nature, we were happy and complete; we became free, and we 
have lost both.  Here originates our two-fold yet very imbalanced longing 
for nature: a longing for its happiness, a longing for its completion. 
                                                             




Schiller is skeptical regarding the possibility of a return to this lost natural state.  What 
modern humanity has lost in terms of its connection to nature, and which is otherwise 
meagerly compensated for by an obsessive adherence to “the natural,” it will rather 
regain and surpass in its drive toward the ideal.  Indeed, Schiller argues that humanity 
post naturam is essentially in constant motion toward the unreachable goal of an ideal 
that consists in the reconstruction of lost natural experience and its reintegration into 
human existence.  In contrast to the Greeks, whose eventual decline followed their 
complete, indeed unsurpassable, integration of human nature and social structure, the 
moderns have lost this initial relationship to nature.  The search for this lost ideal is now 
the lawful lot of modern humanity and guarantees its historical progress.14
 For Schiller the symbolic act is but one consequence of humanity’s perceived 
distance from and therefore affective relationship with nature.  He subsumes the act 
within a broader theoretical scheme in which the operative terms are of perceived 
movement through time away from the source of meaning and at the same time toward 
the unlikely rediscovery of this source.  Indeed, in Über naive und sentimentalische 
Dichtung he refers not to the symbol even as an affective construction but rather to the 
heterogeneity and strangeness of the sign with regard to its intended signified; or, by 
contrast, in the case of naive expression, he refers to the sign’s disappearance in the 
signified – even the basic elements of meaning underpinning the discourse of experience 
are in motion, either radically displaced or else vanishing.
 
15
                                                             
14Schiller, Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung, 718. 
  Following this, Schiller’s 
15“Wenn dort das Zeichen dem Bezeichneten ewig heterogen und fremd bleibt” and, further, of the naive 
means of expression, “Eine solche Art des Ausdrucks, wo das Zeichen ganz in dem Bezeichneten 
verschwindet, und wo die Sprache den Gedanken, den sie ausdrückt, noch gleichsam nackend läßt.”  
Schiller, Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung, 706. 
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critique of Goethe’s sentimental experience (in their August-September correspondence) 
centers less on the site of his grandfather’s house as a stable referential object and more 
on Goethe’s own act of symbolic recognition as the sentimental awareness of loss. 
Their different uses of the shared image of the house underscores marked 
differences in Goethe’s and Schiller’s approaches to the symbolic and sentimental.  For 
Schiller writes of a departure from the home in nature, and of a subsequent longing to 
return home played out in the exile of Kunst, to be read as civilization or culture in an 
often negative sense, but of course also as art.  Schiller thus discerns foremost in the 
realm of poetry the cleft between sign and signified, representational mechanism and 
meaning, which refigures a distance from natural origins.  It is telling that Schiller’s 
reference in Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung is to a metaphorical home, for he 
identifies (and perhaps himself enacts) the sentimental essentially as a perceived over-
arching human condition arising in an awareness of time past and unrecoverable – there 
is no home, merely the suspicion of an origin in nature rendered metaphorically as the 
wrongfully, even unnaturally abandoned mother’s house.  Goethe, by contrast, has indeed 
returned home – to a real (if no longer standing) paternal home, the leaving which is not 
problematized – in an act of completion occasioning in Goethe’s mind the reflection on a 
variety of empirical representation that bespeaks universality.  The resultant symbolic 
object, the endpoint of a sentimental voyage, is the material site of the house as visual 
sign of the universal.  Time, however, figured as the personal and recent history of the 
house and its site, is compressed into the moment of its apprehension and then distributed 
across the space of the city: “so sehn Sie leicht,” he writes to Schiller, “daß es, in mehr 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
In English: “If the sign remains eternally heterogenous and strange to the signified,”and “Such a 
manner of expression, in which the sign disappears entirely in the signified, and where language leaves still 
naked, as it were, the thought it expresses.” 
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als Einem Sinne, als Symbol vieler tausend andern Fälle, in dieser gewerbreichen Stadt, 
besonders vor meinem Anschauen, dastehen muß” (“you can easily see that it must stand 
there especially before my eyes in more than one sense, as a symbol of many thousand 
other instances in this industrious city” – my emphasis).16
What constitutes this moment of symbolic perception?  Foremost, it is a visual 
moment: Goethe’s intuition of the site of the house as symbolically representative of 
space and time arises from his seeing the site itself.  Indeed, a certain visual imperative 
lurks in Goethe’s statement that the site “als Symbol vieler tausend andern Fälle, in dieser 
gewerbreichen Stadt, besonders vor meinem Anschauen, dastehen muß” (“must stand 
there especially before my eyes […] as a symbol of many thousand other instances in this 
industrious city”).
  The history of the particular 
house becomes exemplary of a type of house and a type of experience existing in an 
immediately perceptible symbolic manifold.  Goethe’s symbolic object crystallizes 
through the concentration of time and space in the moment, and presents the personal 
intuition (“meinem Anschauen” – “my eyes”) with the opportunity for a penetration to an 
ideal infinity that transcends time and the individual (“vieler tausend andern Fälle” – 
“many thousand other instances”).  It renders its own moment of perception as a 
particular manifestation of eternity. 
17
                                                             
16Goethe to Schiller, August 16-17, 1797, 390.   
  Moreover, the imperative of this symbolic vision resides in its 
capacity to provide Goethe some respite from the confusion of the empirical: for the 
symbol represents a series.  Goethe’s choice of words is striking: “vieler tausend andern 
Fälle” (“many thousand other instances”) – the single symbolic instance absorbs and 
equalizes the variegations of empirical detail and reissues them in a characteristic, 
17Goethe to Schiller, August 16-17, 1797, 390. 
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general type; the symbolic viewer is thus not obliged to tarry in a world of competing 
signs and details. 18
Finally, the moment of symbolic perception is material.  It requires, in this 
particular case, that Goethe see the physical remains of destruction at a site to which he is 
emotionally connected.  The materiality of the site even threatens to undo Goethe’s 
symbolic transformation of his experience into a glimpse into the universal.  For, he 
wants to see the site as an instance of the promise of cyclical regeneration, a process that 
would override the destructive process that has produced the ruin.  And yet, his symbolic 
desire is entirely activated by material remains that are themselves the product of another 
process, the destructive capacity of war.  To be sure, Goethe’s vision of regeneration 
comprises a history of development, exchange, revaluation, replacement, expansion – 
what began as the grandfather’s house figures now symbolically as an energy drawn from 
the entire city and beyond, multiple particular histories of development.  Yet just as 
Goethe articulates his experience as symbolic, he gathers this diffuse energy and history 
  Indeed, in a striking reversal of Schiller’s understanding of the 
sentimental as a longing fleshed out over time, Goethe’s symbolic experience resides in a 
sidestepping of the destruction of Frankfurt to arrive immediately at the resolution of the 
historically particular in a generic, even quasi-cyclical regeneration – the son returns to a 
paternal home.  In symbolic visual experience, time and particularity are stripped of their 
own informative immanence and reduced to the level of the accessory or merely 
circumstantial, a veneer of the particular still clinging to the universal. 
                                                             
18My understanding of the symbolic, as well as the sentimental, and even (below) Meyer’s semiotics also as 
a mechanism for the management of, and foremost for the suppression of the detail as element of the 
empirical, owes to a reading of Naomi Schor’s Reading in Detail – specifically the chapter “Gender: In the 
Academy,” in which she demonstrates the progressive banishment of what she regards as the feminized 
detail in the 18th-century theorization of Neo-Classicism.  See Naomi Schor, Reading in Detail: Aesthetics 
and the Feminine (New York: Routledge, 1989).  
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into asingle material remain.  Symbolic experience is also an act of condensation of 
infinite particularity into a single object that catches the attention and activates the 
sentimental imagination of the beholder.  Strangely, Goethe’s investment of the ruined 
site with symbolic import is an ambiguous act of holding on to the object at a moment at 
a very particular and materially specific moment in time in order to then remove it from 
time and disregard its particular, time-sensitive materiality.  The symbolic experience is 
freighted with an anxiety about the transitory integrity of the material. 
In subsequent correspondence the symbol develops from a device for the 
organization of experience to an aesthetic category.  Indeed, in the weeks following their 
August exchange, Goethe’s and Schiller’s discussion of the symbolic is interwoven with 
the question into the determination of appropriate objects for poetic or visual 
representation, out of which the symbol emerges as a specialized category operative 
across genres.  To Goethe’s apparent despair at modern artists’ consistent failure to 
choose their objects properly, Schiller responds on September 14 and 15 that the problem 
is indeed one of the bleeding together of the distinct spheres of visual and poetic 
representation; and that the modern poet, in the effort both to surpass a mere realism and 
yet also to remain within the bounds of the sensual, should best follow the example of the 
ancients, whose ability to reduce the empirical to the aesthetic stemmed from their very 
nature – an operation Schiller calls “absolute determination of the object” (absolute 
Bestimmung des Objects).19
                                                             
19Schiller to Goethe, September 14-15, 1797, WuB, 12:321-22. 
  Schiller then sketches a brief poetics for the selection of the 




So scheint mir der Begriff deßen, was man einen praegnanten Moment 
nennt sich vollkommen durch seine Qualification zu einer durchgängig 
bestimmten Darstellung zu erklären. Ich weiß in der poetischen Gattung 
keinen treffendern Fall als Ihren Herrmann [Goethe’s Hermann und 
Dorothea – MA]. Hier würde sich vielleicht durch eine Art von Induction 




The concept of that which one calls a pregnant moment seems to me to 
lend itself perfectly, by virtue of its qualification, for a thoroughly 
determined representation.  I know no more accurate instance in the genre 
of poetry than your Herrmann [Goethe’s Hermann und Dorothea – MA].  
Here it might be possible to demonstrate, through a kind of induction, that 
with any other choice of plot something would have remained 
undetermined. 
 
Schiller then builds upon this proposition (Satz): “Verbindet man mit diesem Satz nun 
den andern, daß die Bestimmung des Gegenstandes jedesmal durch die Mittel geschehen 
muß, welche einer Kunstgattung eigen sind” (“One should now join this proposition to 
the other, that the determination of the object must in every case occur through the media 
appropriate for a genre of art”).  His two components for the choice of the appropriate 
object are thus: that the object be determined with reference to the means or medium of 
its representation (an exterior determination of aesthetic treatment); and that it be 
determined with reference to its aestheticization – the reduction of the empirical 
particularity of the object and its situation at a specific moment in time.  The rendering 
aesthetic of the object is an act analogous to the naming of the symbolic object in the 
Goethean sense: the material object becomes typical of the universal, elevated above the 
real yet still within the bounds of the sensual, a presence bespeaking the inaccessible.  It 
is also infused with the very specific temporality of the pregnant moment, such that it is 
now also situated at an immediately perceptible and critical moment in time that bridges 
past and future.  As an aesthetic category, the symbol has diminished radically in terms of 
                                                             
20Schiller to Goethe, September 14-15, 1797, 322-23. 
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its initial temporal resonance, and is now placed within a temporality bound by the 
dictates of an idealized representation. 
 As an idealized aesthetic category, the symbol operates at a nexus of 
communicative demands.  Its attendant questions concern how much of the particular 
context surrounding the symbolic needs to be known, and how much is already gathered 
into the tight embrace of the symbol.  The extent of the reduction of the temporal varies 
between verbal and visual poetics.  In fact, their correspondence on object and genre, in 
which the discourse on the symbol is couched, draws also from Goethe’s and Schiller’s 
own contemporary works, including the jointly composed essay Über epische und 
dramatische Dichtung (On Epic and Dramatic Poetry, 1797) and Goethe’s recently 
completed epic poem Hermann und Dorothea (Hermann and Dorothea – to which 
Schiller refers in the correspondence – “your Herrmann”).  In a later letter to Schubarth, 
Goethe wrote of the poem: “Alles, was geschieht, ist Symbol und indem es vollkommen 
sich selbst darstellt, deutet es auf das Übrige”  (“Everything that happens is a symbol, and 
by representing itself completely it refers to the rest”).21  The poem casts a love story, 
between the son of an innkeeper and a refugee from the French occupation of the west 
bank of the Rhine, within the double context of world events (the French Revolutionary 
Wars) and the idyll of bürgerlich life in the German small town.22
                                                             
21Goethe to Schubart, April 2, 1818, excerpted in “Nachwort zu ,Hermann und Dorothea ʽ,” in Goethe, W, 
2:747. 
  That Dorothea, a 
refugee, is welcomed by Hermann’s family as his future wife, thereby also putting an end 
to argument between Hermann and his father, suggests that the destructive power of 
phenomenal historical events is resolved through the more fundamental strength of 
22In fact, Goethe referred to the work early as a “bürgerliche Idylle” and claimed after its completion that it 
combined elements of the epic and the drama.  See Goethe to Schiller, early July 1796, excerpted in 
Goethe, W, 2:734; and Goethe to Schiller, December 23, 1797, FA, 31:464-467. 
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Heimat, cyclical family life, the passage of authority from one generation to the next, the 
first experience of love.23
 Indeed, world history is significantly removed to the background in Hermann und 
Dorothea, figuring largely in the presence and reports of refugees who, with the 
exception of Dorothea, do not even enter the town in which much of the work is set.  Yet 
a significant historical dynamic remains at the core of the work.  To follow Goethe’s 
(admittedly much belated) remark: everything that happens in the work is symbol; thus, 
the interaction between the town (the scene of tradition and a relative timelessness) and 
the refugees is the site of that mediation between the particular and the universal where 
  Indeed, in this light the symbol figures rather more as the 
successful avoidance of the particular details of context.  We can instructively compare 
Goethe’s own experience in Frankfurt: destruction is overcome through a symbol 
bespeaking a process of regeneration, even hope, understood as universal.  As it happens, 
Goethe bases the story of Hermann und Dorothea on an account of the expulsion of 
Protestants from the city of Salzburg in the early 1730s.  His choice to restage the story in 
his own time, against the often distant backdrop of events all too familiar, suggests an 
exercise in the symbolic control of the particularity of temporal context at a moment of 
extreme historical pressure – he has chosen to relocate a historical account in his own 
time, and therewith to make obvious the shift in the historical context occurring in the 
background of the love story, but also to keep this context at a distance. 
                                                             
23Recent work on Hermann und Dorothea stresses that its apparent celebration of Heimat and Bürgertum is 
to be understood ironically and critically as the poetic depiction of tradition undergoing change; likewise as 
Goethe’s attempt to render contemporary the Homeric epic by using it as a form to parody other specimens 
of German epic and idyllic literature.  See for example the commentary on Goethe’s epic, FA, 8:1124-
1169; and Peter Morgan, The Critical Idyll: Traditional Values and the French Revolution in Goethe’s 
Hermann und Dorothea (Columbia: Camden House, 1990). 
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Goethe locates the symbol.  Goethe writes to Schiller in December, 1797, in an 
enumeration of the epic and dramatic qualities of the work: 
Daß es aus der dritten Welt, ob gleich nicht auffallend, noch immer genug 
Einfluß empfangen hat, indem das große Weltschicksal teils wirklich, teils 
durch Personen, symbolisch, eingeflochten ist und von Ahndung, von 
Zusammenhang einer sichtbaren und unsichtbaren Welt doch auch leise 
Spuren angegeben sind, welches zusammen nach meiner Überzeugung an 
die Stelle der alten Götterbilder tritt, deren physischpoetische Gewalt 
freilich dadurch nicht ersetzt wird.24
 
 
That it has been, if not obviously, still sufficiently influenced by the third 
world, in that the great fate of the world is woven in, partly real, partly 
through characters, symbolically, and slight traces are given of the 
apprehension, of the coherence of a visible and an invisible world – which, 
I am convinced, steps altogether into the role of the old images of the 
gods, whose physical-poetic force is of course not replaced. 
 
The “third world,” a concept drawn from Über epische und dramatische Dichtung, is the 
world of fantasy, apparition, or fate that may be portrayed in the epic or drama.25
                                                             
24Goethe to Schiller, December 23, 1797, FA, 31:466.  
  The 
third world of Hermann und Dorothea is world history, an invisible world rendered 
visible in the presence of refugees on the Rhine’s eastern bank – the poem’s sign for 
historical time figures as an eruption into timelessness, refugees entering the Heimat, and 
also as that which must be seen.  Accordingly the refugees are treated as spectacle.  The 
symbolic dimension of the work is nourished in this curiosity about and attraction to the 
spectacle of the invisible made visible, by the energy generated between town and 
refugees. 
25The passage in its entirety reads: “Die Welt der Phantasien, Ahnungen, Erscheinungen, Zufälle und 
Schicksale. Diese steht beiden [epic and dramatic poetry] offen, nur versteht sich, daß sie an die sinnliche 
herangebracht werde; wobei denn für die Modernen eine besondere Schwierigkeit entsteht, weil wir für die 
Wundergeschöpfe, Götter, Wahrsager und Orakel der Alten, so sehr es zu wünschen wäre, nicht leicht 
Ersatz finden.”  The first and second worlds are the natural and physical, respectively.  Goethe and Schiller, 
Über epische und dramatische Dichtung [1797], W, 12:250-251. 
In English: “The world of fantasies, forebodings, appearances, coincidences and destinies.  This is 
open to both [epic and dramatic poetry], but it is understood that they should approximate the sensual; 
whereby a particular difficulty ensures for the moderns, because we do not easily find a replacement for the 
miraculous creations, the gods, the prophets and oracles of the ancients, however much we might wish it.” 
40 
 
The visibility of the verbal symbol, its resonance as spectacle, is inflected with 
modes of temporality.  Goethe and Schiller work this out in Über epische und 
dramatische Dichtung in terms of the space and time of the poetic narrative – with 
particular reference to an audience whose experience is theoretically entirely dictated by 
the generic potential of epic and drama.  The drama is the form of the event as it occurs; 
poet and audience are immediately implicated as historical actors and witnesses – the 
poet is described as a Mime (actor) – and the audience’s imagination and intellection are 
displaced by sensual and emotional participation.  The epic is the form of the event as 
past; the poet, removed but in control, opens its narrative space to the audience for a more 
leisurely imaginative examination.  Moreover, both genres permit a narrative structure 
that may move within and beyond whatever series of events serves as the work’s 
foundation – narrative may move around its object, not merely alongside it.  The verbal 
symbolic of Hermann und Dorothea consists in the confrontation with and commentary 
on the spectacle of unfolding historical events, the effects of which resonate sensually 
from the traumatic report of the refugee to the quaint conversation over glasses of Rhine 
wine – a temporal resonance echoing against successive levels of remove, spectatorship, 
and experience.  This verbal symbol is freighted, on the level of the witness/beholder 
within and the audience outside the narrative, with both the experience of vision and also 
the nuances of temporal experience – the pregnant moment to which Schiller referred is 
expanded, its internal dynamics explored from within. 
These layers of visually mediated temporal experience that remain in verbal 
genres are reduced considerably in the visual symbol.  Goethe initially works out the 
concept of a specifically visual symbolic representation in his brief 1797 sketch Über die 
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Gegenstände der bildenden Kunst (On the Objects of the Visual Arts).  Here he details 
classes of appropriate objects for visual representation (the natural, the ideal, the series, 
the symbolic) and the proper methods for handling them.  The object’s self-determination 
through its own sensual presence (sinnliches Dasein) is the most advantageous criterion 
for visual representation; the ideal object is the highest of the advantageous objects, for it 
is stripped of its natural particularities and offered as a depiction of the universal.  
Furthermore, this ideal object does not become a work of art through treatment 
(Bearbeitung); rather, the ideal object confronts the receptive artist as an already fully or 
perfectly formed object (“der Bearbeitung schon als ein vollkommen gebildeter 
Gegenstand entgegen geht”). 26   The ideal object is thus already an eminently visual 
object.  “Das Erfordernis dieser ganzen Classe ist, daß sie sich beim ersten Anschauen 
sowohl im Ganzen als in ihren Theilen selbst erkläre” (“The requirement of this entire 
class is that they declare themselves in whole and in part at the first viewing”) – the 
object presents itself to the artist, as the individual instance fully embodying the type; 
even as a type existing in perfect proportion to an eternal whole, as its own parts 
constitute a harmonious whole.27
 Goethe emphasizes a self-contained and self-communicative capacity in the 
object.  The communication between artist and object depends upon the artist’s intuitive 
response to the discrete and suggestive sensual presence of the object, be it natural or 
  Sensual self-determination requires, then, in the best 
possible instance, that the object be inherently suited to visual representation through its 
immediate material universality – a quality recognized by the artist through intuition.  
The symbolic results when the artist responds properly to such an object. 
                                                             
26Goethe, Über die Gegenstände der bildenden Kunst [1797], WA I, 47:92. 
27Goethe, Über die Gegenstände der bildenden Kunst, 92. 
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ideal.  The resulting work of art functions visually and immediately (“beim ersten 
Anschauen” – “at the first viewing”) as a self-contained unit.  Yet the series of objects 
poses a problem, for the individual unit threatens to remain incomprehensible without 
exterior contextual explication.  The immediately intuitable unity of the natural or ideal is 
lacking, and symbolic visual representation of time is thus difficult, if not impossible. 
 With the series, Goethe clearly has in mind historical representation in the generic 
sense: history, myth, story – the narrative series of actions.  Their representation 
problematically defies his fundamental dictum of self-determination through sensual 
presence because each “object” relies on others and the constituent parts threaten the 
desired effect of self-containment and self-communication in the whole.  Goethe admits 
the possibility of the cycle, however, provided that it remain unified in its variation on the 
theme of a single quality or affect – his example is the depiction of Apollo and the Muses 
or Niobe and her children, each a whole comprising parts linked thematically.  Likewise, 
he concedes two possibilities for the series of actions.  The first is the basis of the bas 
relief, the series of actions that will retain its interest or appeal only through its complete 
representation.  His examples – “wie z. B. die Thaten des Herkules oder von Theilen 
einer Handlung, wie z. B. eines Bacchanals” (“as for example the deeds of Hercules or of 
parts of an action, as for example of a bacchanal”) – suggest that the series is successful 
as historical representation either through its concentration on a discrete, typical event 
(the bacchanal) or by being well known and thematically unified (the deeds of Hercules).  
Indeed, this latter criterion – being well known and thematically unified – provides the 
sole justification for a critical issue, the representation of the single historical event, the 
moment in time.  For Goethe cites as the other possibility those objects “die durch Fabel 
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oder Geschichte allgemein bekannt sind” (“which are generally known from fable or 
history”).28
 The possibilities for a symbolic historical representation – for a visual 
representation of time – are thus harshly circumscribed by Goethe.  Foremost, as we have 
seen, the object should determine itself through its own sensual presence.  Likewise, the 
imagination is excluded from the particular poetry (Dichtung) of visual representation: 
for the visual artist is not the poet who works with the imagination; rather, the visual 
artist presents complete objects that require no imaginative reception.  Goethe’s 
comparison between symbol and allegory at the end of his sketch is instructive in this 
regard: the object rendered allegorically is not appropriate for visual representation 
precisely because it performs its work of representation or reference indirectly (Goethe’s 
term is indirekt bezeichnen – “to denote/indicate/identify indirectly”) – the imagination or 
the intellect must unfold the complex connection between allegorical object and 
  The example is the single deed of Hercules on a carved stone, meaningless to 
anyone lacking knowledge of the entire story, yet the beholder would likely know this 
particular story.  Goethe’s various rules and examples indicate that for him the receptive 
intuition is threatened by the object that unfolds over time, the overriding criterion being 
the capacity of the object to enunciate, express, or explain itself clearly and immediately.  
The accompanying conclusion is that the historical object, the object in time, cannot 
convey its meaning sensually, and thus it cannot ever attain to the symbolic unless the 
temporal is reduced to a secondary status or its particularity is vetted by common 
knowledge.  The (controlled) temporal modes of Hermann und Dorothea are absent in a 
visual object that permits no penetration and expansion of its moment; the temporal 
energy of the visual image is stilled. 
                                                             




 Yet Goethe’s conclusions concerning the reduced possibilities for a visual 
representation of history bring him strikingly close to his point of departure in the 
temporally charged encounter with the site of his grandfather’s house.  His original 
experience was a visual encounter with a grand sweep of time gathered into the material 
object; in his subsequent reflections this temporal charge was quickly reduced from the 
personal, resonating between Goethe and the site of the house (“meinem Anschauen” – 
“my eyes”), and the immanent, retained in the history of the house; to the generic, as 
accessory to an idealized object of regeneration (“vieler tausend andern Fälle” – “many 
thousand other instances”).  And the necessary temporal fluidity and reflexivity of the 
epic symbolic is absent – reflection on the visual apprehension of time occurs only long 
enough for the symbol to assert itself to the intuition.  Thereafter, time as contingent, as a 
matter of personal experience, as destruction, as particular, has vanished into a history at 
the fringes of the visual work of art.  This latter, the visual work of art, becomes the focus 
of an aesthetic apprehension that foremost generates receptive pleasure in sensual 
presence. 
  The symbol communicates directly to the senses of its beholder, thereby 
cutting short the otherwise necessary intellectual travel through the various particulars of 
interpretation; the allegory draws the beholder intellectually into its meaning outside of 
the material bounds of the work, and thus away from the work as visual presence.  
Goethe’s argument tends toward the reduction of aesthetic experience to a single moment 
of visual communication.  The resulting effect upon the historical object is its own 
reduction from narrative to instance, or its reification from specific event to type of event. 
 
                                                             
29Goethe, Über die Gegenstände der bildenden Kunst, 94-95. 
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Meyer: visual objects and the semiotics of the moment 
Goethe lent his unpublished 1797 sketch to Johann Heinrich Meyer, whose own 
expanded version – the longer 1798 treatise also titled Über die Gegenstände der 
bildenden Kunst (On the Objects of the Visual Arts) – was published in their journal 
Propyläen and became the theoretical, and controversially received, foundation for the 
Weimarer Preisaufgaben, competitions for visual artists that lasted from 1799 to 1805. 
Meyer’s work has been regarded as a dogmatic schematization and confounding 
of Goethe’s more fluid thinking on the nature of the visual object and its aesthetic 
treatment. 30
                                                             
30 Helmut Pfotenhauer’s helpful essay “Weimar Classicism as Visual Culture” is an example of the 
tendency to treat Goethe and Meyer as of a piece in their thinking, perhaps still as part of a tradition of 
looking at Meyer largely in the shadow of Goethe.  Paul Weizsäcker argues already in 1886 for a 
reevaluation of Meyer’s  contribution to Goethe’s work on the arts, yet within an interpretive scheme that 
still consigns Meyer the artist to secondary status in an intellectual history oriented toward the reception of 
“Litteraturdenkmale” – see Heinrich Meyer, Kleine Schriften zur Kunst, Paul Weizsäcker, Ed. (Heilbronn: 
Verlag von Gebr. Henninger, 1886), iii-li.  With his own study of the Weimarer Preisaufgaben, Walther 
Scheidig represents the extreme of this tradition by regarding Meyer’s work as excessively pedantic, 
lacking in original insight, and even a cause of some embarrassment to Goethe.  See Walther Scheidig, 
Goethes Preisaufgaben für bildende Künstler (Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1958).  In an essay 
in Goethe und die Kunst Ernst Osterkamp provides a more measured assessment that remains critical yet 
not damning of Meyer – see “‘Aus dem Gesichtspunkt reiner Menschlichkeit.’ Goethes Preisaufgaben für 
bildende Künstler 1799-1805,” in Goethe und die Kunst, Sabine Schulze, Ed. (Stuttgart: Verlah Gerd Hatje, 
1994), 310-322.  A productive reading of the Goethe-Meyer relationship, in which the two are cast as equal 
participants in the aesthetic project of Weimar Classicism, is Martin Dönike’s Pathos, Ausdruck und 
Bewegung. 
  To be sure, he translates Goethe’s representational distinctions into an 
extensive and seemingly rigid categorization of objects – the advantageous, the 
indifferent, and the resistant (vorteilhaft, gleichgültig, widerstrebend) – within which he 
works out a strict hierarchization of genres with critical recourse to noteworthy, if not 
always exemplary, works from antiquity through the Renaissance.  But the differences 
between Goethe and Meyer (and the perceived lapses in logic in the organization of the 
latter’s work) may be read also as commentary on the potential and limitations of 
symbolic visual representation, and most productively in terms of the representation of 
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time.  Indeed, after Goethe drives the visual experience of time into the temporally 
limited aesthetic of the visual symbol, Meyer indicates the possibility of recuperating the 
temporality of this idealized visual experience through an aesthetic centered precisely on 
clarity in visual communication, entailing different possibilities for the representation of 
time. 
Goethe had declared that one demands from the visual arts “deutliche, klare, 
bestimmte Darstellungen” (“distinct, clear, determined depictions”).31
Man fordert von einem jeden Kunstwerke, daß es ein Ganzes für sich 
ausmache, und von einem Werke der bildenden Kunst besonders, daß es 
sich selbst ganz ausspreche. Es muß unabhängig sein, die vorgestellte 
Handlung, der Gegenstand muß, im Wesentlichen, ohne äußere Beihülfe, 
ohne Nebenerklärung, die man aus einem Dichter oder Geschichtschreiber 
schöpfen müßte, gefaßt und verstanden werden.
  Meyer goes a step 




One demands from every work of art that it should constitute a whole for 
itself; and especially from a work of the visual arts that it express itself 
entirely.  It must be independent, the presented action, the object must in 
essence be grasped and understood without exterior help, without the 
additional explanation that one would have to acquire from a poet or 
writer of history. 
 
Meyer at once foregrounds the imperative of an autonomous communicative capacity to 
the visual work of art.  The rigorously reduced status of time accompanying this 
autonomous communication becomes clearer in Meyer’s strict categorical organization 
and hierarchization of objects for visual representation.  To sketch this briefly: within the 
realm of the “advantageous” (vorteilhaft) objects we progress from the naturalism of the 
purely human depiction (rein menschliche Darstellungen) to one of a more universal 
                                                             
31Goethe, Über die Gegenstände der bildenden Kunst, 92.   
32Johann Heinrich Meyer, Über die Gegenstände der bildenden Kunst [1798], in Klassik und Klassizismus, 




character through the introduction of action and history.  But history (historische 
Darstellungen) tends to resist or expand beyond the limits of visual self-expression and is 
thus either best avoided or, interestingly, reduced to the action as attribute that serves the 
clearer depiction of character (Charakterbild).  Once part of the narrative of historical 
depiction, the action becomes the moment, and history becomes a chain of moments that 
clarify universal human experience.  With the symbolic object, the highest in the category 
of the advantageous, we have the concept rendered in sensual form – action, if it is 
present, is entirely an attribute inhering in the depicted object.  Story as an object for 
visual depiction is gone.33
Wilhelm von Humboldt’s response to the published treatise, in a 1799 letter to 
Goethe, generates a productive reconsideration of the status of time in Meyer’s thought.  
Humboldt avers that the criteria for visual historical representation, as laid down by 
Meyer, are perhaps too rigid.  He writes: 
 
Nur weiß ich nicht, ob Sie nicht in Rücksicht der historischen ein wenig zu 
streng urteilen, wenn Sie verlangen, daß sie zugleich von den Motiven der 
Handlung Rechenschaft geben sollen. Da jedes historische Gemälde 
notwendig immer zugleich Charakterbild ist, da es außerdem, wenn es der 
Maler gut behandelt hat, schon dem bloßen Auge interessante und 
                                                             
33For his discussion of the entire range of vorteilhafte Gegenstände, see Meyer, Über die Gegenstände der 
bildenden Kunst, 163-187.  Note that Meyer alters the more traditional hierarchy of genres for the arts 
developed in the 17th and 18th centuries by slightly downgrading historical representation to a status 
subordinate to a variety of portraiture (although, as I will argue below, Charakterbild and portraiture are 
not the same) and further below the conceptualism of the symbolic.  For an overview of genre, with some 
explanation for the reigning prevalence of historical representation in the arts of the period, see Thomas W. 
Gaehtgens and Uwe Fleckner, Eds., Historienmalerei. Zur Geschichte einer klassischen Bildgattung und 
ihrer Theorie (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag, 1996), 12, 16-17.  To put Meyer’s categorical specificity in 
a larger context: Werner Busch argues that traditional genres were broken down over the course of the 18th 
century as artists grew increasingly critical of the received traditions in which they worked and also 
increasingly doubtful of art’s capacity to depict.  See Werner Busch, Das sentimentalische Bild: die Krise 
der Kunst im 18. Jahrhundert und die Geburt der Moderne (Munich: Beck Verlag, 1993), 7-17.  Meyer 
appears at once to question the hierarchies of tradition, and to propose a new hierarchization of objects and 






angenehme Stellungen und Gruppen darstellt, so dünkt mich, ist es genug, 
wenn es übrigens insofern durch sich allein verständlich ist, daß die 
physische Handlung vollkommen daraus klar wird, und daß diese auch 
schon an und für sich sinnlich oder moralisch bedeutend ist. Die 
historische Bedeutung kann dann freilich nicht viel mehr hinzufügen, als 




Only I am not sure that you do not judge a little too strictly with respect to 
the historical when you demand that it should simultaneously account for 
the motives for the action.  As every historical painting is necessarily 
always at the same time an image of character; and as, moreover, it depicts 
interesting and pleasing postures and groupings to the naked eye, if the 
painter has done it well – then it seems to me, it is sufficient, provided that 
it otherwise is comprehensible through itself alone, that the physical action 
becomes completely clear from that, and that this is also already in and for 
itself sensually or morally significant.  Historical significance can 
admittedly not add much more then that the figures in their former names 
are impressed more securely on the memory. 
 
Humboldt’s reservation concerns the sensual or moral significance that might be gleaned 
from historical representation, and he emphasizes the interest or pleasure aroused through 
composition.  The historical significance of the depicted event, he concludes, can add 
little more than the gloss of factual specificity to be gained from the particular story.  
Goethe concedes the point: 
Es würden wenig ganz reine und vollkommene Darstellungen möglich 
sein, auch wird man nicht einmal einen vollständigen Zyklus schließen 
können, sondern man wird, in mancherlei Rücksichten, sich hin und her 
bewegen müssen. Dabei wird die Regel, die Sie in Ihrem Briefe festsetzen, 
sehr leitend und dirigierend sein, daß nämlich wenigstens die physische 
Handlung vollkommen klar werde, und diese auch schon sinnlich und 
moralisch bedeutend, nicht weniger angenehm sei, daß man aber den 




Few entirely pure and complete depictions would be possible, nor will one 
ever be able to close a complete cycle, but rather one will have to move 
                                                             
34Humboldt to Goethe, March 18, 1799, in Goethes Briefwechsel mit Wilhelm und Alexander v. Humboldt, 
Ludwig Geiger, Ed. (Berlin: Hans Bondy, 1909), 65-66. 




back and forth in many respects.  In this regard the rule that you establish 
in your letter will be a guide and direction – that, namely, at least the 
physical action be completely clear, and if this is also already sensually 
and morally significant, then it is no less pleasing; but that the actual 
motivation and the more specific determination is to be learned from the 
poem. 
 
Humboldt and Goethe emphasize the physical action of the image as the pleasing 
(angenehm) object of attention, and allow that one may turn to the text in order to learn 
the details of the story and the motivations to the depicted action.  Indeed, the wording of 
Goethe’s reply suggests that the successful image could retain an essential capacity to 
please despite an additional sensual or moral significance, as if the latter two might 
otherwise compete with the image’s more fundamental task to provide pleasure: “und 
diese auch schon sinnlich und moralisch bedeutend, nicht weniger angenehm sei” (“and if 
this is also already sensually and morally significant, than it is no less pleasing”).  The 
focus of historical representation is re-centered on the moment – indeed, in Goethe’s 
response even the once acceptable cycle is now regarded as necessitating an unfortunate 
movement among images (“sich hin und her bewegen”) rather than through them as 
through a series of actions across time.  Moreover, Humboldt’s observation that the 
image pleasing or interesting to the naked eye may also still retain a moral value suggests 
that he operates, at least where visual representation is concerned, with a model of history 
as collection of interesting or instructive events or individuals; and yet with the difference 
that, as a visual representation in which meaning is repositioned entirely in the physical 
action and moral impact of the image, historical representation has essentially no 
historical meaning.  The omission of process, motivation, Beweggrund is acceptable: the 
recyclable exempla of history become the stuff of visual representation; historical time is 
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reduced to a series of recurrent moral themes; and history, visually represented, lacks 
novelty. 
 Goethe and Humboldt’s correction of Meyer’s argument concerning the 
representation of time is more than a matter of critical hindsight.  Rather, Goethe and 
Humboldt revert in their correspondence to a conception of history as essentially without 
innovation.36
Meyer does not differ substantially from Humboldt and Goethe: His interests do 
not lie in the reintroduction of historical time to visual representation.  To go further: for 
Meyer the model of representation has been established, and it is foremost antique.  No 
less, his intense focus on semiotic purity reveals an obsession with a visual sign that does 
not draw attention to itself as such, but rather that transcends its capacity as mediator, and 
thus also the work of art as material, in order provide direct access to meaning.  In short, 
in many respects Meyer’s thinking lacks even the modest novelty and flexibility of 
  This recourse to history as the source for sensual and moral pleasure, at the 
expense of an empirical knowledge of the passage of time, suggests that for Goethe and 
Humboldt the visual arts are a strategy for a control of the passage of time in an 
aestheticizing mode of denial.  Aesthetically speaking, the critical visual issue is the 
moment that pleases and provides moral confirmation.  Temporality as instability, 
unpredictability, and novelty, even when arising from the causal chain of a known 
Beweggrund, not only cannot be accommodated visually but ought to be suppressed 
outright. 
                                                             
36In this respect, Humboldt and Goethe seem to revert to a more or less “premodern” conception of history 
as the source for moral exempla, but lacking in innovation in terms of what the future holds.  I draw this 
insight from Reinhart Koselleck’s “Historia Magistra Vitae. Über die Auflösung des Topos im Horizont 
neuzeitlich bewegter Geschichte” in Koselleck,  Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten 




Goethe’s and Humboldt’s.  Yet the latters’ critique still falls short of the heart of Meyer’s 
argument.  Indeed, his aesthetic commitments, his dogmatic position in the Querelle des 
anciens et modernes, and his extreme normativization of Goethe’s thought on the visual 
object result in an illuminating focus on the sheer mechanics of visual representation.  
Most apparent, in this regard, is that Meyer detaches visual represention from its capacity 
to please; his treatise revolves more around the problem of clarity in visual 
communication, less so in its various limits with regard to sensual stimulation.  The 
problem of the representation of time then becomes part of a larger examination of the 
problem of meaning.  Meyer’s understanding of the potential for the symbol as a 
conveyer of meaning, and his advocacy for a visual sign that the viewer can read, is 
radicalized and sharpened by his perception of a semiotic decay in Western visual 
representation.  His treatise is an argument for the rejuvenation of modern Western visual 
language, in which the titular “object” is judged and ranked for its capacity to signify. 
The object’s appropriateness for visual representation – an issue to which Meyer 
devotes much attention – is certainly a question of generic categorization, but also of the 
treatment of the object.  Meyer writes of the advantageous object, for example, both that 
“Das Werk liegt gleichsam schon im Keime” and that it “wächst unter der pflegenden 
Hand des Künstlers schnell hervor” (“The work lies already in its seed, as it were,” and 
“it grows quickly under the caring hand of the artist”).37
                                                             
37Meyer, Über die Gegenstände der bildenden Kunst, 163. 
  Moreover, the issue of treatment 
recurs in the variation on basic genres that runs throughout Meyer’s treatise.  Portraiture, 
for example, figures under the names Charakterbild (image/picture of character) and 
Bildnis (portrait/likeness), the former an advantageous object, the latter indifferent; 
likewise, varieties of landscape occur in both categories – the significant difference 
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involves, essentially, the artist’s treatment of the chosen object either in a naturalistic 
manner (the indifferent object) or with greater expressivity of the characteristic and 
general (the advantageous object).38  Finally, and most importantly, Meyer concedes that 
genre may be difficult to determine, and that we might reevaluate the quality of the work 
of art depending upon the genre to which we assign it.  In an extended observation on an 
antique work he refers to as the Medici vase (ill. 3), Meyer argues that the image that 
fails as historical representation is successful as Charakterbild.39
                                                             
38Meyer, Über die Gegenstände der bildenden Kunst, 172-173, 187, 192.  
  His reasoning is in part 
that, despite his inability to fathom why the artists would depict Ulysses, Teresias, 
Alexander, and Diogenes altogether in the presence of Iphigenia, he can call the vase a 
successful work really only on the basis of its depiction of Charakter – whereas, as the 
historical depiction of the sacrifice of Iphigenia, it is flawed.  But the indirect implication 
is that, regardless of the artists’ intentions, we rely on a standard of judgment drawn 
entirely from the knowledge about representation that we glean directly from our reading 
of the work at hand.  There is no historical representation or representation of character as 
such, merely objects we read in various ways.  The categories are thus a heuristic guide to 
39 “Wenn deshalb die Künstler der zwei Basreliefe der V. Albani, welche wir so eben als Beispiele 
angeführt haben, allenfalls nicht, wie man gemeiniglich dafür hält, Geschichten haben liefern wollen, 
sondern, aus einer uns unbekannten Ursache, und zu einem besonderen Zwecke notwendig fanden, den 
Ulysses mit dem Tiresias, den Alexander und Diogenes als Charaktere zusammen zu stellen, und diese ihre 
Absicht vielleicht ehemals unter Umständen deutlich war, so wäre ihnen nichts weiter vorzuwerfen, denn 
nur unter dem Titel eines Charakterstückes finden wir Ursache, jenes Basrelief der medicäischen Vase für 
gut behandelt gelten zu lassen, wollte man solches aber als die Geschichte von der Aufopferung der 
Iphigenia betrachten, so wäre es eine höchst fehlerhafte Darstellung.”  Meyer, Über die Gegenstände der 
bildenden Kunst, in Klassik und Klassizismus, 196. 
In English: “If therefore the artist of the two bas reliefs of the V. Albani, which we have just 
adduced as examples, in no case wanted to depict stories (as one typically believes), but rather, out of some 
cause unknown to us, and for a particular purpose, found it necessary to place Ulysses with Tiresias, 
Alexander and Diogenes together as Charaktere, and if this intention of theirs was perhaps formerly, and 
under different circumstances, entirely clear – then there would be nothing more to reproach them with, for 
it is only under the label of the Charakterstück that we find cause to agree that the bas relief of the Medici 
Vase is well handled.  Should one wish to regard it as the history of the sacrifice of Iphigenia, then it is a 
highly flawed depiction.”  
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the construction of images and the more accurate gauging of their visual impact, a set of 
templates for reading the visual for different kinds of information.  The question now 
driving Meyer’s rhetoric is: how can we draw meaning from the work of art? 
 Given his dictate that the work of art “sich selbst ganz ausspreche” (“express 
itself entirely”), we might conclude by way of answer to this question that meaning 
communicates itself. 40
gebietet selbst Ideen und Begriffen uns sinnlich zu erscheinen, nötigt 
dieselben in den Raum zu treten, Gestalt anzunehmen, und den Augen 
anschaulich zu werden; ja wir würden diese Wunder schwerlich für 
möglich halten, wenn nicht die Alten solche wirklich geleistet und in ihren 
Werken aufgestellt hätten.
  Properly rendered, the advantageous symbolic image 
communicates its conceptual content in sensual and even three-dimensional, animated 




itself commands ideas and concepts to appear to us sensually, compels 
them to enter the room, to assume form, to become visible to the eyes.  
Indeed, we would hardly consider such miracles possible, had the ancients 
not achieved them and displayed them in their works. 
 
The properly self-communicating symbolic image functions as the material and entirely 
present embodiment of the conceptual that now enters the space already inhabited by the 
viewer – communication occurs through presence.  Meyer defines this criterion against 
the model of antiquity.  Indeed, he argues that the modern artist has lost the ancient 
capacity for symbolic representation because the moderns chose not to use the visual 
language of the ancients, in short, but then also failed to produce a new, modern visual-
symbolic system of equal precision and vitality.  The argument unfolds as follows: 
antique symbolic representation succeeded owing to the conceptual simplicity of the 
ancients; art has been unable to keep pace symbolically with the gradual expansion of the 
                                                             
40Meyer, Über die Gegenstände der bildenden Kunst, 162.   
41Meyer, Über die Gegenstände der bildenden Kunst, 180. 
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conceptual realm, and the artist has resorted to the addition of signs or attributes to 
convey meaning; in the modern era the reliance on the additional sign or attribute has 
reached an extreme, and conceptual representation has become a matter of arbitrary 
semiotic approximation and guesswork owing to the lack of a standard symbolic code.42
 How do we delineate the function of the symbolic in relation to the sign or 
attribute?  Foremost, we might recall that for Goethe the symbol permits an intuitive 
penetration of the empirical world of particular details.  Meyer drives this function 
exclusively into the dimension of visual representation: the modern chaos of signs and 
attributes renders the object resistant in terms of its capacity to communicate immediately 
– such objects do not appeal to “the sense of the eye” (“den Sinn des Auges”).
  
More information is represented less adequately. 
43
                                                             
42“Die symbolischen Figuren der alten Kunst sind, wie schon gedacht worden, sinnliche Darstellungen 
abstrakter Begriffe, es scheint indessen als habe die Kunst, so zu sagen, nicht genug Breite und Raum für 
eine große Zahl derselben, und ihre Deutlichkeit nehme in eben dem Maße ab, als die Charaktere sich 
einander mehr nähern. Je weniger der darzustellende Begriff an sich einfach und von den andern 
unterschieden war, je mehr mußte er durch beigelegte Attributen bezeichnet werden, da sie aber ihre 
Bedeutung nun nicht mehr ganz sich selbst, oder ihrer Gestalt, sondern zum Teil diesen beigelegten 
Zeichen dankten, so waren sie auch nicht mehr vollkommene Gegenstände [….] In neuern Zeiten aber ist 
alles gar übertrieben worden, man scheint zu glauben, es sei schon genug, wenn eine Gestalt nur dem 
Begriff, welcher vorgestellt werden soll, nicht grob widerspricht, und ist gewohnt, die Bedeutung aus den 
Attributen zu erraten, welche nicht einmal immer dieselben sind.”  Meyer, Über die Gegenstände der 
bildenden Kunst, 205. 
  The 
In English: “The symbolic figures of ancient art, as we have already considered, are sensual 
depictions of abstract concepts, but it seems in the meantime as if art, so to speak, had not enough breadth 
and space for a large number of the same, and their distinctness diminished to the degree that Charaktere 
grow closer to one another.  The less the concept to be depicted was simple in itself and differentiated from 
others, the more it had to be signified through additional attributes.  But as they no longer had entirely 
themselves, nor their form, to thank for their meaning, but in part these added signs, they were no longer 
complete objects  [….]  But in more recent time everything has become simply exaggerated.  One seems to 
believe that it is sufficient if the form does not too crudely contradict the concept that is supposed to be 
represented, and one is accustomed to guessing meaning from attributes that are not even always the same.” 
43“Widerstrebend und unstatthaft für die bildende Kunst sind alle diejenigen Gegenstände, welche nicht 
sich selbst aussprechen, nicht im ganzen Umfange, nicht in völliger Bedeutung, vor den Sinn des Auges 
gebracht werden können. In einem Kunstwerke, welches an die wissenschaftlichen Kenntnisse des 
Beschauers appellieren muß, ist eigentlich nur die geringere Hälfte in dem Bilde selbst enthalten, dasselbe 
liefert uns nur eine gewisse äußere Gestalt der Dinge, welche der Künstler eigentlich hat darstellen wollen; 
den bessern Teil, die Bedeutung aber muß der Beschauer selbst dazu beitragen, und gewissermaßen das 
Werk vollenden. Aber wenn er auch die Kenntnisse besitzt, und überdies den besten Willen dazu, so wird 
doch im ersten Moment das Gemüt gehemmt sein, der Eindruck geteilt und geschwächt werden, und dieser 
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need to decipher meaning or receive communication from the image intellectually 
indicates that the work does not fulfill a fundamental criterion for the visual arts – 
primary meaning must not be supplied by the beholder but revealed.  Moreover, the work 
that fails in this respect remains distant, an object of admiration (as work) but not of 
attraction or participation.  Correspondingly, Meyer conceives of an artist whose skill 
resides in eliciting from the viewer an immediate and necessary reaction.  Illegible or 
arbitrarily used signs or attributes that require time for their decipherment obstruct this 
kind of reaction and participation from the viewer.  But, of course, the question is not 
merely one of a choice between signs; the aggressive sensual presence of the symbolic 
work of art, its freedom from the additional attribute, suggest that for Meyer the visual 
symbolic object is signification, pure and unobstructed communication of meaning.  The 
moderns have failed to develop the pure visual signification practiced, as Meyer 
contends, by the ancients; analogously, for Meyer the most pressing aesthetic issue is the 
modern failure to read intuitively beyond the particular (figured here as the illegible or 
arbitrary sign or attribute), to grasp meaning within the sensual without additional 
exterior explication. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Moment ist der wichtigste, in welchem wir unwillkürlich entscheiden, entflammt oder abgekühlt werden; 
verstrich er umsonst, so ist der Zauber dahin und wir werden zwar die Kunst noch bewundern, aber niemals 
wieder lebhaften Anteil an dem Werk nehmen, nie uns von demselben angezogen oder hingerissen fühlen.”  
Meyer, Über die Gegenstände der bildenden Kunst, 193. 
 In English: “Resistent and impermissible for the visual arts are all those objects that do not express 
themselves, that cannot be brought before the sense of the eye in their entire scope and their full 
significance.  In an artwork that must appeal to the scholarly knowledge of the beholder, only the inferior 
half is itself actually retained in the image, this latter gives us only a certain exterior form of those things 
the artist actually wants to depict.  But the beholder himself must supply the better part, the meaning, and, 
to a certain extent, complete the work.  But even if he possesses this knowledge and, moreover, the good 
will to apply it, nevertheless his receptive disposition is obstructed in the first moment, the impression is 
divided and weakened – and this moment is the most important, in which we make an instinctive decision, 
in which we are inflamed or cooled.  If this moment passes without effect, then the magic is gone and we 
will surely still admire art, but we will never again take an active part in the work, never feel ourselves to 
be attracted or carried away by it.” 
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 In Meyer’s scheme even historical representation figures among those acts of 
signification that populate the advantageous category of objects, at the head of which 
reigns the symbolic.  Here “historical” is to be understood in the wider sense of story: 
mythological, biblical, literary, historical - narrative, thus including both fact and fiction.  
For Meyer objects both pleasing and shocking are admissible.  Regarding the latter, an 
example of which is the Laocoon group (ill. 4), the artist is protected against the charge 
of impropriety by the authority of the story – the artist has not concocted gruesome or 
disturbing subject matter, merely represented an existing story.  Finally, whereas the 
single historical object may be unsuitable for representation owing to a lack of clarity in 
communication of meaning, the cycle of historical images is indeed permissible.44  Meyer 
also explicity recommends those objects that make a “great effect” (große Wirkung): 
“und dem zufolge wären Gegenstände, wo Ernst, Traurigkeit, und Schmerz, wo das 
Pathetische und Tragische herrscht, für historische Darstellungen vor allen andern 
passend und bequem” (“and it follows that objects in which seriousness, sadness, and 
pain, where the pathetic and the tragic reign, are the most fitting and convenient [or 
comfortable – MA] for historical depictions”).45
                                                             
44Meyer, Über die Gegenstände der bildenden Kunst, 167-168.  
  Additionally, historical representation is 
essentially an act of displacement: the interesting subject matter transfers the viewer to 
other times (“Sie versetzen uns in andere Zeiten” – “They displace us into other times”).  
Thus, in the realm of the historical, visual communication of meaning occurs in a 
temporal mode of the expansion of perspective – the concentrated moment provides a 
glimpse beyond the moment of viewing – and the interesting figures we encounter 
thereby communicate more clearly to us when in a state of extravagant suffering, crisis, 
45Meyer, Über die Gegenstände der bildenden Kunst, 167.  
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or at a tragic climax.  On the one hand, Meyer’s claims for historical representation read 
as more modest than Goethe and Humboldt’s recommendations – the latters’ 
“interessante und angenehme Stellungen und Gruppen” (“interesting postures and 
groupings”) become “passend und bequem” (“fitting and convenient/comfortable”) under 
Meyer’s care, entirely a matter of a good fit between object and genre.46
This occurs within what seems otherwise a curious nexus of affects.  How can we 
reconcile the gravity of “Ernst, Traurigkeit und Schmerz […] das Pathetische und 
Tragische” (“seriousness, sadness and pain […] the pathetic and tragic”) with “passend 
und bequem” (“fitting and convenient/comfortable”)?  We should recall the thrust of 
Meyer’s argument: the best visual art (the advantageous category) not only foregrounds 
humanity, it represents human themes with visual precision.  We may now read this 
alongside one of Meyer’s own examples: despite the permission of suffering in historical 
representation, a model for which is the Laocoon group, he rules against scenes of 
martyrdom lest they offend the eye and sentiment.  At issue is not the comparative truth 
of stories (Laocoon, for example, or martyrdom).  Rather, Meyer’s exception draws from 
his own injunction that historical representation involve the purely human (auf der Basis 
des Reinmenschlichen der Handlung), as well as his relation of historical representation 
with the representation of character in an intertwining of agent and action.  Laocoon’s 
visual impact is in the individual’s body in a moment of suffering.  By contrast, in the 
scene of martyrdom too much emphasis is placed on the inflicting of pain, the method 
  On the other 
hand, this good fit should still move the viewer, even transport the viewer beyond the 
moment of viewing.  Appropriateness of object to medium in the genre of historical 
representation reintroduces temporality. 
                                                             
46Humboldt to Goethe, March 18, 1799, 65-66. 
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and devices used, and on the circumstances of martyrdom.  Formally Meyer’s concern is 
quite unmistakable: when faced with the historical image, the beholder must be able to 
penetrate the mass of subsidiary, obscuring, or even revolting details to gaze upon the 
significant essence of the moment.  The exceptional status of the  tragic or pathetic, then, 
seems to rest in its representation not of process but of moment, and of the expression of 
character that emerges in the suffering body – character defined through an action deeply 
informed by its placement in narrative.47
For Meyer the symbolic is but the purest in a series of visual significations 
including the visual representation of time.  Goethe’s qualifications regarding the visual 
  The martyred body is the bearer of the details 
of pain, and martyrdom is suffering as event.  The permissible suffering body incarnates 
the passage of time in a momentary eruption of passion; history, albeit still reduced to the 
most critical moment, is rendered sensual – suffering is temporal, the body a sign of 
history. 
                                                             
47Meyer clarifies his allowance for the tragic in 1797 correspondence with Schiller and Goethe concerning 
Alois Hirt’s recent essay Laokoon (published by Schiller in the 10th issue of Die Horen in 1797).  Hirt had 
argued that the acute representation of physical suffering in Laocoon gives the lie to a Winckelmannian 
reading of serenity in suffering, thereby calling into question the perceived representational priorities of the 
Greeks.  Goethe’s concern with this reading is the logical consequence of its questioning an aesthetic 
centered on the principle of beauty.  The question then becomes: how can one acknowledge the benefits of 
Hirt’s attention to the detailed charactierization of pain while also recuperating Laocoon as a beautiful work 
of art?  Meyer responds to Goethe with the argument that tragic objects such as Laocoon are a permissible 
exception to the rule of beauty: it is not possible for the artist to render Laocoon realistically and  in a 
manner pleasing to the viewer, for realism would repel the viewer.  The artist must and may then depart 
from a standard of realism or the verisimilar.  For a summary of this discussion, see Dönike, Pathos, 
Ausdruck und Bewegung, 86-95.  It is obvious that the central concern of this discussion is to retain 
Laocoon as a model work of art – for it makes little sense that a work of art should be recuperated for an 
aesthetic of beauty on the grounds that the repelling qualities of its subject are not depicted with maximum 
realism – nor is this argument an adequate response to Hirt.  It does, however, underscore that this 
discourse on Laocoon – and by extension Meyer’s delineation of a category of historical representation 
accommodating the tragic – is foremost concerned with the disciplining of its preferred objects and their 
recruitment for a theory of representation that seeks to control the contingent, the passionate, the violent, 
the transitory.  Simon Richter of course argues along similar grounds concerning Classicism’s 
representation of pain in Laocoon’s Body and the Aesthetics of Pain.  He also helpfully traces the centrality 
of pain and the concern with the effect of terror in “German Classical Tragedy: Lessing, Goethe, Schiller, 
Kleist, and Büchner,” in A Companion to Tragedy, Rebecca Bushnell, Ed. ((Massachusetts: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2005), 435-451. 
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representation of time result in a separation of knowledge of temporal context from the 
depicted and viewed moment, which later becomes a source for an extra-temporal moral 
and sensual stimulation.  Temporal context as the particular content incarnating time’s 
passage becomes an exterior matter.  By contrast, Meyer isolates time in a limited 
category of representation that he considers semiotically successful because inherently 
communicative – he identifies a sign that signifies the passage of time.  Specifically, the 
suffering body (and, by extension, the tragic and pathetic as instances of character in 
action) becomes this sign.  The result is a re-temporalization of the sign in the realm of 
the visual aesthetic.   Moreover, this temporalized sign stands out, in a category of 
representation (the advantageous) seeking the purely human and the concept rendered 
spatially, in its embodiment, not just materially, but even physically in the human form.   
Under pressure from Humboldt, Goethe had arrived at a somewhat fretful position 
regarding the diffusion of story across the many bodies of the cyclical work of art.  
Meyer draws time into a single suffering body. 
 
Goethe’s Über Laokoon: aestheticizing vision and the persistence of time 
 Despite Goethe’s own efforts to reduce time in the visual arts to an idealized 
moment, a temporality remains operative in his practice of reading the work of art as 
symbol.  His 1798 essay Über Laokoon is at once an exercise in the construction of a 
classical aesthetic of the momentary and ideal, and an indication of how the work of art, 
considered other than as an object for sensual pleasure, retains the imperative of a 
temporal and particularized reading.  The tension reigning in the essay between these 
alternatives – the momentary and ideal on the one hand, the temporal and particular on 
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the other – is all the more compelling when considered in light of the circumstances of 
the essay’s compositon and publication.  The piece was published in 1798 in the first 
issue of Propyläen, a model of classicist aesthetic viewing practice also promoted as 
radically new in the history of German Laocoon reception, and accompanied by a crude 
illustration of the statue (ill. 5) – it lends a practical weight to the theoretical program of 
the journal.48  But the essay was written in mid-1797, prior even to Goethe’s enunciation 
of the symbol as he stood before the site of his grandfather’s house, and in fact Goethe 
does not use the words symbol or symbolic in his reading of Laocoon.  But his reading of 
the sculpture conforms to his later delineation of a visual symbolic work of art – it 
remains a practical model of a theory of the art work and of viewing.  Yet the tension 
between this reading and the alternative reading lurking about the pages of the essay (the 
work of art resituated in its particular and temporal context) reveals the extent to which 
Goethe has foreclosed a different sensual and cognitive communicative potential in the 
work of art in the interests of an atemporal ideal.  To the extent that we may consider the 
composition of the essay a pivotal moment in the prehistory of the symbol, a crucial 
developmental state in the evolution of a theory, it strikingly displays evidence of the 
very contingency and even affective compulsion of this evolution – the aggressive 
construction of an aesthetic.49
                                                             
48The advertisement for the first issue of the journal in the Intelligenzblatt of the Allgemeine Literatur-
Zeitung, December 15, 1798, reads: “UEBER LAOKOON. Der in diesem Kunstwerk dargestellte Moment 
wird anders als bisher geschehen bezeichnet.”  Reprinted in Goethe, Propyläen, 1104. 
 
 In English: “ON LAOCOON.  The moment depicted in this artwork is characterized in a different 
manner than has previously been done.” 
49My reading is informed by, if sometimes contradictory to, several examinations of Goethe’s Laocoon 
essay.  Neil Flax, for example, highlights Goethe’s formalist reading of the work as an explicit challenge to 
a Diderotian fabulist reception of the work of art.  For Flax,  Diderot foregrounds the imaginative, literary, 
and often allegorical possibilities inherent in a relationship in which the painting denies the existence of the 
beholder, who responds by denying the existence of the painting.  In Flax’s assessment, Goethe proposes a 
reversal: the beholder foregrounds his/her presence before a work of art that is received and analyzed as a 
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In the essay Goethe argues that the Laocoon group exemplifies the highest 
potential of the visual arts in its sensually stimulating depiction of the pregnant moment – 
redefined by Goethe as a moment of transition.  This moment of sudden transition is 
important: “der höchste pathetische Ausdruck, den sie [die Kunst – MA] darstellen kann, 
schwebt auf dem Übergange eines Zustandes in den andern” (“the highest expression of 
the pathetic that it [art – MA] can depict hangs in the transition from one state into 
another”).50  As he further argues, the aesthetic appeal of this transitional moment resides 
necessarily in the trace it still bears of the immediate past: “Bleibt alsdann bei einem 
solchen Übergange noch die deutliche Spur vom vorhergehenden Zustande, so entsteht 
der herrlichste Gegenstand für die bildende Kunst” (If the distinct trace of the previous 
condition remains in such a transition, then the most superb object for visual art 
emerges”).51
                                                                                                                                                                                     
material composition structured around the dynamic of a narrative.  As will become apparent, I disagree 
wth Flax’s contention that Goethe responds to the grammar and syntax of the work of art – not because 
Goethe does not do this, but rather because he then elides this compositional-narrative syntax into a single 
moment of “optimal visibility” that should not require syntactic reading.  See Neil Flax, “Fiction Wars in 
Art,” Representations No. 7 (Summer, 1984), 1-25.  Indeed, it is worth considering, as a pendant to Flax’s 
grammatical argument, Ernst Osterkamp’s contention that Goethe was unable to describe the image without 
irritation given his belief that the image was foremost subject to perception and intuition, not to the word – 
although Osterkamp also argues that Goethe then develops an organic method for describing Laocoon.  See 
Ernst Osterkamp, Im Buchstabenbilde. Studien zum Verfahren Goethescher Bildbeschreibungen (Stuttgart: 
J.B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1991), 1, 113-116.  Inka Mülder-Bach highlights Goethe’s unique 
contribution to the Laocoon discourse in his effort to regard the statue as a visualization of time centered on 
causality, rather than as structured around a dynamic tension in content – but I believe she does not draw 
out entirely the implications of this in relation to her other observation that the ahistorical ideality assigned 
the statue is a response to the Napoleonic looting of art objects.  See Inka Mülder-Bach, “Sichtbarkeit und 
Lesbarkeit. Goethes Aufsatz Über Laokoon,” Das Laokoon-Paradigma. Zeichenregime im 18. Jahrhundert, 
Inge Baxmann, Michael Franz, and Wolfgang Schäffner, Eds. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2000), 465-479.  
Finally, Simon Richter argues that Goethe’s reading of Laocoon is profoundly anti-classical in its tendency 
to absorb and overcome previous readings, thereby becoming an allegory for the visual representation of 
the concept of ut pictura poesis.  See Simon Richter, Laocoon’s Body and the Aesthetics of Pain, especially 
164-167.  For my part, I argue that Goethe’s urge is precisely to overcome this very dynamic present both 
in the sculpture and in his reading – hence the tension in the essay, as I see it, between atemporality and 
ideality on the one hand, and historicity and particularity on the other. 
  The aesthetic criterion for the sensual appeal of the Laocoon group, its 
particular Anmut (grace), resides in its quality as the expression of the trace during 
50Goethe, Über Laokoon [1798], in Klassik und Klassizismus, Helmut Pfotenhauer and Peter Sprengel, Eds. 
(Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1995), 156. 
51Goethe, Über Laokoon, 156.  
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transition from one moment to the next, its material crystallization not merely of 
suffering but of the passage into suffering – trace and transition provoke a stimulating 
anticipation, the temporality is a mere function of Anmut.  Indeed, as a reaction to 
archaeologist Alois Hirt’s previous reading of the group, foregrounding the naturalism of 
the ancients, Goethe advocates the aesthetic idealization manifest in the sculpture, and by 
extension for a symbolic art in which the universality of suffering transcends its natural 
particulars in an art object autonomously providing stimulation.  Although his essay takes 
its place alongside four decades of Laocoon reception, Goethe never refers directly to any 
of his theoretical predecessors (Winckelmann, Lessing, Herder, Hirt); and the projected 
novelty of his approach only underscores the theoretical moment of the text as one 
claiming for itself a brief isolation in and against time.  The text is presented without 
traces. 
Yet Goethe’s writing is deeply informed by a concern for its own historical 
moment.  He produces his theoretical work of 1797 against the backdrop of Napoleon’s 
removal from Italy of numerous works of art that constitute a Classicist canon.52
                                                             
52See again the Introduction to this work, as well as Richter, Laocoon’s Body and the Aesthetics of Pain, 
164.  
  Goethe 
focuses on this issue in a most provocative passage in which he states that the wounding 
of Laocoon by the snake is the primary cause of the sense of motion in the group (“die 
Hauptursache der ganzen Bewegung” – “the primary cause of the entire movement”) – a 
detail, he continues, misrepresented during the restoration of the group but fortunately 
still preserved in the remains or traces of the serpent’s mouth on the rear of Laocoon’s 
leg, “wenn nur nicht diese höchst wichtigen Spuren bei der jetzigen traurigen 
Veränderung auch verloren gehen!” (“if only these most important traces are not lost as a 
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result of the current, unfortunate changes!”).53  Goethe’s entire reading of the expressive 
moment of the Laocoon group relies on the preservation of a trace that might itself 
already have disappeared into history.  The idea of the trace recurs in Goethe’s use of a 
metaphor of a running child suddenly struck by a playmate and fallen to the ground – 
another image of trauma to the body.  Goethe adopts a comparable posture in writing 
about the Laocoon group at the moment of its own removal from safe ground – indeed, 
his invective is typically phrased in terms of the assault upon and dismemberment of Italy 
as “art body” (Kunstkörper).54
The running child, a central metaphor in Goethe’s essay for the trace retained in 
the transitional moment, also unsettles his claims concerning this moment.  He writes: 
  The text in its context is infused with a sensitivity to the 
moment in which, assaulted from several sides simultaneously (by archaeology and the 
spoils of war), Goethe’s aesthetic must pick itself up off the ground and carry on. 
Man sehe ein lebhaftes Kind, das, mit aller Energie und Lust des Lebens 
rennt, springt und sich ergötzt, das aber etwa unverhofft von einem 
Gespielen hart getroffen oder sonst physisch oder moralisch heftig verletzt 
wird; diese neue Empfindung teilt sich wie ein elektrischer Schlag allen 
Gliedern mit, und ein solcher Übersprung ist im höchsten Sinne 




Let one imagine a lively child who, with all possible energy and passion 
for life, runs, jumps, and amuses itself, but who is more or less 
unexpectedly hit hard by a playmate, or otherwise violently wounded 
either physically or morally.  This new sensation diffuses itself like an 
electric shock throughout all the limbs, and such a leap is pathetic in the 
highest sense – it is a reversal, of which one has no concept who has not 
also experienced it. 
 
The visual weight of this image falls on the moment in which the “elektrischer Schlag” 
(“electric shock”) of the blow strikes the child’s body – it is a leap from one state to the 
                                                             
53Goethe, Über Laokoon, 155. 
54Goethe, “Einleitung,” Propyläen, 41. 
55Goethe, Über Laokoon, 156.  
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next, the simultaneous experience of radical opposition.  Accordingly, we are given to 
understand that the strike against the running child is unexpected (unverhofft), an 
occurrence of which one must have experience if one is to understand what is at stake.56
Given his reference to personal experience, Goethe displays a striking lack of 
curiosity about such a prehistory.  His willful disregard for anything other than the most 
mundane circumstances surrounding the moment rings as drily programmatic.  He carries 
this preference for naturalistic interpretation of contextual circumstances into his reading 
of Laocoon: while prefering to reserve the depicted moment of the group for an aesthetic 
of ideal beauty, he insists that the work suffers no loss of aesthetic resonance if, for lack 
of knowledge of Laocoon’s story, it is contextualized as the “tragic idyll” of a father and 
his sons, asleep in the open air, attacked by serpents “in accordance with their nature” 
(“ihrer Natur gemäß”).
  
Goethe stages this defining metaphor in the simplest of terms: the child is running before 
being struck, presumably by a playmate – the situation is highly natural, and there 
remains no temptation to wonder about the prehistory of the child’s fall.  Yet the 
metaphor raises a crucial question for Goethe’s reading of the Laocoon group, 
specifically the inquiry into the prehistory of the moment in question. 
57
                                                             
56Goethe, Über Laokoon, 156.  For another discussion of this passage see also Richter, Laocoon’s Body and 
the Aesthetics of Pain, 166-171.   
  A tension in his reading becomes apparent.  He praises the 
sculpture’s act of Entblößung, its stripping away of all particulars to reveal the essential, 
yet then provides a context for the action that, however, sidesteps the essential 
particularity of cause and settles rather upon a situation of typical or generic quality.  In 
defining the work’s aesthetic contours, he also renders it very much a temporal object; 
57Goethe, Über Laokoon, 154. 
65 
 
the residue of temporal particularity, if persistent only in the weakest of terms, threatens 
to displace the sculpture from the symbolic realm. 
Goethe exacerbates this tension between suppression and persistence of temporal 
particularity in his advice to the viewer – specifically in praising the group’s exemplary 
aesthetic accessibility in the transition from darkness to light. 
Um die Intention des Laokoons recht zu fassen, stelle man sich in 
gehöriger Entfernung, mit geschloss’nen Augen, davor, man öffne sie und 
schließe sie sogleich wieder, so wird man den ganzen Marmor in 
Bewegung sehen, man wird fürchten, indem man die Augen wieder öffnet, 
die ganze Gruppe verändert zu finden. Ich möchte sagen, wie sie jetzt 
dasteht, ist sie ein fixierter Blitz, eine Welle, versteinert im Augenblicke 
da sie gegen das Ufer anströmt. Dieselbe Wirkung entsteht, wenn man die 
Gruppe Nachts bei der Fackel sieht.58
 
 
In order to grasp the Laocoon’s sense of movement correctly, one should 
stand at an appropriate distance before it, with clos’d eyes; one should 
open and close them again immediately.  One will then see the entire 
marble in movement, one will fear, in opening the eyes again, to find the 
entire group changed.  I dare to say, as it now stands there, it is a fixed bolt 
of lightening, a wave, turned to stone in the very moment it hits the shore.  
The same effect emerges if one sees the group at night by torchlight. 
 
Having reduced the prehistory of the moment to a situation of disinterest (by virtue of 
which the serpents’ attack, while utterly unexpected, is also entirely natural), Goethe now 
advocates closing one’s eyes altogether, or viewing the statue by night in torchlight, 
thereby enhancing its quality as a moment without visible history or consequence.  The 
traces of the immediate past may remain, but the tendency is not to question them, even 
to reduce the group in its entirety aesthetically to a trace in time experienced in a moment 
of intellectual dumbness and sensual passivity.  To the extent, then, that this momentary 
trace is also an aesthetic ideal, an object stripped of particularity and exposed in its 
                                                             
58Goethe, Über Laokoon, 154.  For the translation of “Intention” (“intention/purpose/purport”) as “sense of 
movement,” I borrow from the translation of Ellen von Nardoff and Ernest H.von Nardoff in Goethe, 
Essays on Art and Literature, John Gearey, Ed. (New York: Suhrkamp, 1986), 18. 
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universal essence, its extreme ideal visibility emerges from the equally extreme context 
of an obscuring blindness or darkness. 
 The balance of this initial layer of Goethe’s reading is that the original narrativity 
of the work, its reference to the story of Laocoon and his sons to be found in Virgil and 
other sources, is replaced by a new narrative that is entirely contained in the work itself.59  
As “idyll” the work functions, under Goethe’s care, as an embodiment of a generic 
storytelling, in which the causality of the attacking snakes becomes a primary motive 
force outside of any other sequence of events, an event merely setting a story in motion.  
The work is a total story, its imminent coherence detached from any other context – it 
becomes the item in a visual chronicle.60
 In this regard the inclusion of an illustration of Laocoon (ill. 5) in the 
corresponding volume of Propyläen arouses curiosity.  Goethe’s general approach to the 
Laocoon is rather reverential – he describes his reflections as “occasioned by” (“bei 
Gelegenheit”) the sculpture, but by no means an exhaustive attempt to master the work of 
art.  His approach to Laocoon is not as if toward an object of  analysis, but rather as if 
inspired by a presence that shares his own space of experience.
 
61
                                                             
59For versions of the Laocoon story, see Richter, Laocoon’s Body and the Aesthetics of Pain, 24-26.  
  The illustration 
reverses this attitude by re-presenting the sculpture as mere image or icon.  Goethe’s 
general detachment of the sculpture from its narrative context, and his ideal relocation of 
it in a controlling darkness, is radicalized in the sculpure’s two-dimensional rendering 
against a blank background, the damage of its age and the seams of production and 
restoration altogether omitted.  The sculpture becomes an image to view, framed by the 
60 My thinking on this point is influenced by Hayden White’s “The Value of Narrativity in the 
Representation of Reality,” in The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical 
Representation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 1-25. 
61Goethe, Über Laokoon, 149.  
67 
 
page, held at a managed distance by the reader, adduced as evidence, its arousing 
presence eradicated. 
 But the included illustration also induces a reversal of the tendency of the 
argument toward de-particularization and generic temporality.  The passage in which 
Goethe advocates blinking the eyes or viewing the work by torchlight also bears the 
traces of his effort to produce an aesthetic model balancing both the extreme visibility of 
an ideal moment and the possibility of extended deconstruction and cognitive 
investigation.  A fragment from the 1770s, the decade following his first encounter with 
plaster reproductions of the group in Leipzig or Mannheim, reveals Goethe engaged in a 
direct, even physical, effort to understand the dynamics of the group’s composition: 
durch alles auch <?> der großte Verstand im kleinsten am 
merkwürdigsten. 
Der Altste 
Die Köpfe müssen alle ganz allein in der Lage beurteilt werden in der sie 
stehen einzeln tut keiner seinen Effekt. Der Kopf des jüngern Sohns ist 
abscheulich wenn man ihn auf ein Postament grad stellt und herrlich wenn 
man ihn abgenommen auf den Tisch vor sich hin legt. Der ältere Just das 
Gegenteil. Der Alte steht in der Gruppe und will auch so stehend angesehn 
sein. Furcht und Streben sind herrlich mit einander verbunden. Man 
schaue den übertriebnen Stirn Drang des Knaben. Man schaue die über der 
Stirn vorstrebende Locke. Es ist Angst in dem Munde Aber feste Angst. 
Teilnehmende gegenwürkende Angst. Der Kopf schon jugendlich 
beschoren. Der Jüngere hat die Haare noch weiblich hinten aufgebunden 




through everything also […] the greatest understanding in the smallest the 
most curious. 
The oldest 
The heads must all be judged only in the position in which they stand 
individually none exerts its effect.  The head of the younger son is hideous 
if one has removed it and lays it on the table.  The older Just [sic] the 
opposite.  The old man stands in the group and wants to be seen so.  Fear 
and exertion are joined together magnificently.  One should see the 
exaggerated pressure in the forehead of the boy.  One should see the lock 
                                                             
62I include the fragment as it is reprinted in Klassik und Klassizismus, 621-622. 
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of hair reaching out over the forehead.  There is fear in the mouth, but firm 
fear.  Participating, counteracting fear.  The head already trimmed 
youthfully.  The younger still has his hair tied in back in the feminine 
manner and gathered over the foreheard in a knot.  He needs to be seen 
leaning back. 
 
This fragment predates the essay by two decades, and yet it might be the piece to which 
Goethe had intended to return in formulating a response to Hirt’s work.63
 In the fragment and preceding passage, Goethe reintroduces the concept of space 
as an area occupied by the object and to be entered and explored by the beholder.  
Goethe’s directions to the beholder in the essay mimic his use of the third-person 
imperative in the fragment: “man schaue” and “stelle man sich” – “one should see” ( also 
“let one look”) and “one should stand” (or “let one stand/place oneself”).  In the 
fragment, these imperatives accompany a manipulation of parts effecting the virtual 
deconstruction of the group into its particulars for the purpose of gauging the success of 
the composition (“Die Köpfe müssen alle ganz allein in der Lage beurteilt werden in der 
sie stehen einzeln tut keiner seinen Effekt” – “The heads must all be judged only in the 
  In substance 
the two works are not mutually contradictory; rather, more striking is that with the 
fragment we can see Goethe literally idling among the pieces of the group, imagining 
various elements separated from the composition, and dwelling on details that would 
likely go unseen in the momentary glimpse or at night by torchlight.  Indeed, such details 
(of the forehead, the hair, the mouth, the apparent desirability that one piece be exhibited 
as if leaning back) tend toward an emphasis on particularity and even the natural that is 
incompatible with the aesthetic ideal of the moment.  The fragment reveals Goethe 
attempting to penetrate the particular in order to see and understand how the ideal is 
constructed – the emphasis is on cognitive process rather than immediate intuition. 
                                                             
63Klassik und Klassizismus, 617. 
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position in which they stand individually none exerts its effect”).  And thus when in the 
essay Goethe directs the reader “stelle man sich in gehöriger Entfernung, mit 
geschloss’nen Augen” (“one should stand at an appropriate distance […] with clos’d 
eyes”), he issues the command to adopt an experimental spatial relationship with respect 
to the work, one that is changeable (subsequent commands in the essay include “Gehen 
wir nun weiter,” “Let us now continue” and “Denken wir,” “Let us think/imagine” – 
expressions of figurative, intellectual motion).64
 Goethe has argued that Laocoon may be read as a tragic idyll with no loss of 
aesthetic resonance to the depicted moment, and that this ideal of the moment is best 
experienced by blackening out the narrative context of the group.  But his argument 
hereafter is divided.  The initial implication – that the Laocoon group, if treated as a work 
of art conforming to the highest aesthetic standards, will behave as such and reveal its 
exemplarity – is undermined by a secondary implication that one need not treat the work 
  Furthermore, we might imagine that this 
entire passage is but a précis of current aesthetic practice: if one were to adopt the 
appropriate position, close and then briefly open the eyes, and behold the group as if it 
were in motion, then one would experience the very effect achieved at night and by 
torchlight – and, given this reading, we might then wonder if his description “wie sie jetzt 
dasteht, ist sie ein fixierter Blitz, eine Welle, versteinert im Augenblicke da sie gegen das 
Ufer anströmt” (“as it now stands there, it is a fixed bolt of lightening, a wave, turned to 
stone in the very moment it hits the shore”) is intended only as the highest aesthetic 
praise, or merely one of several receptive possibilities.  The entire passage suggests both 
an experimentation with an art of the ideal moment and also the limitations of this 
approach. 
                                                             
64Goethe, Über Laokoon, 158-159.  
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in this manner, in which case it will reveal something else entirely.  One need not adopt a 
position of willed blindness to the prehistory and consequences of the statue’s depicted 
moment – Goethe himself has made this clear, if indirectly.  Even if he does suppress an 
essentially more hermeneutic approach to the work, his fragment indicates that an 
exploratory encounter with its constituent parts has nonetheless been informative for his 
ability to read the moment depicted in the group, that his own intuitive prowess lies less 
in the distanced reading of signs or the appreciation of the symbol than in the personal, 
even tactile deconstruction and experimental manipulation of the object.  Finally, terms 
such as versteinert (turned to stone) and fixiert (fixed) echo elsewhere in the essay as 
Ruhe (calm) and Einheit (unity), and yet the reception of the statue as either fixed, frozen, 
turned to stone, or at least calm and unified is contradicted by Goethe’s decisive 
judgment that the entire work may be seen as “in movement” provided one treats it as if it 
has a past and future, regardless of the necessity of this context.  The doctrine that this 
highly visual moment is the only one appropriate for visual representation and aesthetic 
idealization, such that even its context is rendered irrelevant, is undermined by our 
attention to this wider temporal context, even by our mere requirement that such a 
context exist only negatively in the interests of an aesthetic proof of ideality. 
This situation rings less paradoxical, however, if we consider Goethe’s statement 
that the “ruhiger Gegenstand […] in sich selbst geschlossen” (“still object […] closed in 
itself”) is the first and dearest of the objects of the sculptor, but that the artist eventually 
moves to the “leidenschaftlich-bedeutenden” (“passionate-significant”), a category 
comprising exemplary works like the Laocoon group. 65
                                                             
65Goethe, Über Laokoon, 152.  See also Dönike, Pathos, Ausdruck und Bewegung, 116. 
  According to the logic of 
Goethe’s argument, this latter category, including also Laocoon, is of a higher aesthetic 
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caliber precisely in its depiction of passion, suffering, and motion, even if these latter are 
subjected to an aesthetic distancing and subsumption beneath the dictates of sensual 
beauty. 
 Goethe thus also points to an area for aesthetic representation outside of the realm 
of the beautiful and complete or closed.  Geschlossen bears the latter two meanings, 
“complete” in the sense of self-containment, and “closed.”  As we see just above, the first 
object of the sculptor is “in sich selbst geschlossen”: closed within itself, contained, 
complete.  Yet, of course, in time the artist abandons such an object and takes up the 
“passionate.”  Is this latter an incomplete object?  Two possibilities suggest themselves: 
the one, that this latter object is a greater representational challenge to the artist because 
the leidenschaftlich (passionate) both rubs against the intended closure, and the 
bedeutend signifies more explicitly than the mere “ruhiger Gegenstand” (“still object”).  
The other possibility, though, is that closure and completion are obstructions to the 
viewer.  In his instructions to the viewer of sculpture Goethe advises, naturally, that the 
viewer occupy a suitable distance “with clos’d eyes” (mit geschloss’nen Augen).  Closure 
is a matter for the object in question and for the viewer.  But Goethe also explores, if 
indirectly, the territory outside of this paradigm for viewing sculpture: with closed eyes 
one remains forcibly unaware of the context informing the passionate moment briefly 
glimpsed.  Indeed, the potential acts of the imagination or the intellect that occur when 
the eyes are closed must always again be contradicted by the reappearance of a moment 
that, in its ideality, never changes.  Closure may indeed play a vital role in the aesthetics 
of beauty, but it brings with it the danger that one might, so to speak, remain blind to 
additional aesthetic possibilities once the standard of beauty has been dismantled.  
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Indeed, when we speak of the visual representation of the moment and of suffering, as is 
the case with the Laocoon group, closure or completion seems to obstruct our ability to 
gain knowledge from our vision – a situation to which Goethe possibly refers in his usage 
geschloss’nen (clos’d), the elided form suggesting that with respect to the representation 
of the moment in time a norm of closure does not bring completion but rather entails a 
loss.  When the work of art does more than radiate beauty, when it represents the 
possibility of a sensually mediated knowledge for which beauty is irrelevant, then its 
closure is an obstruction.  It must open itself to the beholder.  This Goethe makes clear in 
his own subsequent compositional analysis of the group – he is able to substantiate his 
temporal argument only with recourse to an extended, analytical, and deeply physically 
involved reading of composition.  In the face of the history of the moment, he must keep 
his eyes open. 
 Goethe declares Laocoon’s wound the primus movens of the expressivity of the 
group, the stimulus that not merely sets in motion what we see specifically but also acts 
as the central temporal focus.  He continues: “Wenn wir nun die Hauptfigur in diesem 
Sinne gefaßt haben, so können wir auf die Verhältnisse, Abstufungen und Gegensätze 
sämtlicher Teile des ganzen Werkes mit einem freien und sichern Blicke hinsehen” 
(“Once we have grasped the main figure in this sense, we can look upon the 
interrelations, gradations, and oppositions of all the parts of the work with a free and 
secure gaze”).66
                                                             
66Goethe, Über Laokoon, 157.  
  This language suggests a more aggressive and intimate observation: we 
are decidedly no longer dealing with an aesthetic of the momentary glimpse or the torch-
lit experiment; rather, when we know the compositional importance of the wound, we can 
thereafter actively (hinsehen – “to look at”) and freely wander over the group in its 
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entirety and pay attention to structural details – interrelations, gradations, and 
oppositions.  Goethe proceeds in this very direction: he muses over the object as such; 
examines the individual figures; returns to the idea of a doppelte Handlung (the 
doubled/two-fold action of simultaneous struggle and suffering) established earlier, 
thereby reiterating some of what he has just stated; returns again to the idea of the tragic 
idyll and reflects on its relation to the depicted moment; indeed, he declares outright that 
one might even think ahead into the future in order to see how the depicted moment is 
unique in its transitional quality.67
 Goethe initiates this opening by reading time in suffering.  For, the reaction of 
each of the three figures in the group marks a temporal perspective and, the three taken 
together, a total temporality.  Goethe notes that the experience of suffering, one’s own or 
another’s, elicits fear, terror, and sympathy (Furcht, Schrecken, Mitleid).  Here he 
adheres to a discourse established by Aristotle and modified by Lessing.  So Goethe: fear 
and sympathy are appropriate for poetry, while terror is suited to the representation of the 
transitional moment at which one becomes aware that suffering is at hand (“das 
unerwartete Gewahrwerden gegenwärtigen Leidens” – “the unexpected becoming aware 
of present suffering”).
  Goethe departs from an aesthetic of beauty in his 
indication that the sensual ascertainment of pain is the key to our knowledge of the 
group’s temporal dynamic, and proceeds to open up the closed work of art in order to 
complete it at his intellectual leisure. 
68
                                                             
67Goethe, Über Laokoon, 157-159. 
  Terror, Laocoon’s emotion and ours on his behalf, is a reaction 
68Lessing’s commitment to a principle of Mitleid (sympathy - eleos) in tragedy (taken from Aristotle’s 
couplet phobos and eleos) led him to translate phobos as “fear” rather than “terror” – thereby founding an 
aesthetic grounded in the viewer’s sympathy not for a terror-inspiring protagonist, but at least for one 
whose actions might arouse fear or provoke a sympathetic fear.  Goethe follows up on this by including 
both terror (Schrecken – the original phobos) as well as fear (Furcht) in his reading of Laocoon, allowing 
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of the present; we feel pity for his younger son, who, because he was attacked first and is 
now beyond salvation, registers the past; and in the elder son, who looks on while trying 
to extricate himself from the first coils of the serpent, we recognize both the fear of 
coming danger and the hope for escape, two orientations toward the future.69
Of course, this emotional-temporal dynamic is inherent in the group, an extended 
compositional embodiment of the trace in the moment of transition.  Here also the tension 
in Goethe’s reading is clear: the completed time frame, a device intended (according to 
Goethe) to soften the impact of terror, is thematically closed in its circulation around a 
central focal point from which the temporality of the group radiates sufficiently to 
balance the composition.  At the same time, however, the balancing and completing 
effect of this temporality is the result of reflection – the moment in its immediate 
temporal resonance has been deconstructed, its parts evaluated for their capacity to elicit 
an emotional response.  But with the elder son Goethe also implicates the beholder as 
participant, thereby further breaking down the contained composition of the group and 
opening it to the contingency of reception.  Our own emotional response to the elder son 
already wavers between hope and fear, his own and ours for him.  Thus our own 
  In the 
Laocoon group, then, we have a complete time frame of past, present, and future.  This 
expanded temporal context helps to soften the impression of terror, Goethe argues; but 
then it also diminishes the solitary impact of the moment by couching it in a narrative 
framework that also helps the viewer to recognize the moment of terror, the moment 
appropriate for a visual representation of pathos and thus the moment that needs to be 
seen. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
fear and sympathy to contain terror in an ideal and formally circumscribed moment.  For details of the 
reception of Aristotle, see Richter, “German Classical Tragedy,” 437-439. 
69Goethe, Über Laokoon, 158-159. 
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implication in the emotional-temporal dynamic begins to undo the compositional closure 
of the group by introducing the contingency of an open future. 
Goethe’s reading of the sculpture fully enters this contingent territory in a brief 
final section of the essay in which he addresses whether Virgil’s depiction of the Laocoon 
episode, in the Aeneid, merits its often damning comparison to the sculpture.  Goethe 
finds the two incomparable on grounds of genre: in short, Virgil must, in accord with the 
dictates of his medium (the epic) dwell on the details of narrative.  Goethe’s argument 
reads as follows: 
 Da einmal der unglückliche vertriebene Aeneas selbst erzählen soll, daß 
er und seine Landsleute die unverzeihliche Torheit begangen haben, das 
bekannte Pferd in ihre Stadt zu führen, so muß der Dichter nur darauf 
denken, wie die Handlung zu entschuldigen sei? Alles ist auch darauf 
angelegt, und die Geschichte des Laokoons steht hier als ein rhetorisches 
Argument, bei dem eine Übertreibung, wenn sie nur zweckmäßig ist, gar 
wohl gebilligt werden kann. So kommen ungeheure Schlangen aus dem 
Meere, mit Kämmen auf dem Haupte, eilen auf die Kinder des Priesters, 
der das Pferd verletzt hatte, umwickeln sie, beißen sie, begeifern sie; 
umwinden, umschlingen darauf die Brust und Hals des zu Hülfe eilenden 
Vaters, und ragen mit ihren Köpfen triumphierend hoch empor, indem der 
Unglückliche unter ihren Wendungen vergebens um Hülfe schreit. Das 
Volk entsetzt sich und flieht beim Anblick, niemand wagt es mehr ein 
Patriot zu sein, und der Zuhörer, durch die abenteuerliche und ekelhafte 




As the unfortunate, expelled Aeneas is himself supposed to be narrating 
that he and his fellow people committed the inexcusable error of bringing 
the famous horse into their city, the poet must only consider how this 
action is to be excused?  Everything is invested in this, and the story of 
Laocoon stands here as a rhetorical argument in which an exaggeration, 
provided it is to the point, surely can be permitted.  And so monstrous 
snakes come from the sea, with crests upon their heads, they rush to the 
children of the priest who had spurned the horse, coil around them, bite 
them, poison them with venom; coil around and constrict the breast and 
neck of the father, rushing to help; and rise up triumphantly with their 
heads, while the unfortunate one cries in vain for help in their coils.  The 
people are terrified and flee at sight of it, no one dares to be a patriot any 
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more; and even the listener, terrified by the bizarre and repulsive story, 
gladly admits that the horse should be brought into the city. 
 
Goethe couches a brief visual description of the attack itself deep within its narrative 
context.  His point, of course, is that Virgil’s own description of the scene is a necessary 
rhetorical device intended to explain, in short, the fall of Troy.  Virgil had license to do 
what the sculpture may not: tell the story in detail, even repulsive exaggeration.  But as a 
final pendant to Goethe’s opening remarks in his essay, on the nature of fine works of art, 
this passage effects a final unbalancing of his argument on behalf of the Laocoon group 
as object of the intuition. Indeed, his conclusion advocates strongly for that other reading 
of the sculpture that has for the duration of the essay lingered in the shadow – in which 
Laocoon is repositioned in his particular context and read as historical revelation. 
The status of the beholder varies critically between Goethe and Virgil.  The elder 
son is no longer the foremost witness, for in Virgil’s account both sons are attacked first, 
then the father.  A future-oriented beholder is removed in this version from the central 
spectacle entirely and relocated in the distanced observation of the Trojans.  But this is 
not structured aesthetic vision; Aeneas is a unique beholder, for he reports not on 
sculpture but on an actual (if still fictive) event; moreover, an event that was disastrously 
misinterpreted by all who witnessed it.  Laocoon is suddenly relocated in a wider 
temporal nexus of cause and effect that extends beyond the limits of the statue, and the 
particulars of which must be known – the sculpture presents the beholder with the 
opportunity to see “history.”  This visibility of history is not merely contained in the 
composition of the work but spreads beyond its limits.  Aeneas’ narrative forms part of an 
unfolding of event and reception that extends, through his own retelling, even to the 
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  My contention has been that the work of art functions in the theory of Weimar 
Classicism as a template for the visual perception of time and history.  The initial 
temporal charge of the symbol, present in Goethe’s experience in Frankfurt, is 
diminished over the course of further reflection as the symbol itself is recruited for 
aesthetic representation.  Ultimately the visual symbol of the work of art, while hovering 
close to its origins in visual experience, is a representational device of radically rediced 
temporality, allied to an aesthetic concerned foremost with sensual stimulation.  Meyer’s 
achievement is to isolate and clarify the mechanics and therewith the intent of symbolic 
representation as a matter of semiotic clarity and legibility, while simultaneously 
defining a model for the visual representation of time in the suffering body as 
incarnation of time’s passage.  These clarifications to Goethe’s theoretical delineation of 
the visual symbol reside, surprisingly, in Goethe’s own pre-theoretical, exemplary 
reading of the Laocoon group: the exclusive beauty of the art object is maintained only 
at the expense of its capacity to communicate the particularity of temporal context.  The 
original temporality of the symbol is retained only if the work of art is approached with 
an eye for more than beauty. 
 The symbol remains a tense representational device.  Does it organize and reduce 
in the interests of pleasure or for the communication of information?  Rather, as the 
symbol travels from experience to theory, and between the verbal and visual, it marks 
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the use of aesthetics – specifically visual representation – as a means both to organize 
and control the field of temporal contingency and particular detail and thereby to 
communicate in an exclusively visual manner.  The consistent emphasis on a reception 
determined by the self-expressivity or self-communication of the work of art – retained 
by Meyer, for example, likewise at the heart of Aeneas’ story – suggests an irritability, 
even discomfort with time and a desire to reduce it, if still acknowledging its 
inescapable immanence, to the fully comprehensible moment, indeed even to master and 
overcome to movement of history. 
 Goethe’s inclusion of the story of Aeneas at the end of his essay undoes this 
effort at mastery.  Indeed, Goethe’s own poetics provide the key.  With Aeneas we have 
the moment of visual reception, and its attendant charge of correct interpretation, 
couched within layers of poetry referencing various layers of experience and reception.  
The story of the fall of Troy unfolds in the emotionally charged narration of the event 
after the fact, by Aeneas as dramatic poet and actor in the event; and the reader of the 
poem has the opportunity to reflect on a chronology of events in the meta-temporal 
space of epic narrative.  Goethe’s own reader is thus located at the end of a chain of 
aesthetically mediated receptive acts that open the initial event to successive waves of 
interpretation and reaction.  As the temporality of Goethe’s personal moment of 
symbolic reception in Frankfurt disappears – beginning with his shift from his own 
intuition to the universal import of what he sees – the symbol starts to gather up a poetic 
of historical reception and representation, drawn from the particular, that is eventually 
suppressed in the theory of the visual symbol.  It reasserts itself when Goethe looks 

















This chapter is about Schiller’s attempt to represent history as a visual 
phenomenon.  My focus is Schiller’s approximately decade-long shift, over the course of 
the 1790s, from prose narrative history to historical drama.  I argue that the legibility and 
reliability of the historical actor as visual sign, an underlying and increasingly 
problematic theme of Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Kriegs (History of the Thirty Years 
War, 1791-92), becomes a central focus of Schiller’s aesthetics in the mid-1790s.  
Ultimately Schiller makes the historical actor as sign a central representational issue of 
the Wallenstein trilogy. 
I want to turn to Kant briefly in order to clarify the concept of the historical sign 
as I use it in this chapter.  In his 1798 essay “Erneuerte Frage: ob das menschliche 
Geschlecht im beständigen Fortschreiten zum Besseren sei?” (“A Renewed Attempt to 
Answer the Question: ‘Is the Human Race Continually Improving?’”) Kant defines the 
Geschichtszeichen (sign of history) as a sign of humanity’s essential moral disposition to 
improvement.1
                                                             
1Immanuel Kant, “Erneuerte Frage: ob das menschliche Geschlecht im beständigen Fortschreiten zum 
Besseren sei?” Werkausgabe XI: Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik, und 
Pädagogik 1, Wilhelm Weischedel, Ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag, 1977), 357-
360. 
  The power of this disposition lies in its capacity as a vehicle or conduit 
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for the progress of reason in human affairs; and the recognition of this disposition means 
also recognition of the fundamental respect for reason, on the part of humanity, that 
guarantees a better future.  The sign of history is thus also bound up in a semiotics of 
reception, through which successive waves of spectacle and observation signify 
humanity’s openness to and enthusiasm for improvement.  Kant’s language is not only 
visual but dramatic: he writes of Zuschauer (spectators, an audience), Spiel (play), and of 
the Teilnehmung der Spielenden (the participation of players).  The event inspiring Kant 
is the French Revolution, and the corresponding sign of history emanates from the 
spectators’ ability to perceive, beneath the obscuring layers of the Terror and 
Revolutionary War, the slow advance of republicanism with its guarantee of peace.  The 
brunt of his argument is that we are allowed to believe in a future endowment of peace 
and constitutional government because we observe the enthusiasm of others for such a 
future.  Additionally for Kant this sign of history, the culmination of processes of 
reception, legitimates his act of predicting the future (his terms are weissagen and 
vorhersagen – to predict, foretell, augur).  Yet despite the rational trajectory of his 
argument, constructed carefully from an inquiry into the knowledge we can gain from 
acts of reception, the Geschichtszeichen is also an affective construction: an emotional 
response to a perceived need for historical foresight, despite recognition of the empirical 
limits of such foresight.  The sign of history is a phenomenon, indeed a series of visually 
perceptible phenomena, pointing to something we might take as a law of historical 
change.  By locating a mechanism for historical change in the receptivity to a sign of 
humanity’s moral disposition to progress, Kant also grounds (by virtue of his own 
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argument) the present as the primary vantage point for a highly visual interpretation of 
history. 
The presentism and visuality of Kant’s later concept are already found in 
Schiller’s 1789 inaugural lecture at the University of Jena, Was heißt und zu welchem 
Ende studiert man Universalgeschichte? (What Is and to What End Does One Study 
Universal History?).  Universal history, according to Schiller, is the study of the 
historical origins of the present moment.  Schiller employs explicitly visual language to 
describe the endeavor of universal history: he presents pictures (Gemälde) of competing 
and incompatible notions of historical work and the point of view (Gesichtspunkt) from 
which they are to be evaluated; he speaks of the instructive and entertaining spectacle 
(lehrreiches und unterhaltendes Schauspiel) that is demonstrated (zeigen) in the world-
wide discoveries of European explorers; and he considers the possibility of reconstructing 
humanity’s origins in the mirror (Spiegel) of peoples perceived as primitive.2
The methodology of the universal historian is to construct a chain of connections 
from the present into the past; where existing sources fail, the philosophical 
understanding (philosophischer Verstand) must compensate in order to fill in gaps.  But 
Schiller warns explicitly against constructing an artificial coherence or teleology – 
despite his passionate rhetoric on behalf of the study of history, he does not accommodate 
  The sheer 
import of the past and the possibilities for its research and knowledge manifest 
themselves in a visual revelation in the present. 
                                                             
2Friedrich Schiller, Was heißt und zu welchem Ende studiert man Universalgeschichte? [1789], SW, 4:753-
754.  To clarify: Schiller’s lecture predates Kant’s essay by nine year – whether Schiller knew the essay in 
or after 1798, I do not know.  Nor, for that matter, whether Kant knew Schiller’s 1789 lecture.  Schiller did 
of course rely on Kant’s earlier 1784 Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht and 
the 1786 Mutmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte (both published in the Berlinische Monatsschrift), 
as well as Über den Gebrauch teleologischer Prinzipien in der Philosophie, published in 1788 in Teutscher 
Merkur.  A list of known sources for Schiller’s lectures may be found in SW, 4: 1055-1056. 
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a need to know the future and thus assigns no historical role to affect.  In the 1789 
address his recurring visual vocabulary is limited: terms such as lichtvoll, Hinblick, 
Schauplatz (enlightening, view, scene) operate at the level of rhetoric, they describe no 
fundamentally perceptive quality in the engagement with the past.  Likewise, when 
Schiller argues that the study of history inspires the optical illusion (optisch täuschend) 
that the brevity of the life of the individual is expanded into the longevity of the species 
(Gattung), he issues merely a prompt for recognizing the present significance of universal 
history and the effect universal history may have on the individual’s understanding of the 
self.3
Kant and Schiller explicitly mix the visual and the verbal, yet there is a difference 
in their thinking about the role of vision in the acquisition of knowledge about history.  
Kant configures the historical event as a spectacle or drama, whose spectators (more 
likely readers of news than actual visual spectators) submit to an immediate enthusiasm 
for the meaning of the event and enter into a direct emotional relationship with history, 
predicated upon the belief in a better future.  The drama of history carries such spectators 
from their own present into the future.  And Kant’s dramatic visual language – spectator, 
play – suggest an imaginative enthusiasm and a sense-receptivity to the event that is not 
incompatible with verbal reportage yet goes beyond it to place the  reader as spectator in 
the immediate presence of history.  Curiously, at roughly the time of Kant’s writing 
Schiller would also theorize dramatic poetry along similar lines in 1797 (in the essay 
Epische und dramatische Dichtung, discussed in the previous chapter), as the verbal form 
  His visual rhetoric centers on the contemporary relevance and promise of universal 
history, but the work of the universal historian is confined to the sober research of 
historical sources and the application of the understanding. 
                                                             
3Schiller, Was heißt und zu welchem Ende studiert man Universalgeschichte? SW, 4:765.  
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instigating an affective, immediate, present- and future-oriented bond between audience 
and actor.  But in 1789 it is Schiller himself who intends, with his inaugural address, to 
appeal to his audience’s enthusiasm and carry it headlong into the discipline of universal 
history.  Yet universal history is largely a backward-looking discipline – it excavates the 
pre-history of the present, and Schiller’s visual language of enthusiasm is replaced by the 
words of the source and the reason of the historian. 
Schiller’s attitude toward the visual will shortly change, as he recognizes the 
visual sign of history as a sign of meaning and a fundamental dynamic in historical 
movement and experience, rather than merely an affective instigation to historical 
research.  In what follows I consider the problematic role of the historical actor as sign of 
history in Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Kriegs (History of the Thirty Years War).  
Then I focus on Schiller’s aesthetic writings of the 1790s, most specifically on what I 
term an aesthetic of Charakter (character) and its application to the perception and 
evaluation of individual action.  Thereafter I turn to the Wallenstein trilogy.  First I 
examine how anticipation of action is built up over the course of the first two parts, 
Wallensteins Lager and Die Piccolomini (Wallenstein’s Camp and The Piccolomini), 
specifically in a discourse on speech, action, and vision.  Then I focus on Act III of 
Wallensteins Tod, in which the conflict between Wallenstein’s speech and gesture 
visually reveals an antagonism between individual and historical situation.  In conclusion, 
I comment on the ostentation of Wallenstein’s dramatic speech and Schiller’s 
dramatization of subtle gesture. 
 
Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Kriegs: the historical actor as visual sign 
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 Already in 1786 Schiller professed an interest in the great individuals of the epoch 
of the Thirty Years War. 4   At the time, he was writing Geschichte des Abfalls der 
vereinigten Niederlande von der spanischen Regierung (History of the Revolt of the 
Netherlands against Spanish Rule, 1788), his first long prose historical narrative set in 
the 16th century – the Age of Religious Wars, a period that had initially attracted him 
when he wrote Don Carlos, and which became fertile ground for his interest specifically 
in questions of philosophy and representation of history.  The status and significance of 
the historical actor also changes across these projects.  The sheer length of time Schiller 
spent working on Don Carlos is attributable to the shift in emphasis in the drama from 
generational conflict in the vein of Sturm und Drang to a more intense concentration on 
the role of the individual in a given historical situation.  Characterization, although 
complex, is still often rooted in opposing ideal types that collide against one another.  In 
Abfall der Niederlande the characterization grows more psychological, suggesting a 
deeper interest in the motivations of actors who however, in the end, may still strike the 
reader as more or less fixed types reacting predictably under given circumstances.5
 This development owes to biographical and methodological transformations.  
Schiller wrote Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Kriegs in installments for the Historischer 
  In 
Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Kriegs Schiller gives more attention to the development 
of character in the context of a situation; yet this attention does not remain consistent 
over the course of the narrative. 
                                                             
4Schiller to Christian Gottfried Körner, April 15, 1786, excerpted in Schiller, WuB 4, 586. 
5Transformations in Schiller’s historical characterization may accompany the development of his dramatic 
characterization.  A former tendency to regard Schiller’s dramatic figures as representations of his political 
commitments or as types of the idealist or realist has yielded to the observation that Schiller preferred, after 
his period of historical and aesthetic work, to produce dramatic characters developing in given historical 
situations.  See, for example, Lesley Sharpe, Schiller and the Historical Character: Presentation and 
Interpretation in the Historiographical Works and in the Historical Dramas (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1982), 1-2, 48-51. 
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Calender für Damen from 1790 to 1792.  During this period his own work as professor of 
history at Jena was coming to an end owing to ill health; likewise, he confessed an 
increasing interest in aesthetics and Kantian philosophy, and eventually a desire to cease 
work as a historian.  Thus, the work is transitional in that Schiller’s own interests were 
undergoing transformation, his patience and stamina for historical research faltering.  
Indeed, four of the five books detail only roughly the first half of the war, and Book 4 is 
given over to the relatively short period from the death of Gustav Adolf (1632) to 
Wallenstein’s assassination (1634).  The alterations in his attentions and intensity as a 
writer of history owe much to variations in his own interest in the material and his 
available energy; but they are also compelling as the model of a historical methodology 
itself undergoing rapid transformation.  A shift is quickly discernible in Schiller’s 
authority as historical narrator: from interpretive command of the rich panorama of 
events and rhetorical confidence in their representation, to an increasing reliance on the 
perceptibility of the historical actor as a form of historical movement and perfect 
embodiment of the meaning of history.  Thus the initial portrayal of a balance of forces at 
work in the events leading up to the Thirty Years War (political self-interest, religious 
ideology, German nationalism and freedom of conscience and national-self-
determination, Habsburg imperialism, and the creation of a system of sovereign and 
mutually cooperative European states) develops into an examination of historical actors 
at work, and shortly emerges as the history of two actors, Gustav Adolf and Wallenstein. 
 This shift is manifest in the application of a language of light, clarity, vision, 
spectacle, and phenomenon.  In fact, the story as Schiller tells it may be described as a 
series of illuminating moments constructing a larger event of progressive significance.  
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Already in the opening pages of Book One Schiller allows the destructive and 
constructive forces of the war to coalesce in a single light-producing causal relationship: 
“So wie die Flamme der Verwüstung aus dem Innern Böhmens, Mährens und Österreichs 
einen Weg fand, Deutschland, Frankreich, das halbe Europa zu entzünden, so wird die 
Fackel der Kultur von diesen Staaten aus einen Weg sich öffnen, jene Länder zu 
erleuchten” (“Just as the flame of devastation found its way out of the heart of Bohemia, 
Moravia, and Austria to ignite Germany, France, and half of the Europe, so the torch of 
culture will open its own way out of these states to illuminate those lands”).6  And when 
he immerses the reader in the details of individual actors, he analyzes their various 
successes and failures with respect to the ability to exercise far-sightedness regarding the 
progressive significance of the war.  The case of Henry IV of France is exemplary.  What 
Schiller calls Henry’s “lichtvolle Politik” (“enlightened politics”) is precisely his 
ambition to dislodge Habsburg Austria from its tyrannical position of power and replace 
it with a balanced state system.  Henry’s intentions are “enlightened” because, as 
“spectator to the unrest in Germany” (“Zuschauer der Unruhen in Deutschland”), he has 
been able to discern the root cause of the problem in Austria’s immoderate ambition.7
                                                             
6Schiller, Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Kriegs [1791-92], SW, 4:366.  Occasionally cited parenthetically 
as GDK with page number.  English translations are my own. 
  
Henry’s enlightened plan is compared to the “chimerical” (schimärisch) fantasies of 
others who desire a similar end yet lack the means or ambition to undertake such a 
campaign.  Henry is thus called a “statesman” (Staatsmann), a term Schiller reserves 
elsewhere for those keenly political minds who replace the fallen heroes Gustav Adolf 
and Wallenstein, but which nonetheless registers as compatible with the penetrating 
vision and enlightened policy of Henry in contrast to the “robbers” (Räuber) who, 
7Schiller, Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Kriegs, SW, 4:407-408.  
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according to Schiller, Henry must unfortunately rely on to see his plans through.  Henry 
desires a non-religious international cause against Habsburg tyranny; his German allies 
are blinded by their own religious prejudice and interest in self-aggrandizement 
(Religionshaß, Vergrößerungsbegierde), the very dynamics that Schiller naturally finds 
operative in the Thirty Years War and yet incompatible with its progressive position in 
history. 
 Henry is depicted as the historically far-sighted actor, able to penetrate the 
obscuring particularity of the moment to see into and thereby influence the future.  “Jeder 
große Mensch will für die Ewigkeit gearbeitet haben” (“Every great man desires to have 
worked for eternity”) is the motto under which Schiller evaluates Henry’s plan.  When it 
fails at his assassination, he writes: “Ravaillacs Messerstiche retteten Österreich, um die 
Ruhe von Europa noch um einige Jahrhunderte zu verspäten” (“The stab of Ravaillac’s 
knife saved Austria, only to postpone Europe’s peace by several centuries”).8
                                                             
8Schiller, Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Kriegs, SW, 4:408-409.  
  Schiller 
couples death and historical significance here as he will for Gustav Adolf and 
Wallenstein – the rhetorical implication is that Henry’s far-sightedness is most evident at 
his death, indeed that Henry’s ability to change the course of history becomes most 
incontestably clear when his light is extinguished, that events after Henry occurred as 
they did explicitly because of his absence.  Henry’s significance as a figure of interest in 
the history of the war is founded largely in the moment of his violent disappearance.  
Schiller’s method is to join the creative and destructive into a single compelling focal 
point: Henry’s own creativity, his ability to make history, is connected directly to his 
assassination just as the creative forces unleashed by the war (Erleuchtung, illumination) 
are generated by the war’s destructive capacity (Entzündung, the lighting of a fire).  
88 
 
Schiller’s use of this dual imagery of the creative and the destructive is also of course 
visual: the war both enflames and illuminates; Henry’s politics are enlightened, he 
disappears.  Schiller models his initial method as historian in Geschichte des 
Dreißigjährigen Kriegs in his authority to discern and interpret, within the landscape of 
events, visually compelling signs of historical progress otherwise obscured by 
destruction, even as they linger on the verge of disappearance.  As historian, he makes 
visible – on the level of event and then of actor. 
 Gustav Adolf, the King of Sweden and eventual leader of Protestant forces in 
Germany, is treated also as an eminently readable sign.  Indeed, Gustav’s selflessness, 
devotion to the German-Protestant cause against Habsburg-Catholic tyranny, his fairness 
with his allies and those he has defeated, and foremost his series of victories render him 
the embodiment of historical movement.  In Book Three Schiller provides an overview of 
Gustav’s progress as a highly visible phenomenon in the visual panorama of the war. 
Man erlaube mir, in einer kurzen Übersicht den siegreichen Marsch 
Gustav Adolfs zu verfolgen, den ganzen Schauplatz, auf welchem er allein 
handelnder Held ist, mit schnellen Blicken zu durcheilen und dann erst, 
wenn, durch das Glück der Schweden aufs äußerste gebracht und durch 
eine Reihe von Unglücksfällen gebeugt, Österreich von der Höhe seines 
Stolzes zu erniedrigenden und verzweifelnden Hülfsmitteln herabsteigt, 
den Faden der Geschichte zu dem Kaiser zurückzuführen.9
 
 
Allow me to follow Gustav Adolf’s victorious march in a brief overview, 
to rush with quick glimpses over the entire scene on which he is the only 
active hero; and only then, when Austria, pushed to the extreme by 
Swedish fortune and bent beneath a series of disasters, descends from the 
height of its pride to humiliating and desperate measures for assistance, to 
lead the thread of the story back to the emperor. 
 
This passage is a compendium of Schiller’s transformed methodological techniques.  He 
writes here as elsewhere of Schauplatz – the scene of spectacle – yet here Gustav Adolf’s 
                                                             
9Schiller, Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Kriegs, SW, 4:547.  
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actions unify the dispersed scenes of the war into a single area of action dominated by 
him.  The war is now his war, he is “the only active hero” – his action (handeln) 
generates the story of the war (Handlung – plot, narrative), and is also coded here as a 
thread (Faden) connecting several points of the story (from Gustav Adolf’s various 
exploits, back to the Emperor) into a single plot-like development.  Moreover, Gustav is 
an extremely visible figure, his unifying and directing action is discernible immediately 
(Übersicht, mit schnellen Blicken – overview, the quick glimpses) over a large area.  
Previously, illuminating figures like Henry IV emerged from and acted within a context 
of various and often competing motivations, in a history construed as the historian’s act 
of sorting through details and judging on the basis of an omniscient historical hindsight.  
Now Schiller portrays the war as Gustav Adolf’s personal spectacle.  And Schiller’s 
vision as historian comes to rest on the unifying and significant actions of his protagonist. 
 Schiller endows Gustav Adolf with the historical literacy he also found in Henry 
IV – a historical far-sightedness suggestive of Gustav Adolf’s ability to comprehend the 
deeper dynamics of his historical situation.  As Gustav Adolf succumbs to his own 
grandeur, Schiller describes the problem as one of inverted vision – excessive Zuversicht 
or over-confidence in his abilities compounded with an increasing feeling that his is a 
divine cause: “gern verwechselte er seine Sache mit der Sache des Himmels, erblickte 
[…] in sich selbst aber ein Werkzeug der göttlichen Rache” (“He gladly mistook his 
cause for a divine cause, saw […] in himself a tool of divine vengeance”).10
                                                             
10Schiller, Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Kriegs, SW, 4:541.  
  Eventually 
Gustav Adolf no longer models the far-sightedness Schiller finds in Henry IV; rather, his 
own gaze is turned entirely inward.  His death is timely, then, for it upholds the status of 
his actions as Erscheinung (appearance, phenomenon) of the higher, progressive 
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historical forces operative in the war – he remains, almost in spite of himself, a clear, 
legible sign.  Astonishingly (in contrast to his depiction of both Henry and Wallenstein), 
Schiller casts aside speculation that Gustav Adolf was assassinated by one of his own and 
concludes: 
Aber durch welche Hand er auch mag gefallen sein, so muß uns dieses 
außerdordentliche Schicksal als eine Tat der großen Natur erscheinen. Die 
Geschichte, sooft nur auf das freudenlose Geschäft eingeschränkt, das 
einförmige Spiel der menschlichen Leidenschaften auseinander zu legen, 
sieht sich zuweilen durch Erscheinungen belohnt, die gleich einem kühnen 
Griff aus den Wolken in das berechnete Uhrwerk der menschlichen 
Unternehmungen fallen und den nachdenkenden Geist auf eine höhere 
Ordnung der Dinge verweisen. So ergreift uns Gustav Adolfs schnelle 
Verschwindung vom Schauplatz, die das ganze Spiel des politischen 




But through whatever hand he may have fallen, this extraordinary destiny 
must appear to us as a deed of great nature.  History, so often reduced to 
that joyless business of dissecting the monotonous game of human 
passions, sees itself repaid from time to time with phenomena that fall into 
the calculated clockwork of human affairs like a clever trick from the 
heavens and point the reflective spirit toward a higher order of things.  In 
such a way are we grasped by Gustav Adolf’s sudden disappearance from 
the scene, which all at once obstructed the entire play of the political 
clockwork and foiled the calculations of human cunning. 
 
Gustav Adolf remains semiotically transparent and thus reliably legible.  And Schiller 
suggests here why he has come to rely so strongly on Gustav Adolf: “Die Geschichte […] 
sieht sich zuweilen durch Erscheinungen belohnt” (“History […] sees itself repaid from 
time to time with phenomena”).  Because Schiller has elevated Gustav Adolf in the 
narrative to the level of the great, history-making individual, Gustav Adolf then becomes 
a model for the transparency that Schiller desires as a historian.  
 Wallenstein undoes this transparency.  He is a figure of unclear intentions and 
ambiguous loyalty.  Deposed as general in the Imperial armies owing to court intrigue, he 
                                                             
11Schiller, Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Kriegs, SW, 4:636-637.  
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demonstrates his loyalty to the Emperor by retiring to Prague.  Schiller devotes an entire 
page to describing the extent of his palace, the numbers of attendants and pages, the 
luxury and sumptuary, the magnificent seclusion of Wallenstein’s retirement before 
summarizing: “In dieser prahlerischen Dunkelheit erwartete Wallenstein still, doch nicht 
müßig seine glänzende Stunde und der Rache aufgehenden Tag” (“In this ostentatious 
obscurity Wallenstein awaited, quietly but not idly, his shining hour and the dawning of 
the day of revenge”).12
 Nevertheless, after he has recounted the details of Wallenstein’s conspiracy and 
assassination at the end of Book Four, Schiller must admit his dissatisfaction with the 
resultant image of the man, not least owing to the partiality of his sources. 
  The image is a striking reversal of that of Gustav Adolf in terms 
of visual quality and semiotic transparency.  For, Gustav Adolf’s action alone succeeded, 
in Schiller’s eyes, in uniting the many centers of gravity and extremes of the war into a 
single meaningful narrative.  By contrast, Wallenstein’s retirement casts a visually 
brilliant image but he himself is secluded to the point of invisibility, and his anticipation 
of action (revenge – figured here as a bright future in contrast to the dark present) 
frustrates the forward motion of the narrative by standing outside of it (Wallenstein does 
not act, he waits to act).  Yet the metaphors of light Schiller employs to describe 
Wallenstein’s secret ruminations – the shining hour, the dawning day – also suggest that 
for Schiller eventual action will still be meaningful. 
Denn endlich muß man zur Steuer der Gerechtigkeit gestehen, daß es nicht 
ganz treue Federn sind, die uns die Geschichte dieses außerordentlichen 
Mannes überliefert haben; daß die Verräterei des Herzogs und sein 
Entwurf auf die böhmische Krone sich auf keine streng bewiesene 
Tatsache, bloß auf wahrscheinliche Vermutungen gründen. Noch hat sich 
das Dokument nicht gefunden, das uns die geheimen Triebfedern seines 
Handelns mit historischer Zuverlässigkeit aufdeckte, und unter seinen 
                                                             
12Schiller, Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Kriegs, SW, 4:491-492.  
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öffentlichen, allgemein beglaubigten Taten ist keine, die nicht endlich aus 
einer unschuldigen Quelle könnte geflossen sein. Viele seiner getadeltsten 
Schritte beweisen bloß seine ernstliche Neigung zum Frieden […]13
 
 
For in the end one must admit, to the assessment of justice, that the story 
of this extraordinary man has been transmitted to us by not entirely 
faithful pens, and that the duke’s treason and his design on the Bohemian 
crown are based on no rigorously proven fact but merely upon conjecture 
of probability.  The document remains as yet unfound that would reveal to 
us with historical reliability the secret springs of his actions, and among 
his public and generally verified deeds there is none that could not 
ultimately have emanated from an innocent source.  Many of his most 
reproved steps attest merely to his serious inclination toward peace […] 
 
Wallenstein is one of two men in the narrative who tower over the events of their time 
and act as forces of history, yet with his death we are at a loss.  Up to this point in his 
narrative Schiller has rather painstakingly charted the course of his conspiracy; suddenly 
this detailed narrative becomes utterly unreliable, and our need to understand Wallenstein 
grows with his increased obscurity.  No less: whereas Gustav Adolf vindicates the efforts 
of the historian, Wallenstein merely reproduces obscurity by calling into question the 
nature of those sources that transmit his story.  The documents attesting to Wallenstein’s 
guilt as a conspirator are belied by the intuition that matters might have been different.  
Finally, Schiller’s dissatisfaction in his depiction of the events leading to Wallenstein’s 
assassination must be also be understood as a failure in the structure of historical 
movement in the narrative, for the extreme legibility that connected the lives and violent 
deaths of Henry and Gustav into particular (if also differing) moments of profound 
historical understanding is in the case of Wallenstein utterly absent.  In the place of 
certainly about the operation of history, Schiller now has only speculation and doubt. 
 By the end of Book Four, Schiller’s Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Kriegs has 
become a reflection on the obscurity of historical knowledge.  Indeed, the trajectory he 
                                                             
13Schiller, Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Kriegs, SW, 4:688.  
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establishes over the course of these first four of the five books – from pan-optic and 
omniscient narrator whose task is to see, to the actor whose visual actions provide 
knowledge, to the actor whose visual obscurity obstructs knowledge – suggests that for 
Schiller ultimately the foundation of historical knowledge itself is now the visibility and 
legibility of the historical actor as sign of history’s meaning.  Because the actor as sign – 
at times clear and legible, at times obscure and illegible – is now the medium for the 
transmission of meaning, the explicit representation of history (as narrative) is now a 
different challenge: the representation of the historical actor.  In this regard Wallenstein, 
although obscure, is nevertheless a clearly delineated representational problem. 
 
Aesthetics and the transition from history to drama 
This representational problem involves historical actors at that moment in time 
when their action has reached a peak not only in its ability to influence circumstance but 
also in its susceptibility to the contingency of circumstance.  In the three cases discussed 
above – Henry IV, Gustav Adolf, and Wallenstein – this peak resulted in death.  Indeed, 
at least with regard to Henry IV and Wallenstein, Schiller makes clear that their 
assassination, the instance in which it becomes clear that they are no longer in control of 
their circumstances, is the result of their ambition.  The coupling of death and historical 
significance, of extinguishing and illumination, yields a pivotal moment in historical time 
incarnate with extreme clarity in the action and reaction of the individual.  Schiller 
devotes his attention to the representation of individual action in time – to the 
aestheticization of the historical actor –  in his aesthetic thought of the 1790s. 
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In order to reprise the stakes of aestheticization, I want to jump ahead briefly from 
the early 1790s, when Schiller finished Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Kriegs and began 
his aesthetic work in the wake of his reading of Kant, to 1797 when his work on the 
Wallenstein trilogy was already underway.  During this later period he also participated 
with Goethe in the project of defining the respective spheres of operation of the various 
genres: the dramatic, the epic, the visual.  In the letter to Goethe dated September 14-15, 
1797 (also discussed in the previous chapter) Schiller lays out a process he calls absolute 
Bestimmung des Gegenstands (absolute determination of the object), and explains as well 
why he finds this process necessary.  Foremost, absolute determination of the object 
involves the selection of an object appropriate for the genre; the reduction of the 
empirical particularity of the object to the point where the object now mediates general or 
universal truths; and the placement of the object in the most fitting moment in time – 
what Schiller calls the praegnanter Moment (pregnant moment). 14
                                                             
14Schiller to Goethe, September 14-15, 1797), WuB, 12:321-323. 
  This process of 
absolute determination is intended to render the object suitable for poetic representation 
while still maintaining its particular, sensual, empirical qualities – lest the poet otherwise 
draw too heavily on the imagination at the expense of experience (however abstracted in 
its passage into the work of art).  Its overall import is that it renders the particular objects 
of the empirically known world as vehicles for the representation and knowledge of the 
universal.  When Schiller admits that his rendering of Wallenstein’s assassination in 
Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Kriegs is unsatisfactory, he formulates a representational 
problem that he eventually works through to the point of a theory of representation 
articulated in the 1797 letter – how to make sense of Wallenstein the man, at a moment in 
history that seems to define him yet that remains unclear. 
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Moreover, the moment of Wallenstein’s assassination with its attendant and 
unanswerable questions will become the object of the Wallenstein trilogy.  Schiller in fact 
had no little difficulty disciplining the vast material at his disposal for the trilogy, but 
eventually found the solution to his problem, in part under the influence of Goethe’s 1797 
essay Über Laokoon, by structuring the trilogy around its own pregnant moment as a 
dramatic turning point – as it were, he returns, by way of an Aristotelian concept 
contested by Lessing and Goethe, to his own earlier historiographical practice of 
privileging the moment in historical time at which charismatic agency meets an end that 
it has summoned itself. 15
Der Moment der Handlung ist so prägnant, daß alles was zur 
Vollständigkeit derselben gehört, natürlich ja in gewißem Sinn 
nothwendig darinn liegt, daraus hervor geht. Es bleibt nichts blindes 
darinn, nach allen Seiten ist es geöfnet. Zugleich gelang es mir, die 
Handlung gleich von Anfang in eine solche Præcitipation und Neigung zu 
bringen, daß sie in steetiger und beschleunigter Bewegung zu ihrem Ende 
eilt. Da der Hauptcharakter eigentlich retardierend ist, so thun die 
Umstände eigentlich alles zur Crise und dieß wird, wie ich denke, den 
tragischen Eindruck sehr erhöhen.
  Lessing regarded the pregnant moment as the moment 
anticipating that which ought not to be represented visually – the pregnant moment is the 
moment of anticipation, also sometimes of fear.  Goethe by contrast argued in his essay 
on Laocoon that the pregnant moment is transitional and thereby also of the highest 
aesthetic order in its capacity to stimulate the senses.  Schiller explains in a letter to 




The moment of the action is so pregnant, that everything pertaining to its 
completion must in a certain sense naturally lie in it and proceed from it.  
Nothing blind remains, it is open in every direction.  At the same time I 
succeeded in bringing the action immediately from the beginning in such a 
                                                             
15Ilse Graham discusses the Goethe-Schiller correspondence concerning Über Laokoon  and Schiller’s 
return to work on Wallenstein in October, 1797 in Schiller’s Drama: Talent and Integrity (London: 
Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1974), 245-283. 
16Schiller to Goethe, October 2, 1797, excerpted in Schiller, SW, 4:621-622.  
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precipitation and decline that it rushes to its end in constant and 
accelerated motion.  As the main character is actually retarding, it is the 
circumstances that bring everything to crisis and this, I think, will quite 
elevate the tragic impact. 
 
If Lessing theorizes the correct moment for representation (a moment of anticipation), 
and Goethe theorizes the representation of the moment (the sensual stimulation of 
transition), Schiller dramatizes what occurs within this moment.  He opens it up to 
scrutiny as his primary aesthetic object, and he offers a dramatized narrative of what 
occurs within its tight confines that will precipitate a rapid end.17
 But, as a dramatization for the stage, this moment will be presented both visually 
and verbally.  The acceleration from beginning to tragic end occurs not only through 
action performed for spectators, but also through language that comments on action, 
summons action, seeks to prevent action, arouses reaction.  And yet this language is part 
of a visual spectacle.  As I have suggested, and will subsequently argue, Schiller’s 
problem – for the solution to which he turns to the structuring device of the pregnant 
moment – is that of the representation of the historical actor at a moment in time when 
  Indeed, his effort at the 
total exposure of the moment – such that, in his words, there is no blind spot, everything 
is open – entails as well a nearly three-dimensional approach to time in space.  In 
referring to Wallenstein as a retarding force, Schiller employs the vocabulary of epic 
narrative time he and Goethe had explicated in Über epische und dramatische Dichtung 
to describe movement within narrative: the central action accelerates and the main 
character slows down, inducing a tragic clash that is unfolded in an extended present 
realized spatially on the stage. 
                                                             
17For this comparison of Lessing and Goethe, see Inka Mülder-Bach, “Sichtbarkeit und Lesbarkeit. Goethes 
Aufsatz Über Laokoon,” in Das Laokoon-Paradigma. Zeichenregime im 18. Jahrhundert, Inge Baxmann, 
Michael Franz, and Wolfgang Schäffner, Eds. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2000), 474. 
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this actor’s actions, even fatal actions, seem to clarify the meaning of events, to provide 
coherence.  This problem grows more acute with Wallenstein, for his death does have the 
same clarifying, ordering effect of the deaths of Henry IV or Gustav Adolf.  The pregnant 
moment of the drama is not unfolded through dramatic language alone, but also through 
action – specifically, action that is also meaningful, even in its capacity to rub against the 
language of the drama. 
I turn to the concept of Charakter in order to consider how the pregnant moment 
of the drama may also be unfolded through action.  Charakter and das Charakteristische 
are prominent concepts in the aesthetic thought of the period, referring to a category of 
knowledge about the psychic constitution or essence of the individual to be gained 
sensually from the individual’s expressive action. 18   Contemporary to Schiller, for 
example, Heinrich Meyer defines Charakterbild (the image of character) as that category 
of visual representation in which action serves the better to represent the essential nature 
of the human subject depicted.  Meyer writes in Über die Gegenstände der bildenden 
Kunst (On the Objects of the Visual Arts, 1798): “Es sind Abbildungen vom Menschen 
selbst, von seinem Wesen, seinem Innern, nicht nur eine unbedeutende Ähnlichkeit mit 
der äußern Gestalt derselben”  (“They are illustrations of humanity itself, of its essence, 
its interior, not only an insignificant similarity to the latter’s exterior form.”)19
                                                             
18For a general overview of the concept Charakter see Thomas Bremer, “Charakter/das Charakteristische,” 
Ästhetische Grundbegriffe. Historisches Wörterbuch in sieben Bänden, Volume 1, Karlheinz Barck et al., 
Ed. (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler Verlag, 2000-), 772-794. 
  The act 
19Johann Heinrich Meyer, Über die Gegenstände der bildenden Kunst, in Klassik und Klassizismus, Helmut 
Pfotenhauer and Peter Sprengel, Eds. (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1995), 173.  I 
should point out that Meyer’s is by no means the reigning understanding of Charakter in the period.  
Writing also of the arts, specifically of the concept of das Kunstschöne (the artistically beautiful, the 
beautiful in art), Alois Hirt describes Charakteristik more as a matter of appearance than of an inner 
essence conveyed visually.  But this should not be taken as superficial by comparison with Meyer’s 
understanding.  For Hirt, Charakteristik is achieved in the work of art when parts retain their object-
specific individuality while also tending toward the completion of a whole suggesting of the purposiveness 
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breaks through the potential deception of appearance to reveal interior motivation and 
define the actor.  It is useful to recall that in Meyer’s scheme of representational modes 
(discussed at greater length in first chapter) Charakterbild is close to yet evaluated more 
highly than historische Darstellung (historical depiction).  The latter uses the individual 
actor as a visual device for representing time; the former uses the action in time to 
express the individual.  This couplet is reminiscent of Schiller’s own historiographical 
penchant in Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Kriegs for focusing on the creative-
destructive moment in time at which individual action is overcome by a historical 
dynamic of its own making, whereby the significance of action itself and of the role of 
the individual grows most clear.  Meyer’s privileging the image of character over the 
image of time accords with his search for a stable symbolic in visual representation.  For 
Schiller, however, the drama concerns the passage of time marked by the disappearance 
of the great individual – the task of understanding the passage of time is inseparable from 
the revelation of individual motivation.  Charakter becomes an aesthetic site for reducing 
the complex interplay of human action and reaction to a sign of the passage of time 
incarnate in the active individual.   
I believe that Schiller offers a model for gauging Charakter in action and gesture 
in the essays Kallias oder über die Schönheit (Kallias or On Beauty, letters from Schiller 
to Körner, dated 1792-1793, first published in 1847) and Über Anmut und Würde (On 
Grace and Dignity, 1793).  He does not explicitly address the issue of Charakter in these 
essays; rather, his focus is beauty.  His basic contention is that beauty is freedom given in 
appearance to the intuition.  Natural beauty and the beauty of art occur as the result of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
of the work of art.  See Alois Hirt, “Versuch über das Kunstschöne” [1797] in Die Horen Jahrgang 1797 
(Weimar: Verlag Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 2000),623-659. 
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complex of natural determinations or aesthetic regulations (Schiller’s general term is 
Technik, technique or technology) – form is a product of an array of external influences.  
But a judgment of beauty may not inquire into this underlying technique or technology – 
beauty must appear as freely determined by the object, as heautonomous (self-legislated), 
not as the result of heteronomous influence.  On the human level, grace is the appearance 
of beauty in movement and action that may be intuited as the sign of harmony between 
human will and purpose.  Grace as the unintended effect of action must also appear as the 
result of a heautonomous concordance between material circumstance (what Schiller 
refers to as Materie des Willens and as Zweck, matter/material of the will and purpose) 
and psychic state (Form des Willens and Gesinnung – form of the will and 
attitude/disposition) – when the action is graceful, the actor appears to will what is also 
necessary, to be psychically disposed toward the exterior constraints of action. 20
                                                             
20Schiller, Kallias oder Über die Schönheit. Briefe an Gottfried Körner, SW, 5: 394-433.  See especially 
the section dated “Jena, den 23. Februar 1793” (408-426).  And Schiller, Über Anmut und Würde, SW, 
5:434-435. 
  
Notwithstanding the emphasis on beauty and grace – the essays’ contributions to 
Schiller’s inquiry into the objective ground of the judgment of beauty  – what remains is 
a theory for gauging the momentary relation between will and constraint visually in the 
sensual impression left by action.  When the central question concerns beauty and grace, 
Schiller expressly demands that the technical dynamics of beauty and grace be of no 
concern to the intuition.  Nevertheless, he delineates a visual technique for inquiring 
specifically into action as the product of an interplay between the will of the actor and the 
heteronomy of exterior forces that influence the will, a technique focused on the body 
and expressive motion of the actor as indicative of the psychic disposition of the actor.  
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The actor also becomes the locus and particular, performative embodiment of the 
confluence of motives that can induce change over time. 
Schiller’s more purely philosophical inquiry into beauty is accompanied, even 
underpinned and substantiated by an inquiry into the visual experience of the general 
made flesh in the actor in the embodiment of conflict between will and constraint.21  In 
this respect Schiller’s attention to the body and to gesture as signs that convey meaning is 
very much a part of the concern for the status and technique of the actor initiated earlier 
in the 18th century.  It has been argued that Schiller (among others) abandoned the 
naturalism associated with bürgerliches Trauerspiel and taken to an extreme in the 
dramatic production of Sturm und Drang, in favor of a more symbolic understanding of 
the function and appearance of the actor as staged embodiment of a generalized human 
experience.  In Über Anmut und Würde he even expresses skepticism that the stage actor 
will ever be able to learn or properly imitate the gesture expressive of the state of the soul 
from within the medium of acting itself – when it comes to grace, to true expressive and 
revealing gesture, the actor must draw from human experience.  The stage actor is now 
but an abstraction and formalization of the human condition of will struggling with 
necessity.22
                                                             
21John Guthrie’s recent study of the role of gesture in Schiller’s dramas, for example, places this inquiry in 
several contexts, including Schiller’s medical studies, and also the reforms of acting undertaken in the 18th 
century, involving an increasing naturalism and attention to gesture.  See John Guthrie, Schiller the 
Dramatist: A Study of Gesture in the Plays (Rochester: Camden House, 2009), especially 1-46.  For more 
information on the German theater, the acting reform, and the attention to the actor’s body, see also 
Michael Sosulski, Theater and Nation in Eighteenth-Century Germany (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing 
Company, 2007) and Erika Fischer-Lichte, History of European Drama and Theatre (New York: 
Routledge, 2002). 
  Schiller refashions the actor on the stage as the formal site and visual object 
for observing the general forces operative in the movement of history, incarnated in the 
individual and rendered most perceptible at the moment of their most intense interaction. 




Wallenstein: speech, vision, and action 
 With the Wallenstein trilogy, Schiller brings together these strands of thought in a 
portrayal of the great individual not merely at a pivotal or pregnant moment in time, but 
visibly working against the current of the moment.  Moreover, by dramatizing a moment 
in time, he thereby expands this moment into an unfolding series of constituent 
developments – the passage of time is rendered visible in stage actors enacting a moment 
in historical time.  Moreover, the meaning of action and the search for an authority that 
will sanction correct action are configured as a tension between words – historical 
narrative, debate, even the individual word – and vision stimulated variously by the 
deceptive sign or the sign signifying real transformation in the dynamics of power that 
constitute the moment. 
 The structure and development of the trilogy reflect and sort out this interplay by 
concentrating on those around Wallenstein before concentrating on Wallenstein himself, 
while simultaneously modeling an anticipation of the future that ultimately devolves 
upon Wallenstein.  In Wallensteins Lager (Wallenstein’s Camp) the army, camped before 
Pilsen (Wallenstein’s winter quarters) debates Wallenstein’s reputation and speculates on 
his future course of action.  As the title Die Piccolomini (The Piccolomini) suggests, the 
second part concerns the machinations of Wallenstein’s closest and most trusted advisors, 
among them his oldest comrade Octavio Piccolomini and Octavio’s son Max, who also 
enjoys the unique paternal affection of Wallenstein.  Wallensteins Tod (Wallenstein’s 
Death) presents Wallenstein at the moment in which his plan (to defect from imperial 
service and ally himself and his forces with the Swedes) has been discovered and he is 
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forced to take decisive action.  Matters climax in Wallensteins Tod as Wallenstein is also 
confronted by conspiracies and ambitions developing over the course of the trilogy: 
several of Wallenstein’s confidants, foremost Octavio Piccolomini, defect to the imperial 
cause; Max Piccolomini is rejected as an appropriate suitor for Wallenstein’s daughter; 
and Wallenstein’s soldiers, refusing to ally themselves with the Swedes, take up arms 
against their general. 
 The moment of the drama begins far in advance of this climax, however.  The 
tension between anticipation and action gains momentum already from the beginning of 
Wallensteins Lager. Here the army is camped and inactive before the city of Pilsen; 
Wallenstein and his generals are in Pilsen; his wife and daughter have just arrived, as has 
the imperial ambassador Questenberg.  Pilsen is the stage upon which history will 
presently unfold, and the growing army is an audience left to its own devices and 
distractions. 
 Schiller stages the impatient, and spectatorial, anticipation of the army in terms of 
the search for reliable signs and the distraction of the unreliable.  In Scene 2, for example, 
the Sergeant-Major (Wachtmeister) and Trumpeter (Trompeter) wonder why the army 
has received doubled pay despite that it is camped and inactive.  The Trumpeter avers 
that it is in honor of the arrival of Wallenstein’s wife and daughter, to which the 
Sergeant-Major responds: “Das ist nur der Schein” (“That’s just for show”).23
                                                             
23Friedrich Schiller, Wallensteins Lager, 2.58, SW, 2.  Translation: Friedrich Schiller, Wallenstein’s Camp, 
in The Robbers and Wallenstein, translated by F.J. Lamport (New York: Penguin Putnam, 1979), 177. 
  In his 
opinion, the increase in pay is intended to induce the army at Pilsen to welcome and 
entertain new soldiers arriving from throughout the empire – which leads to further 
speculation on why the army and its leadership are amassing in full force, and why an 
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imperial ambassador has arrived (he is identified not by name but by his wig and gold 
chain of office).  Speculation on the meaning of events is configured in terms of a 
distracting Schein (show, appearance) that obscures the real dynamics of the moment, 
referenced by the term Werk in the Trumpeter’s declaration: “Ja, es ist wieder was im 
Werke!” (“Yes, there is something in the works again!”).24  Their success in focusing 
attention on an event of significance is immediately undone in the brief Scene 3 in a 
dispute over jewelry and gambling that appropriates and debases the language of 
appearance, sign, meaning.  The Sharpshooter (Scharfschütz) and Croat (Kroat) argue 
over a necklace.  The Sharpshooter offers the Croat a fine blue cap which he claims to 
have won “im Glücksrad” (“on the wheel of fortune”).  His reasoning is merely: “Es ist 
mir nur um den schönen Schein” (“I only want it for the show”).25  The two exchange as 
the Sharpshooter declares to the Trumpeter and Sergeant-Major: “Wir tauschen hier! Die 
Herrn sind Zeugen!” (“We’re exchanging here!  The gentlemen are our witnesses!”).26
                                                             
24Schiller, Wallensteins Lager 2.65. 
  
The “Glücksrad” announces a revolution in the use of basic elements of discourse, and 
their continued recycling throughout Wallensteins Lager, adding as well the notion of 
chance that undermines the decisiveness sought by the Sergeant-Major and Trumpeter in 
Scene 2.  Scene 3 pushes the discourse on historical events (the arrival of the duchess and 
daughter, the gathering of the armies, the presence of the Viennese ambassador) in a 
banal, even distracting direction, figured in the Sharpshooter’s admission “Es ist mir nur 
um den schönen Schein” (“I only want it for the show”).  For, this utterance is in drastic 
opposition to the Sergeant-Major’s previous dismissal of the arrival of Wallenstein’s 
family as Schein, an event of no real explanatory meaning and one that obscures a truth.  
25Schiller, Wallensteins Lager 3.100.  Translation: Schiller, Wallenstein’s Camp, 179.  
26Schiller, Wallensteins Lager 3.104.  
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Formerly employed rhetorically to signal distraction from the true inner working of the 
moment, Schein is now the preferred object of attention.  The “show” of the ritual arrival 
of the duchess and daughter, or of the necklace, become routinized as the standard of 
“appearance”(another translation of Schein) – what appears is now called into question, 
and a more concerted viewing (the zeugen, witnessing, of the Trumpeter and Sergeant-
Major) become deceptive and debased acts. 
 The distraction of vision and the preference for the superficial in the search for 
meaning are symptomatic of a lack of action in the camp.  The soldiers present 
themselves as men of the deed, not the word, and so the winter’s inactive anticipation of 
what Wallenstein will do assumes the form of a torrent of words.  Indeed, Wallensteins 
Lager is given over entirely to the depiction of soldiers talking, yet typically without 
resolving the issue of what the future holds.  Wallenstein’s own motto is cited by the 
Wachtmeister for the purpose of legitimating discussion – “So sagt er, ich hörts wohl 
einigemal, / Ich stand dabei. »Das Wort ist frei, / Die Tat ist stumm, der Gehorsam 
blind«, / Dies urkundlich seine Worte sind” (“I heard him say so a number of times. / 
Now let me see – Yes: ‘Speech is free, / Action is silent, obedience blind,’ / Those are his 
very words, you’ll find”). 27
ERSTER JÄGER. Lief ich darum aus der Schul und der Lehre, 
  Yet the freedom of speech also sanctions the absolute 
variance of the word, its incapacity to convey meaning, in contrast to the wordless, 
unreflective deed.  The speech of the First Trooper (erster Jäger) in Scene 6 exemplifies 
the conflict between word and deed while also underscoring the soldier’s expectation of 
action. 
 Daß ich die Fron und die Galeere, 
 Die Schreibstub und ihre engen Wände 
                                                             
27Schiller, Wallensteins Lager, 6.338-341.  Translation: Schiller, Wallenstein’s Camp, 187.  
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 In dem Feldlager wiederfände? – 
 Flott will ich leben und müßig gehn, 
 Alle Tag was Neues sehn, 
 Mich dem Augenblick frisch vertrauen, 
 Nicht zurück, auch nicht vorwärts schauen – 
 Drum hab ich meine Haut dem Kaiser verhandelt, 
 Daß keine Sorg mich mehr anwandelt.28
 
  (WL 6.238-247) 
FIRST RIFLEMAN:  Did I run away from my desk in the school 
 Only to find the same labour and rule, 
 The narrow study, the toil and the cramp 
 Awaiting me here in the soldier’s camp? 
 I want to live well, not have too much to do, 
 Every day of my life see something new, 
 Cheerfully seize the moment, in sum, 
 Not brood on the past, nor on things to come –  
 That’s why I’ve sold Ferdinand my skin: 
 In the face of care I can merrily grin. 
 
The freedom of speech is a quality of its variability and its association with the specific 
and troubling over-stimulation of choice and an excess of thought.  In the motto, free 
speech is contrasted with the deed and an obedience stripped of sensual and expressive 
faculties (silence/muteness, blindness).  In the First Trooper’s speech, the life of action is 
optically enticing but also given over to an immediacy of sensory stimulation at the 
expense of an expanded faculty of vision (a shift described in temporal terms such as Alle 
Tag, dem Augenblick, Nicht zurück, nicht vorwärts – translatable as “every day, the 
moment, not backwards, not forwards”).  Despite that the soldiers appropriate 
Wallenstein’s sanctioned freedom of the word when they argue, they prefer a life of 
action in the present moment, without the care associated with the word: “Drum hab ich 
meine Haut dem Kaiser verhandelt, / Daß keine Sorg mich mehr anwandelt” (“That’s 
why I’ve sold Ferdinand my skin: / In the face of care I can merrily grin.”). 
                                                             
28Schiller, Wallensteins Lager, 6.238-247.  Translation: Schiller, Wallenstein’s Camp, 184.  
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 The relationship between the deed and the moment bears upon the understanding 
of historical movement operative at the root of these discourses.  In “selling his skin” to 
the emperor the First Trooper is no more free than he was in the servitude of schooling.  
But in referencing a freedom from the confinement of the walls of the school (likened to 
imprisonment) and the freedom from deliberation configured temporally as a carelessness 
about time, the First Trooper formulates a crude definition of freedom as residing in 
action and movement in the present.  This unreflective and temporally careless action 
nonetheless is held to resonate in time and to make history, as the Second Trooper 
(zweiter Jäger) attests in another monolog recounting the exploits of the Holkische Jäger: 
“Wo wir nur durchgekommen sind – / Erzählen Kinder und Kindeskind / Nach hundert 
und aber hundert Jahren / Von dem Holk noch und seinen Scharen” (“Everywhere we 
have left our trail, / Generations will tell the tale/ For a hundred years and a hundred more 
/ Of Holk and his men and their deeds in this war”).29
 In their inactivity, configured in an excess of speech and debate, the soldiers 
sentimentalize the active life of the past and await the deeds of the future.  Their 
inactivity is figured in terms of endless speech about action, and speculation on current 
events that seeks unsuccessfully to determine the nature of the moment from visual signs.  
The fundamental problem is not that vision itself is unreliable, nor for that matter that the 
army lacks visual prowess.  Already in Scene 2 a discussion of appearance and meaning 
  History takes the form speech or 
words long after the fact, but it is the deed – action, motion, the clearly visible and easily 
interpreted (“Wo wir nur durchgekommen sind” – also translatable as “Wherever we 
have merely passed through”) – that makes history in a moment in which one trusts 
oneself entirely to the present. 
                                                             
29Schiller, Wallensteins Lager, 6.212-231.  Translation: Schiller, Wallenstein’s Camp, 184.  
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led the Sergeant-Major and Trumpeter to the conclusion that events of importance (“Ja, 
es ist wieder was im Werke” – “Yes, there is something in the works again”) are 
occurring beneath a layer of distracting signs (Schein).  But events past, present, and 
future revolve around Wallenstein, who is physically absent,  His abstract presence is 
figured in speech about him, references to him that avoid naming him directly (he is more 
commonly referred to as der Fürst, der Friedländer – the Prince, Friedland); and his own 
image on a coin adduced in the final scene of Wallensteins Lager as proof of 
Wallenstein’s authority.  As men of action the soldiers have not doubted the source of 
authority; yet when camped and enjoying an unusual leisure of endless talk, they cast 
about desperately for signs of the authority that will inspire action, indeed for any sign of 
meaning.  If the soldiers suffer an excess of inactive talk, they also suffer an unusually 
high degree of visual stimulation without satisfaction – in a reversal of Wallenstein’s 
motto, with no one to obey the army is no longer blind.  It becomes rather an audience 
impatient for the spectacle that will restart the forward motion of time.  
 Schiller redeploys the motifs of Wallensteins Lager in Die Piccolomini – the 
meaning of signs, the conflict between word and vision, the interpretation of the image.  
Yet the situation is from the outset of the second part of the trilogy quite different: 
whereas the camp is as a stage and the army an audience, in the Pilsen town hall we have 
actors on the stage, the active objects of the army’s anticipation.  Schiller describes the 
scene in the initial stage direction as “Ein alter gotischer Saal auf dem Rathause zu 
Pilsen, mit Fahnen und anderm Kriegsgeräte dekoriert” (“A large old Gothic room in the 
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Town Hall of Pilsen, decorated with banners and other warlike trophies”).30
 For example, the arrival of the duchess and daughter at Pilsen is described by 
Isolani, one of Wallenstein’s generals, in terms of delightful visual distraction in Act I 
Scene 1.  “Und siehe da! der Herzog sorgt dafür, / daß auch was Holdes uns das Aug 
ergötze” (“But look!  The duke has taken care to find / Some fairer object for our eyes as 
well”).
  The town 
hall is the current seat of power and location of those actors whose authority and decision 
influence the outside world, including the camp, an interior world in which the outside 
world is discussed, even influenced, yet at a distance, and – as will be demonstrated – 
often literally not clearly seen.  If the camp is prey to an excess of visual stimulation, the 
town hall will often suffer from the lack of it. 
31  Isolani’s expression of visual delight is accompanied, however, by a parallel 
conversation between Illo and Buttler concerning the absence of some of Wallenstein’s 
other generals.  The stage direction reads: “Illo (der nachdenkendgestanden, zu Buttlern, 
den er ein wenig auf die Seite führt)” (“Illo [who has been standing musing, to Butler, 
drawing him aside a little]).”  While the imperative of vision (“Und siehe da!” – “But 
look!”) locates a distracting spectacle, the hushed private conversation is accompanied by 
reflection and the probing of details in order to arrive at a truth: “Wie wißt Ihr, daß Graf 
Gallas außenbleibt?” (“How do you know that Gallas will not come?”).32
                                                             
30Friedrich Schiller, Die Piccolomini, Act I Scene 1, SW, 2:315.  The English is from Friedrich Schiller, 
The Piccolomini, in The Robbers and Wallenstein, translated by F.J. Lamport (New York: Penguin Putnam, 
1979), 220. 
  That these 
instances occur simultaneously on the stage signals a development in Die Piccolomini 
that distinguishes it from Wallensteins Lager: whereas in the first part the army as a 
whole works through its visual and verbal search for knowledge, authority, and action, in 
31Schiller, Die Piccolomini, I.1.38-39.  Translation: Schiller, The Piccolomini, 220.  
32Schiller, Die Piccolomini, I.1.40.  Translation: Schiller, The Piccolomini, 220.  
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Die Piccolomini the stage is occupied by competing versions of knowledge and 
competing attempts to direct action.  What the army seeks in the first part is enacted on 
stage in the second in a dramatization of attempts to instigate action and move history, 
with its own accompanying dynamic of verbal disagreement and the insignificance of the 
word, keen insight and impairment of vision. 
 As in Wallensteins Lager so too in Die Piccolomini the problematic aspect of 
vision is not unreliability but rather a susceptibility to distraction on the part of the 
beholder and the need for a penetrating visual prowess.  This becomes explicit in a 
private conversation between Questenberg and Octavio Piccolomini.  Questenberg 
professes shock to discover the imperial army’s exclusive loyalty to Wallenstein, thereby 
emphasizing that his eyes, closed in Vienna, are now open: “Wir sahens nur mit 
Höflingsaugen an, / Die von dem Glanz des Throns geblendet waren; / Den Feldherrn 
hatten wir noch nicht gesehn, / Den allvermögenden, in seinem Lager” (“We saw these 
things with our courtiers’ eyes, / Still blinded by the throne’s imperial blaze; / The 
general himself we had not seen, /All-powerful, encamped amidst his troops”). 33
                                                             
33Schiller, Die Piccolomini, I.3.289-292.  Translation: Schiller, The Piccolomini, 229.  
  
Questenberg contrasts a vision that suffers impairment or distortion both physically (the 
vision of Wallenstein impaired by the optical brilliance of the imperial throne) and 
cognitively (in the courtiers’ imagination that authority emanates from the throne), with 
the more direct vision of experience.  Furthermore, Questenberg’s experience in camp 
invites comparison with the experience of others: the visual capabilities of Wallenstein’s 
soldiers are, as we have seen, severely burdened by over-stimulation and thus waver 
between the perception of Werk and the distraction of Schein.  For Questenberg, the 
visual experience of the camp has been one of perceptive penetration that succeeds in 
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recognizing and understanding the implications of a basic semiotic and power 
realignment: “Hier ist kein Kaiser mehr. Der Fürst ist Kaiser!” (“Here is no Emperor 
more. The Prince is Emperor!”).34
 Yet Questenberg’s visual prowess falters shortly thereafter, during a confrontation 
with Max Piccolomini.  It becomes clear to Octavio that his son, who has just escorted 
Wallenstein’s wife and daughter from Carinthia to Bohemia, has fallen in love with 
Thekla, the daughter.  Max reveals this indirectly in passionate terms of having seen 
peace in lands hitherto untouched by war – a contention Octavio and Questenberg do not 
dismiss; indeed, Questenberg emotionally corroborates the veracity of this vision.  
Questenberg also confidently dismisses as delusion Max’s expressed devotion to 
Wallenstein and his harsh criticism of the Viennese court, after Max has left the scene, 
and pleads with Octavio: “und wir lassen ihn in diesem Wahn / Dahingehen, rufen ihn 
nicht gleich / Zurück, daß wir die Augen auf der Stelle / Ihm öffnen?” (“and shall / We 
let him thus deluded go, not call / Him back straightway, that here and now his eyes / Be 
opened?”).
 
35  Octavio has recognized that his son loves Thekla and that his loyalty to 
Wallenstein is stronger, and thus responds: “Mir hat er sie jetzt geöffnet, / Und mehr 
erblick ich, als mich freut” (“It is mine that he has opened, / And what I see, I do not 
like!”).36
                                                             
34Schiller, Die Piccolomini, I.3.294.  Translation: Schiller, The Piccolomini, 229.  
  Questenberg’s complaint is described in the stage direction as “Dringend und 
ungeduldig” (“urgently, impatiently”), a gestural echo of the “Heftigkeit” (vehemence, 
passion) with which Max has defended Wallenstein; Octavio by contrast is described as 
“aus einem tiefen Nachdenken zu sich kommend” (“rousing himself from profound 
thought”).  Just as earlier Isolani’s momentary visual stimulation was contrasted with the 
35Schiller, Die Piccolomini, I.5.584-587.  Translation: Schiller, The Piccolomini, 239.  
36Schiller, Die Piccolomini, I.5.587-588.  Translation: Schiller, The Piccolomini, 239.  
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“nachdenkend” (musing, reflective) Illo, so also here the passion and despair of Max and 
Questenberg leave them ignorant; whereas Octavio exercises a vision distanced from its 
object by reflection and thus demonstrates an understanding of a new problem that will 
complicate his own plans for action.  As if to drive home the point that Questenberg is 
now impaired by his inability to see what has just been revealed before his eyes, Schiller 
has him questioning Octavio further about the latter’s rapid alterations in speech: 
“Besinnen Sie sich, Freund, / Daß Sie in lauter Rätseln zu mir reden” (“Consider now, 
my friend, / These are but riddles that you speak to me”).37  And whereas previously 
Questenberg’s visual perceptivity was sharpened by moving through the camp itself 
(“Der Gang, den ich in Ihrer Seite jetzt / Durchs Lager tat” – “as through the camp I 
walked /Beside you”38), here the confusing veneer of detail provided by Octavio – why is 
it too late? to whom do we now go, to Wallenstein or to “her”? – prohibits movement.  
The result that Questenberg must be led away by Octavio into a future now less clear (the 
direction reads “Er führt ihn weg” – “He leads him away”39
 Wallenstein himself demonstrates varying degrees of perceptivity with regard to 
verbal representation and visual prowess.  The bulk of Act II Scene 7, for example 
(featuring Questenberg’s official audience with Wallenstein) demonstrates the 
intertwining of two competing versions of history.  Questenberg’s version emphasizes 
Wallenstein’s repeated failure to act; and Wallenstein’s is a catalog of complaints about 
mistreatment at the hands of the court.  Wallenstein responds to Questenberg’s narrative 
with impatience: “Den Eingang spart,” “Zur Sache, wenns beliebt,” and “Ersparen Sies, 
uns aus dem Zeitungsblatt / Zu melden, was wir schaudernd selbst erlebt” (“No 
).  
                                                             
37Schiller, Die Piccolomini, I.5.601-602.  Translation: Schiller, The Piccolomini, 239.  
38Schiller, Die Piccolomini, I.3.295-296.  Translation: Schiller, The Piccolomini, 229. 
39Schiller, Die Piccolomini, 334.  
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introductions,” “To business, if you please,” and “You need not read the chronicle to me / 
Of horrors we have seen with our own eyes”).40  Eventually he professes not to recognize 
the events Questenberg describes (the fall of Regensburg); when Max explains to him 
that his army was in Silesia at the time, fighting the Swedes and Saxons, he declares: 
“Recht! Über der Beschreibung da vergeß ich // Den ganzen Krieg” (“Good!  Why, his 
description made me quite forget / The war we fought”).41
 Questenberg’s ultimatum, by contrast – the emperor’s request for eight regiments 
to accompany the Spanish infanta to The Netherlands – is greeted with explicitly visual 
language. 
  Wallenstein contrasts the 
veracity of his own experience of the past with an abstract and unfamiliar  narrative 
reconstruction of events.  The implication, echoing the stakes of the endless talk of 
Wallensteins Lager, is the incompatibility of word and action – underscored by 
Wallenstein’s impatient “Zur Sache, wenns beliebt” (“To business, if you please”), an 
utterance that ends debate about the past and its accompanying verbal excess. 
WALLENSTEIN. Ich merk, ich merk – Acht Regimenter – Wohl! 
 Wohl ausgesonnen, Pater Lamormain! 
 Wär der Gedank nicht so verwünscht gescheit, 
 Man wär versucht, ihn herzlich dumm zu nennen. 
 Achttausend Pferde! Ja! Ja! Es ist richtig, 
 Ich seh es kommen. 
QUESTENBERG.      Es ist nichts dahinter 
 Zu sehn. Die Klugheit räts, die Not gebeuts. 
WALLENSTEIN. Wie, mein Herr Abgesandter? Ich solls wohl 
 Nicht merken, daß mans müde ist, die Macht, 
 Des Schwertes Griff in meiner Hand zu sehn?42
 
 
WALLENSTEIN:  I see, I see – Eight regiments!  Yes, yes! 
 A cunning plan, good Father Lamormain! 
 Were it not schemed with such accursed cunning 
                                                             
40Schiller, Die Piccolomini, II.7.1021, 1038, 1059-1060.  Translation: Schiller, The Piccolomini, 256-257.  
41Schiller, Die Piccolomini, II.7.1088-1089.  Translation: Schiller, The Piccolomini, 258.  
42Schiller, Die Piccolomini, II.7.1232-1241.  Translation: Schiller, The Piccolomini, 263.  
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 I might have thought a fool made such request. 
 Eight thousand horse!  Yes, yes, I see what lie’s 
 Behind it. 
QUESTENBERG:  I assure you there is nothing 
 To see.  Prudence, necessity command it. 
WALLENSTEIN:  What, sir ambassador?  Should I not notice that 
 Your masters tire of seeing it is I 
 Who wield the sword, the power, in my hand? 
 
The dispute becomes a contest over what is to be seen and how it is to be interpreted, in 
which the two men circle around the issue of the moment in time and speculate on its 
architecture.  According to Questenberg, evident necessity is the influential factor; for 
Wallenstein, conspiracy to remove him from power a second time is the fundamental, 
hidden dynamic.  The visual argument between Wallenstein’s and Questenberg becomes 
a matter of, literally, conflicting visions, even of a conflict over the power to produce 
historical spectacle: the spectacle of retaining power, figured in the sight of the sword in 
Wallenstein’s hand; or the spectacle of regaining power, figured in the draining away of 
Wallenstein’s forces for the emperor’s use. 
 Die Piccolomini is about what may be seen or not seen.  The inexplicable absence 
of allies, the secret love affair; the shift of allegiance that is the subject of private 
conversation, contrasted with the public and dramatic performance of power, confidence, 
and loyalty – the dramatic currents of the second part of the trilogy collide beneath the 
surface, only to become fully and simultaneously visible in Wallensteins Tod.  At the 
same time, these currents gather about Wallenstein, who is also largely unseen in Die 
Piccolomini, appearing in Act II only long enough to demonstrate confidence in his 
authority.  The exchange with Questenberg in Scene 7 – “den Eingang spart,” “Zur 
Sache, wenns beliebt” (“No introductions,” “To business, if you please”) – indicates 
Wallenstein’s sheer impatience with the past and narrativization, the desire to get things 
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moving again.  Wallenstein’s brief presence on the stage in Die Piccolomini suffices to 
reassert his dominance in the drama as the actor who calls conflict down upon himself 
through the power of his own ambition.  Indeed, in Act II Scenes 5 and 6 he clearly 
demonstrates a confidence in his own power, the ramifications of which are that he may 
or may not even be playing a game with his closest confidants, and that he may even 
disregard propitious circumstances to act when he sees fit: 
WALLENSTEIN. Die Zeit ist noch nicht da. 
TERZKY.              So sagst du immer. 
 Wann aber wird es Zeit sein? 
WALLENSTEIN.          Wenn ichs sage.43
 
 
WALLENSTEIN:  The time is not yet come. 
TERZKY:            So you say always. 
 When will the time be come? 
WALLENSTEIN:          The day I say. 
 
Wallenstein claims for himself the authority to produce the circumstances most 
propitious for action – no less than the power to control time.  His commands to 
Questenberg indicate an impatience with anything other than his own ability to decide not 
merely what will happen, but when it will occur, and thus also to hold all others in a state 
of anticipation until he chooses to act.  Yet, as is immediately revealed, he bases his own 
authority on the abstracted vision of astrology, another power he claims for himself 
owing to the circumstances of his birth and thus also to the exclusion of those nearest him 
(“Du kannst in die Geheimnisse nicht schauen” – “You are not able to look into those 
secrets”44
                                                             
43Schiller, Die Piccolomini, II.6.958-959.  Translation: Schiller, The Piccolomini, 254.  
).  Wallenstein’s power of vision is radically at odds with the visual prowess of 
those around him.  Thus, while Die Piccolomini unfolds as a contest of ambitions figured 
in conflict between speech and vision, Wallenstein absents himself to follow his own 
44Schiller, Die Piccolomini, II.6.969.  
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visual pursuits in astrology.  At the opening of Wallensteins Tod he is appropriately 
secluded in an astrological observatory regarding the illustrations of planets when Terzky 
brings news that their conspiracy has been discovered. 
 
Schiller’s Laocoon: Wallensteins Tod, Act III 
 While Wallensteins Lager and Die Piccolomini thematize an anticipation of action 
from the absent Wallenstein, in Wallensteins Tod Wallenstein is present on the stage, 
increasingly isolated from those he has relied on, and forced to take action.  Those 
dynamics that have developed secretly over the course of the first two parts of the trilogy 
come  rapidly to light in the first acts of Wallensteins Tod.  Wallenstein learns that his 
conspiracy has been discovered; and, in part under the considerable pressure of Illo and 
Terzky and the psychological manipulation of the Countess Terzky, he agrees to an 
alliance with the Swedes.  Likewise, Octavio secures the loyalty of Isolani and several 
other of Wallenstein’s generals as well as, more importantly, of Colonel Buttler, who 
insists despite his break with Wallenstein that he will stay behind with the general but 
will not disclose why (“Die Tat wirds lehren” – “The deed will show”). 45
                                                             
45Friedrich Schiller, Wallensteins Tod, II.7.1180, SW, 2:448.  Translation: Friedrich Schiller, Wallenstein’s 
Death, in The Robbers and Wallenstein, translated by F.J. Lamport (New York: Penguin Putnam, 1979), 
364. 
  In the 
climactic Act III it becomes clear that Octavio has betrayed Wallenstein and that Thekla 
loves Max Piccolomini, who in turn rashly hopes to possess her despite her father’s 
dynastic ambitions and Max’s own disinclination to follow Wallenstein into treason.  
Previously Wallenstein’s authority manifested itself in his ability to control and move 
others, now those in whom he has invested his power turn against him.  Wallenstein loses 
physical extensions of his will, and his ability to act is reduced to what he himself can do 
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when an act of the will is also a reaction against forces of constraint.  Just as Schiller 
concentrates on a compelling moment in time by expanding it into a dramatic sequence of 
events, so in the reduction of the scope of the trilogy to Wallenstein Schiller focuses not 
merely on an operative visual sign of history – rather, he offers a sign constituting itself 
in action and reaction.  
 Concentration on the isolated Wallenstein is at its most intense in Act 3.  Schiller 
dramatizes this in direct visual confrontation and the command to act.  In Scenes 6 and 7 
Terzky calls Wallenstein to the window to point out to him the inexplicable movements 
of his soldiers: “Niemand weiß die Ursach, / Geheimnisvoll, mit einer finstern Stille, / 
Stellt jedes Korps sich unter seine Fahne” (“No one can tell the cause. / In secrecy and 
with mysterious stillness, / Each corps assembles underneath its standards”).46  Illo enters 
in Scene 8 to report that the Tiefenbach regiment swears loyalty only to Octavio 
Piccolomini in the emperor’s name.  His entrance marks a tendency in Act III for 
characters to move rapidly on and off stage, between the inside and outside worlds, 
bridging the distance between the event and its comprehension until, eventually, all 
characters are in direct confrontation on the stage simultaneously.  Moreover, his news 
elicits from Terzky the plea to Wallenstein to shoot mutinous soldiers: “O gib Ordre!” 
(“Oh, will you give the order!”).47
                                                             
46Schiller, Wallensteins Tod, III.7.1595-1597.  Translation: Schiller, Wallenstein’s Death, 382.  
  Wallenstein is caught between the revelation of a loss 
of power , which appears to him visually in the panoramic sight from his window of a 
reorganization of his camp, and the need to respond with an action (shooting his own 
soldiers) complicit in this very loss. 
47Schiller, Wallensteins Tod, III.8.1647.  Translation: Schiller, Wallenstein’s Death, 384.  
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 The rest of Act III depicts Wallenstein’s struggle to act alone and also to hold on 
to the power he has invested in others.  Buttler’s return to the stage, just after Wallenstein 
has learned of Octavio’s betrayal, leads to an exchange in which Wallenstein variously 
comes to terms with the loss of one confidant while holding on to another.  It is no secret 
that Buttler also has foresworn loyalty to Wallenstein; indeed, in an earlier show of 
prescience Wallenstein himself had expressed his suspicion of Buttler.  Now in Scene 10 
Buttler’s appearance is taken as a sign of loyalty.  The gestures indicated in Schiller’s 
stage directions underscore the sheer physicality of Wallenstein’s dependence: “geht ihm 
mit ausgebreiteten Armen entgegen und umfaßt ihn mit Herzlichkeit” and “sich auf seine 
Schultern lehnend” (“going to meet him with outstretched arms and embracing him 
warmly” and “leaning on his shoulder”).48  He speaks of the wound Octavio has inflicted 
upon his breast: “Kein Schild fing deinen Mordstreich auf, du führtest / Ihn ruchlos auf 
die unbeschützte Brust” (“There was no shield to meet your blow, you struck / With 
murderous stroke my unprotected breast”).49  But his wounded breast does not prevent 
him pressing Buttler close to it: “Komm an mein Herz, du alter Kriegsgefährt!” (“Come 
to my heart, my old comrade-in-arms!”).50  Wallenstein’s bitter elegy to Octavio is a 
sentimental merging of their identities: “In einem Feldbett haben wir geschlafen, / Aus 
einem Glas getrunken, einen Bissen / Geteilt” (“We two have slept in one bed, / Drunk 
from one glass, and shared one bite of bread”). 51
                                                             
48Schiller, Wallensteins Tod, 467.  Translation: Schiller, Wallenstein’s Death, 386.  
  But on the occasion of the loss 
Wallenstein promptly replaces the former double with the new: “ich stützte mich auf ihn, 
wie ich / Auf deine treue Schulter jetzt mich stütze” (“I leant upon his shoulder, as I now 
49Schiller, Wallensteins Tod, III.9.1685-1686.  Translation: Schiller, Wallenstein’s Death, 385. 
50Schiller, Wallensteins Tod, III.10.1689.  Translation: Schiller, Wallenstein’s Death, 386.  
51Schiller, Wallensteins Tod, III.10.1696-1699.  Translation: Schiller, Wallenstein’s Death, 386.  
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/ Upon your loyal shoulder bear my weight”). 52   Ultimately Wallenstein recounts 
Octavio’s treachery as the case of a single moment of affectionate, even physical trust on 
Wallenstein’s part and murder on the part of Octavio: “Und in dem Augenblick, da 
liebevoll / Vertrauend meine Brust an seiner schlägt, / Ersieht er sich das Vorteil, sticht 
das Messer / Mir listig lauernd, langsam, in das Herz!” (“And in the very moment when 
in love/ And trust my breast is beating at his own, / He takes advantage of me, thrusts his 
knife / With slow and stealthy cunning in my heart!”).53
 The subtle interplay of intimate gestures between Wallenstein and Buttler 
develops into open confrontation and self-declaration over the course of the following 
scenes.  Having received the news that several cities including Prague, from which he had 
hoped for loyalty, have defected, and that he has been outlawed, Wallenstein’s reaction is 
self-oriented and self-disciplining.  He dispenses momentarily with the language of 
reliance and betrayal.  The stage direction first indicates this: “Terzky und Illo zeigen 
Schrecken und Wut. Wallenstein bleibt fest und gefaßt stehen” (“Terzky and Illo show 
fear and rage.  Wallenstein remains standing firm and composed”).
  That Wallenstein immediately 
thereafter buries his face in Buttler’s chest (the stage direction reads “Er verbirgt das 
Gesicht an Buttlers Brust” – “Hiding his face against Butler’s breast”) indicates the 
persistence of a debilitating, even obscuring reliance on others to the disadvantage of his 
own decisiveness.  This reliance is figured also as an obstruction of vision: having looked 
out the window, Wallenstein now hides his face. 
54
Es ist entschieden, nun ists gut – und schnell 
  He reviews his 
situation with a distinct immobility and a lack of his previous emotionalism. 
                                                             
52Schiller, Wallensteins Tod, III.10.1698-1699.  Translation: Schiller, Wallenstein’s Death, 386.  
53Schiller, Wallensteins Tod, III.10.1700-1703.  Translation: Schiller, Wallenstein’s Death, 386.  
54Schiller, Wallensteins Tod, 469.  Translation: Schiller, Wallenstein’s Death, 388.  
119 
 
Bin ich geheilt von allen Zweifelsqualen, 
Die Brust ist wieder frei, der Geist ist hell, 
Nacht muß es sein, wo Friedlands Sterne strahlen. 
Mit zögerndem Entschluß, mit wankendem Gemüt 
Zog ich das Schwert, ich tats mit Widerstreben, 
Da es in meine Wahl noch war gegeben! 
Notwendigkeit ist da, der Zweifel flieht, 
Jetzt fecht ich für mein Haupt und für mein Leben.55
 
 
It is decided, well and good; and fears 
And doubts may torture other breasts than mine; 
How swiftly once again my spirit clears! 
It must be night for Friedland’s stars to shine. 
With hesitant resolve, uncertainly 
I drew my sword, when still my choice was free; 
Necessity now speaks, all doubts take flight, 
Now for my head and for my life I fight. 
 
With this language Schiller conjures a strikingly aestheticized image of the individual, 
clearly defined by the contours of inner doubt and exterior constraint, consciously 
reduced to the necessary action of the body.  Wallenstein becomes visible, finally yet 
momentarily, as an individual with clearly comprehensible motivation for his actions, at 
the moment when his isolation and the loss of power he had invested in others are at their 
most extreme.  Thereafter he appears alone on the stage triumphantly addressing the 
absent Octavio: “Den Schmuck der Zweige habt ihr abgehauen, // Da steh ich, ein 
entlaubter Stamm! Doch innen// Im Marke lebt die schaffende Gewalt” (“My leafy 
branches you have hacked away, / A naked trunk I stand!  But here within / My inmost 
marrow springs the vital power”).56
                                                             
55Schiller, Wallensteins Tod, III.10.1740-1748.  Translation: Schiller, Wallenstein’s Death, 388.  
  The allusion to the free breast, the tree shorn of 
branches, and the creative power in the marrow is a striking reversal of the language and 
gesture of dependence that previously dominated.  Wallenstein describes his moment as a 
return to individual creativity: 
56Schiller, Wallensteins Tod, III.13.1791-1793.  Translation: Schiller, Wallenstein’s Death, 390.  
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Es ist der Geist, der sich den Körper baut, 
Und Friedland wird sein Lager um sich füllen. 
Führt eure Tausende mir kühn entgegen, 
Gewohnt wohl sind sie, unter mir zu siegen, 
Nicht gegen mich – Wenn Haupt und Glieder sich trennen, 
Da wird sich zeigen, wo die Seele wohnte.57
 
 
The spirit shapes the body for its dwelling, 
And Friedland soon will fill his camp about him. 
Yes, lead your men in thousands bold to meet me, 
Often they tasted victory beneath me, 
But not against me – Part the head and limbs, 
And you will see in which the soul was dwelling. 
 
Wallenstein combines rhetoric of the reassembly of his forces around him, which he 
figures as the body constructed by the spirit, with imagery of the destruction of the body, 
the separation of head and limbs, the visual location of the soul.  The two premises are 
indivisible in his statement: the body is simultaneously constructed or reconstructed and 
pulled asunder in a destructive act revealing the source of strength within, the character 
made visible. 
 Yet the visual cue for this self-declaration and self-demonstration is stillness: 
bleibt fest und gefaßt stehen – Wallenstein “remains standing firm and composed,” 
sculptural in his presence, the aestheticization of the will to act.  The dramatic, reactive 
implications of this visceral rhetoric are played out in Wallenstein’s subsequent 
confrontation with his own soldiers and Max.  A delegation of the Pappenheimer, a 
regiment hand-picked by Wallenstein and dear to him, enters the stage to question 
Wallenstein about his intentions toward the emperor and the Swedes.  One private refers 
to his desire to join the Korps: “Die Ehr, mein Feldherr, / Um die ich bat, bei diesem 
Korps zu dienen” (“I had the honour, sir, / For which I asked, of serving with this 
                                                             
57Schiller, Wallensteins Tod, III.13.1813-1818.  Translation: Schiller, Wallenstein’s Death, 391.  
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corps”).58  The Korps is the body (Körper) Wallenstein hopes to reassemble around 
himself, to fulfill his ambition to incarnate his power physically in others.  His exchange 
with them echoes the intimacy of his constriction with Buttler: he flatters them and seeks 
to persuade them of the righteousness of his cause while artfully evading their demand 
for a simple, direct answer.  His loses the Pappenheimer, who become convinced that he 
will break with the emperor.  Thereafter he loses Max Piccolomini, to whom the 
Pappenheimer swear allegiance and for whose sake they violently assault the town hall 
from without.  The loss of the Pappenheimer marks the repeated dissolution of the body, 
the pulling apart of head and limbs to which Wallenstein has alluded (“Wenn Haupt und 
Glieder sich trennen, / Da wird sich zeigen, wo die Seele wohnte” – “Part the head and 
limbs, / and you will see in which the soul was dwelling”).  But the loss of Max touches 
Wallenstein more deeply (“dich habe ich geliebt” – “”but you I loved”59
 Yet Wallenstein also rejects Max.  The movement and gesture of their 
confrontation render visible the persistent relationship of pushing away and grasping that 
defines action and reaction under constraint.  In Act 23 Wallenstein releases Max to the 
) – the loss is 
figures not as the loss of an extension of power, but as a blow to that interior strength 
Wallenstein has refered with his language of the naked trunk, the marrow, and the soul.  
His character is in the end depicted not in any eventual action undertaken by force of his 
own will; rather, it is depicted in the his inextricable and all too deeply felt connections to 
others that, despite their breaking, reinforce Wallenstein’s unreadiness for action.  His 
moment of clarity occurs as a function of his occlusion within a network of authority and 
allegiance that now fails and exposes him. 
                                                             
58Schiller, Wallensteins Tod, III.15.1836-1837.  Translation: Schiller, Wallenstein’s Death, 392.  
59Schiller, Wallensteins Tod, III.18.2157.  
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Pappenheimer (again assembling on stage), on the condition that they no longer fire upon 
the town hall – he physically obstructs Max from touching Thekla or himself, as stage 
directions indicate: “tritt zwischen Max und Thekla, welche sich während dieser Zeit 
festumschlungen gehalten,” “Er will seine Hand fassen. Wallenstein zieht sie zurück,” 
“Max versucht es noch einmal, sich der Thekla zu nähern. Wallenstein verhindert es” 
(“parting Max and Thekla, who have remained all the while in a close embrace,” “He 
tries to take Wallenstein’s hand.  Wallenstein draws it back,” “Max tries once more to 
approach Thekla.  Wallenstein prevents him”).60
 Schiller treats Wallenstein as a Laocoon-like figure.  The compelling, even 
stimulating moment of the work is one of physical struggle between opposing forces 
figured in willed self-liberation and the necessity of constriction.  The physical and 
emotional gestures of the sculptural Laocoon are of simultaneous defense against 
attacking serpents and agony that he cannot rescue his sons.  He dwells, across the 
expanse of theoretical observations made upon him, at a moment in time between an 
immediate past to be pushed away and an immediate and hoped for future, within an 
aesthetic time of absolute stimulation in the midst of violence and despair; and he is taken 
  The directions in Scenes 23 and 24 
stress the staging of a conflict between the desire for and refusal of physical contact: 
Wallenstein keeps himself and Thekla at a distance; Max turns to Countess Terzky, who 
turns away; the generals and Buttler remain unmoved (dastehn – to stand there) by Max’s 
pleas; while Max himself moves from one party to the other, emotionally moved 
(zweideutig, unschlüssig, schmerzvoll – ambivalent, undecided, with pain), before 
allowing himself to be led off stage by the Pappenheimer; Wallenstein is immobile 
(unbeweglich). 
                                                             
60Schiller, Wallensteins Tod, 493-494.  Translation: Schiller, Wallenstein’s Death, 413-415.  
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as both signification of a centered stability of soul characteristic of the antique 
appreciation of beauty, and the very model for a disciplined appreciation and production 
of the arts.  Wallenstein’s eventual assassination is not meant to be a secret to the 
audience – indeed, it is a foregone conclusion.  But Wallenstein’s aestheticized passion in 
Act III is a visual display and exploration of how the great individual comes to his end.  
Wallenstein’s gestures of variously pushing away (the emperor, Octavio and Max 
Piccolomini) and pulling back toward himself (Buttler, Thekla, Max Piccolomini, the 
Pappenheimer) demonstrates a quality fundamental to his motivations, the continuous 
reconstitution of his power in an extended body of others executing his will, a process 
swollen with the possibility of complete physical destruction.  Wallenstein’s language 
throughout Act III betrays a suspicion of the extreme violence to be committed upon the 
body in his references to the breast and the marrow, the head and the limbs, the soul and 
the bowels – a violence intimately bound with the signification of character in action 
under duress.  His gesture, bodily movement, and reference to the body mark his 
fundamental antagonism to the situation in which he finds himself.  His body renders the 
movement of time visible in conflict and suffering. 
 
Conclusion 
 I do not want to read too much intention into Schiller’s portrayal of Wallenstein.  
To be sure, that he takes up Wallenstein as a dramatic project just as his historical writing 
arrives at a representational impasse, is suggestive of a conscious shift in representational 
strategy.  And the move from a visualizing history to the drama also suggests an essential 
acceptance of an explicitly visual problem in the experience and understanding of history.  
124 
 
Finally, Schiller’s formulation of aesthetic concepts for the representation of the 
individual, directly (the application of tragedy, the situation in the pregnant moment) or 
indirectly (the development of a method of reading gesture that might also focus on 
conflict between will and necessity) underscores a certain setting of the stage for a 
representation of Wallenstein as a visual lesson in the acquisition of historical 
knowledge. 
 In conclusion, I argue against too much pedagogical intentionalism in Schiller’s 
portrayal.  Rather, I suggest that he stages Wallenstein’s assassination as he does in order 
to provide himself greater clarity regarding the unfolding of events.  The extreme 
anticipation of Wallensteins Lager and Die Piccolomini ensure that Wallenstein’s 
protracted presence on stage in Wallensteins Tod will occur as confrontation.  The visual 
cues emanating from the first two parts of the trilogy – the spectatorship of the camp, the 
search for visual certainly in the Town Hall – precede more ostentatious visual 
confrontation in the third part, especially in Act III in which the forces arrayed against 
Wallenstein are either seen from a window or present themselves to him on stage.  Yet 
Schiller opts to stage Wallenstein’s own resistance, his “retarding” effect, rather in a 
more subtle play of gesture that is not undone but rather fortified by his dramatic speech 
about the body.  Schiller draws attention to the gestures of a man who does not know that 
he cannot master his situation – his gestures of embracing enemies and pushing away 
allies are more telling than his direct language of the will.  The fall of Wallenstein, so 
occluded in the historical record, becomes in Schiller’s hands a process marked out by 
















 This chapter focuses on Classicist art-historical writing and on a specifically 
Classicist visuality.  Its context is the waning of the project of Weimar Classicism in the 
first decade of the 19th century.  With the deaths of Herder (1803) and Schiller (1805) two 
members of the Weimarische Kunstfreunde were lost.  At the same time half a decade’s 
Weimarer Preisaufgaben came to an end in 1805 on a note decidedly inauspicious for the 
fortunes of Classicism: after years of controversial reception from young artists more 
allied to Romanticism, Goethe awarded part of the first prize to Caspar David Friedrich 
for a works submitted in apparent disregard of the preferred criteria for the competition.  
The defining features of Weimar Classicism – the project of an aesthetic renewal founded 
on the antique and foremost Greek model, and the theorization and advocacy of the work 
of art as the complete material embodiment of sensual experience – retreated before the 
growing appreciation for the Romantic, which the Classicists perceived as the indulgence 
of the spiritual at the expense of the legitimacy of the sensual.  Classicism as a strategy 
for the representation and understanding of the passage of historical time thus threatened 
to become history.  Classicism reacted to its perceived marginalization by treating itself 
as both classical and historical: its present-oriented aesthetic engagement gave way to a 
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narrative of self-historicization in which a model for aesthetic production and reception 
retreats from the present.1
 In this process of self-historicization, the Classicists look back to Johann Joachim 
Winckelmann.  In his own groundbreaking 1764 Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums 
(History of the Art of Antiquity) Winckelmann establishes lines of thought about the work 
of art and its history that, I believe, set the tone for his later appreciation by Goethe and 
Meyer.  Foremost, Winckelmann intends his own history of art to be more than “bloße 
Erzählung der Zeitfolge und der Veränderung in derselben […] meine Absicht ist, einen 
Versuch eines Lehrgebäudes zu liefern” (“no mere narrative of the chronology and 
alterations of art […] my intention is to provide a system”).
 
2
                                                             
1This interpretation of Classicism in the first decade of the 19th century as a project in retreat may also be 
found in Andreas Beyer, “Klassik und Romantik. Zwei Enden einer Epoche” in Geschichte der bildenden 
Künste in Deutschland. Band 6: Klassik und Romantik, Andreas Beyer, Ed. (Munich: Prestel Verlag, 2006) 
and in the essay “Die Ästhetik des Selbstseins. Goethes Kunstanschauung 1805-1816” in the commentary 
to Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Sämtliche Werke, Briefe, Tagebücher und Gespräche I/19: Ästhetische 
Schriften 1806-1815, Friedmar Apel, Ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag 1998), 727-757. 
  Winckelmann’s system 
presupposes a cyclical rise and fall in the arts – indeed, in focusing on the art of antiquity, 
Winckelmann isolates a single cycle in history that begins, at least as far as the remains 
of ancient art allow, with Egyptian art, reaches a pinnacle of development in the art of the 
Greeks, and enters a period of decline in Roman appropriation and imitation of Greek 
models.  Crucial for his innovation in art history, Winckelmann declares that one must be 
able to see the remains of antique art in order to understand its historical development: 
the previous reliance on reproductions of ancient works and on existing and faulty 
histories has produced an errant knowledge of ancient art that can be remedied only by 
recourse to the object itself.  Winckelmann’s approach fuses a systematic consciousness 
2Johann Joachim Winckelmann, “Vorrede,” in Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums [1764] (Baden-Baden: 
Verlag Heitz GmbH, 1966), ix.  This and all English translations of Winckelmann are from Johann Joachim 
Winckelmann, History of the Art of Antiquity, trans. Harry Francis Mallgrave (Los Angeles: Getty 
Publications, 2006), 71.   
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of historical time and development, the cycle, with direct viewing of the work of art.  In 
this respect, the term Lehrgebäude (system, scheme – literally a structure for teaching) 
gains from its etymology, for Winckelmann’s scholarship draws upon his own presence 
in Rome, at the center of the remains of antiquity: in his study the spatial location of the 
work of art coalesces with a systematic understanding of time gleaned from the visual 
engagement with the work itself.  The surviving works of antiquity, viewed personally 
and comparatively – and most importantly, together – yield their own historical secrets to 
the inquiring and systematizing eye. 
 For Winckelmann beauty is the mark of the style of the work of art and thus also 
that quality that enables the viewer to place works of art in their proper place in historical 
development.  Beauty – specifically the beauty of Greek works, the highest achievement 
of style in antique art – is thus a heuristic tool and a category which, despite its 
enhancement and decline in art over the course of a historical cycle, still has a universal 
value.  Beauty provides historical knowledge.  Yet Winckelmann also declares: “die 
Schönheit ist eins von den großen Geheimnissen der Natur, deren Wirkung wir sehen, 
und alle empfinden, von deren Wesen aber ein allgemeiner deutlicher Begriff unter die 
unerfundenen Wahrheiten gehöret”(“Beauty is one of the great mysteries of nature; we all 
see and feel its effect, but a general and clear concept of its essence remains among the 
undiscovered truths”).3
[…] denn diese Werke haben alle eine Elliptische Figur, und hierinn 
bestehet die Schönheit derselben. Je mehr Einheit aber in der Verbindung 
  Indeed, Winckelmann provides no definition of beauty, despite 
its centrality to his concept of style.  Rather, he suggests that the experience of the 
beautiful resides in the motion of the eye over beautiful, moving forms: 
                                                             
 3Winckelmann, Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums, 142.  Translation: Winckelmann, History of 
the Art of Antiquity, 192.  
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der Formen, und in der Ausfließung einer aus der andern ist, desto größer 
ist das Schöne des Ganzen. Ein schönes jugendliches Gewächs aus 
solchen Formen gebildet ist, wie die Einheit der Fläche des Meers, welche 
in einiger Weite eben und stille, wie ein Spiegel, erscheint, ob es gleich 
allezeit in Bewegung ist, und Wogen wälzet.4
 
 
[…] for all these works have an elliptical shape, and herein resides their 
beauty.  The greater the unity in the combination of forms, and in the 
flowing of one from the other, the greater the beauty of the whole.  A 
beautiful youthful creature is fashioned from such forms like the unity of 
the surface of the sea, which from a distance appears flat and still, like a 
mirror, even though it is constantly in motion and rolls in waves. 
 
Beauty resides in forms that appear to move perpetually around several points and to 
encompass several forms within a single contour.  The movement inherent in beauty, or 
at least in that which appears beautiful to Winckelmann, is reciprocated in the eye of the 
beholder, which must also move over the beautiful form, as Winckelmann notes later in a 
continuation of his metaphor of the sea: 
Der erste Anblick schöner Statuen ist bey dem, welcher Empfindung hat, 
wie die erste Aussicht auf das offene Meer, worinn sich unser Blick 
verlieret, und starr wird, aber in wiederholter Betrachtung wird der Geist 
stiller, und das Auge ruhiger, und gehet vom Ganzen auf das Einzelne.5
 
 
The first sight of a beautiful statue is, to him who has feeling, like the first 
view of the open sea, wherein our gaze loses itself and becomes fixed, but 
after repeated contemplation, the soul becomes more still and the eye 
quieter and moves from the whole to the particular. 
 
Beauty, it seems, is a concept of allure, for it resides at an unfathomable depth within the 
work of art, from which it radiates an energy that captures the eye with its motion, and 
the eye responds by exploring the surface of the beautiful form.  Linked to beauty as its 
highest characteristic, style is that quality in the work of art that can command the 
attention of the eye and induce an experience of still, visual examination.  Historically, 
                                                             
4Winckelmann, Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums, 152. Translation: Winckelmann, History of the Art of 
Antiquity, 197. 
5Winckelmann, Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums, 288.  Translation: Winckelmann, History of the Art of 
Antiquity, 263-264.  
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the best work of art is one that draws the gaze toward itself and holds it in an act of 
sensual-rational investigation into the source of its motive energy. 
 To be sure, this abstraction of Winckelmann’s thinking does not do justice to the 
full force of his legacy and influence on his Classicist successors.  But these two strands 
of his thought – the history of art as a history of the cyclical development and decline of 
styles defined by their power to command the quiet attention of the eye and mind – are 
fundamental for Weimar Classicism’s later understanding of itself both in terms of its 
defense of a kind of visual representation and its historical self-understanding.  For, in the 
first decade of the 19th century Weimar Classicism perceived the decline precisely of the 
kind of art it favored, and very much so in terms of the relationship between the work of 
art and the eye.  Moreover, Winckelmann’s presence as beholder in his own history 
signals the sheer importance for Weimar Classicism of the relationship between the 
beholder of the work of art and the Classicist eye on the one hand, and on the other the 
work of art as visual object marking the passage of time.  After Winckelmann, to look at 
art means to measure the passage of time in objects and the effect they exert on their 
beholder. 
 In this chapter, then, I consider how Weimar Classicism’s art-historical writing 
reflects a consciousness of Classicism as a style receding into the past, and how it also 
attempts to safeguard images that would preserve a certain way of looking.  I begin with 
Goethe’s 1805 sketch for a life of Winckelmann, part of the book project Winckelmann 
und sein Jahrhundert (Winckelmann and His Century) in which Goethe wavers between 
an idealization of Winckelmann and a historicizing approach to Weimar Classicism.  
Thereafter I examine Meyer’s appraisal of the achievement of Winckelmann, specifically 
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in terms of the renewal and spread of good taste Meyer perceives in the arts following 
Winckelmann, in his own contribution to the Winckelmann project, Entwurf einer 
Kunstgeschichte des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts (Plan for a History of the Art of the 
Eighteenth Century).  Finally, I turn to Carl Ludwig Fernow’s 1806 Leben des Künstlers 
Asmus Jakob Carstens (Life of the Artist Asmus Jakob Carstens), in which the creativity 
of the Classicist artist is withdrawn from the material world and relocated in individual 
imagination.  In conclusion I consider the historical image of Classicism as a 
characteristic history drawn from the interpretation of Classicism’s own expressive 
motion in time. 
 
Goethe’s Winckelmann: the perspective on history 
 The 1805 book Winkelmann und sein Jahrhundert, a biography and history of art 
jointly composed by Goethe, Meyer, Carl Ludwig Fernow, and Friedrich August Wolf 
marks a decisive turning point in the life of Weimar Classicism while also making clear 
the ambivalence felt by the Weimarische Kunstfreunde toward Classicism’s loss of 
momentum.  This ambivalence is amply demonstrated in the biographical component of 
the project, Skizzen zu einer Schilderung Winkelmanns (Sketches for a Portrayal of 
Winckelmann).  The Skizzen consist of three parts: a thematic treatment of 
Winckelmann’s life, written by Goethe; Meyer’s assessment of Winckelmann’s legacy 
for the history of art; and Wolf’s comments on an array of subjects pertaining to 
Winckelmann’s education and work.  Goethe’s intention was to lay the foundations for a 
proper biography – as it is, his admittedly fragmentary contribution presents 
Winckelmann largely in a symbolic mode.  Winckelmann’s life, ambitions, temperament, 
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relationships, and accomplishments are depicted as characteristic of a type of human 
nature, as the model of fully actualized individual creativity.  Indeed, as often as not a 
thematic chapter is introduced with reference to the Mensch, to a human experience that 
then glosses some specific aspect of Winckelmann’s life and work.  In the “Eintritt” 
(“Entrance”), for example, we read: 
Findet sich hingegen in besonders begabten Menschen jenes gemeinsame 
Bedürfnis, eifrig, zu allem, was die Natur in sie gelegt hat, auch in der 
äußeren Welt die antwortenden Gegenbilder zu suchen und dadurch das 
Innere völlig zum Ganzen und Gewissen zu steigern; so kann man 
versichert sein, daß auch so ein für Welt und Nachwelt höchst erfreuliches 
Dasein sich ausbilden werde. 
   Unser Winkelmann war von dieser Art. In ihn hatte die Natur gelegt, 
was den Mann macht und ziert.6
 
 
When, on the other hand, that common need is found in people of 
exceptional talent, eagerly to seek out in the exterior world the counter-
images corresponding to everything nature has laid in them, and thereby to 
elevate their interior fully to the whole and the certain: then one can be 
assured that an existence will be formed that will be most pleasing for the 
world and for the posterity. 
   Our Winckelmann was of this kind.  Nature had laid in him that which 
makes and adorns the man. 
 
Winckelmann is a compelling, even stimulating model for human creative potential, and 
his example remains instructive even half a century after his death.  Indeed, in the final 
chapter (“Hingang” – “Death”) the untimeliness of his murder is downplayed in favor of 
an interpretation of his death (“ein kurzer Schrecken, ein schneller Schmerz” – “a brief 
                                                             
6 Johann Wolfgang Goethe, “Skizzen zu einer Schilderung Winkelmanns,” Winckelmann und sein 
Jahrhundert, FA I, 19:177-178.  This and all translations are my own unless otherwise noted.  The reader 
should also note that in this and other period writings, Winckelmann’s name is commonly spelled 
“Winkelmann.”  I prefer to leave this usage uncommented in quotations. 
 The chapters of Goethe’s contribution to Skizzen zu einer Schilderung Winkelmanns are as 
follows: Einleitung, Eintritt, Antikes, Heidnisches, Freundschaft, Schönheit, Katholizismus, Gewahrwerden 
griechischer Kunst, Rom, Mengs, Literarisches Metier, Kardinal Albani, Glücksfälle, Unternommene 
Schriften, Philosophie, Poesie, Erlangte Einsicht, Spätere Werke, Papst, Charakter, Gesellschaft, Fremde, 
Welt, Unruhe, Hingang.  In English: Introduction, Entrance, The Antique, The Pagan, Friendship, Beauty, 
Catholicism, Becoming Aware of Greek Art, Rome, Mengs, Literary Career, Cardinal Albani, Strokes of 
Good Fortune, Writings Undertaken, Philosophy, Poesy, Knowledge Gained, Later Works, Pope, 
Character, Society, Strangers, World, Unrest, Death. 
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terror, a quick pain”) emphasizing that his achievement is guaranteed for posterity.  He 
dies “als ein vollständiger Mann” (“as a complete man”), and his early death inspires 
others to carry on his work (“Daß W. früh hinwegschied, kommt auch uns zu Gute” – “It 
is a benefit to us that W. departed early”).  Winckelmann is vollständig, both complete 
and closed, iconic and distant in his death, and yet still present in his legacy, which he 
figuratively breathes out from his grave (“Von seinem Grabe her stärkt uns der Anhauch 
seiner Kraft” – “The breath of his power strengthens us from his grave”).  Winckelmann 
is both past and present, dead and still living.7
 This ambivalence regarding Winckelmann’s status in time is transferred to 
Classicism as such in Goethe’s introduction to Winkelmann und sein Jahrhundert, where 
Goethe describes the relationship between the past of the Weimarische Kunstfreunde and 
the present of the Winckelmann.  “Nicht daß sie [die Weimarischen Kunstfreunde – MA] 
auf gewisse Vorstellungsarten beschränkt hartnäckig einerlei Standpunkt behauptet 
hätten,” he declares; rather “gestehen sie vielmehr gern durch mannigfaltige Mitteilung 
gelernt zu haben” (“Not that they [the Weimar Friends of Art – MA] would have insisted 
 
                                                             
7Goethe et al., Skizzen, 211-212.  Meyer and Wolf are decidedly more critical of Winckelmann, if still 
positively so – they are willing to focus on the shortcomings of his research.  I will deal with Meyer in 
greater detail below; and while I otherwise prefer to pass over Wolf’s contribution to the project, I will 
mention here that he also adopts a decidedly different attitude toward Winckelmann’s death, eschewing 
Goethe’s gesture toward immanent redemption.  Specifically, Wolf believes that a later Winckelmann 
could have returned to the enthusiastic yet flawed work of the 1750s and 1760s to correct and enhance his 
own earlier methodology (“wo er wie ein Seher so viele größere und kleinere Erscheinungen in Einen Blick 
aufnimmt, als Deuter und Dolmetscher ihm nachzugehen” – “wherever he records so many greater and 
smaller phenomena in a single glimpse, like a seer, then also to follow as an interpreter and translator.”  
Skizzen, 232.  Indeed, Wolf even proposes a possible collaboration with Lessing. 
 It should be noted that Goethe’s contributions to Winckelmann und sein Jahrhundert were among 
the last to be finished.  The idea for the project itself dates to at least 1799, when the Duchess Anna Amalia 
gave Goethe a collection of letters from Winckelmann to her own late secretary, Hieronimus Dietrich 
Berendis.  Meyer’s own contribution (the single longest section of the work) was first conceived in the 
mid-1790s and drafted by 1804.  The book project thus developed over the course of the life of Weimar 
Classicism as a coherent aesthetic initiative and was completed only as Classicism began its defensive 
retrenchment halfway through the first decade of the 19th century.  For details, see the commentary in 
Goethe, Ästhetische Schriften 1806-1815 [FA I 19], 762-764.  
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stubbornly and narrowly upon one single viewpoint, rather they admit to having learned 
happily through diverse communications”). 8
                                                             
8Goethe, “Vorrede,” Winckelmann und sein Jahrhundert, 12.  
  The activities of the Weimarische 
Kunstfreunde are portrayed retrospectively as the exchange of opinions of a group alive 
with and nourished by the interactions of its constituent members just as it, in turn, 
interacts with cultured German society as a whole.  The tension in the moment of writing 
this introduction, between the living past and the perceived terminus of the present, is 
evident in the reference to Standpunkt (viewpoint).  Goethe observes, for example, that 
previous writings – including Propyläen, written reviews of the Weimarer Preisaufgaben, 
contributions to the Jenaische Literaturzeitung, and his own 1803 Das Leben des 
Benvenuto Cellini (The Life of Benvenuto Cellini) – exerted some influence on the whole 
of German culture despite that they were never published in a single volume.  His 
contention is that the group has historically neither adopted a single perspective on 
aesthetic matters nor attempted to produce any unified program; rather, that the group’s 
active contribution to the arts in Germany has occurred through the diversity of opinion, 
mutual stimulation and influence, and a generalized and very public communication of 
opinion through journal literature and the art competition.  Winkelmann und sein 
Jahrhundert is a significant departure from this previous practice: the multi-authored 
initiation of a critical edition of the work of Winckelmann, the forefather of German 
Classicism and the symbolic representation of the very Classicist mode of being.  
Whereas previous work had operated in the mode of a diverse reception of the antique 
and Renaissance past that was unified only in its agreement regarding the relevance of 
antique and Renaissance art for contemporary art practice, Winkelmann und sein 
Jahrhundert renders this contemporary and living Classicism as a thing of the past. 
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 Goethe’s use of the term Standpunkt is a direct and very contemporary reference 
to the problem of historical representation posed by the individual’s relationship to 
history.  Goethe nuances this problem in a manner that explains both the ambivalent 
symbolic reception of Winckelmann and the ambivalence in Classicism’s self-
consciousness.  Foremost, the term Standpunkt signals the assumption of a subjective 
position toward and perspective of historical events.  Reinhart Koselleck argues, for 
example, that the very modern historical concept of Standort or Partei 
(position/perspective, party) first occurs with a shift over the course of the 18th century 
away from a belief that the work of the historian functions as a mirror to reflect the past, 
and toward a recognition that the historian’s own subjectivity is reflected in the work of 
history – that the entirely subjective understanding of history is a necessary accessory to 
the discovery of a historical world unmoored from the past and channeling through the 
present.9  Metaphors of the mirror, the reflection, and the display of the naked truth of 
history (Spiegel, wiederspiegeln, speculum vitae humanae, and nudité – terms cited by 
Koselleck from sources ranging from antiquity to the period around 1800) underscore the 
visual charge of this shift by describing the work of history as, essentially, a work of 
vision and observation.10
                                                             
9Reinhart Koselleck, “Standortbindung und Zeitlichkeit. Ein Beitrag zur historiographischen Erschließung 
der geschichtlichen Welt,” in Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1985), 176-207. 
  The work of Johann Martin Chladenius is influential in this 
respect: in his essay “Vom Zuschauer und Sehepunckte” (“Of the Spectator and the Point 
of View,” in his 1752 Allgemeine Geschichtswissenschaft) he breaks down the varieties 
of historical experience to categories of variously embodied and interested visual 
spectators.  The charge of Chladenius’ argument is that any historical narrative is the 
10Koselleck, “Standortbindung und Zeitlichkeit,” Vergangene Zukunft, 178-183.  
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product of an entirely subjectively determined attitude toward the event visually 
experienced.11
 Chladenius’ “Sehepunckt,” Koselleck’s “Standort,” and Goethe’s “Standpunkt” 
are close and perhaps functionally equivalent terms (Koselleck also interchanges 
“Standort” and “Perspektive”).  Yet Goethe also seems to collapse into “Standpunkt” 
concepts of an active seeing (“Sehepunckt”) and a passivity of being seen, and therewith 
to recognize the historical implications of adopting a perspective, a tension between 
remaining outside of history and becoming part of it.  Of Winckelmann, for example, he 
writes: “Sobald er nur zu einer ihm gemäßen Freiheit gelangte, erscheint er ganz und 
abgeschlossen, völlig im antiken Sinne” (“Once he has achieved the freedom appropriate 
for him, he appears entire and closed, fully in the antique sense”).
 
12
 There is another sense of closure implied by Goethe’s reference to Winckelmann 
in sculptural terms.  Whether, to reprise Goethe, Winckelmann is ideally closed, or still 
breathing from the grave, he has become an art-historical object.  Sculpturally, he also 
becomes a visual object – he “appears” in an ideal sense.  At the same time the 
references, variously, to sculpture and to the grave suggest the end of motion.  The 
alluring motion of the work of art that had so captivated Winckelmann at mid-century, 
  Winckelmann in the 
exemplary creative mode is phenomenally whole, complete, antique; by assuming the 
plastic expressive qualities of ancient sculpture, he becomes a work of art and is thereby 
closed.  Because the Winckelmann project is also a self-reflexive project for Classicism, 
it reveals Classicism wavering consciously between its aggressive, strategic aesthetics of 
looking, and becoming the object of vision, the finished work in history. 
                                                             
11Johann Martin Chladenius, “Von Zuschauer und Sehepunckte,” in Allgemeine Geschichtswissenschaft 
[1752] (Vienna: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1985), 91-115.  
12Goethe et al., Skizzen, 180.  
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when he elicited a new wave of Classicism from antique objects radiating an 
unfathomable and remarkable, sublte dynamism, threatens to be stilled in the early 19th 
century, in the interests of preserving Winckelmann as a monument to a mode of being 
and seeing and as an exemplary object. 
 
Meyer: history and taste 
 Winckelmann’s achievement occupies a central place in Meyer’s two 
contributions to Winkelmann und sein Jahrhundert.  The approximately ten pages he 
appends to Goethe’s Skizzen zu einer Schilderung Winkelmanns assess Winckelmann’s 
achievement in the context of aesthetic and art-historical knowledge in the 18th century. 
And with his Entwurf einer Kunstgeschichte des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts, the longest 
single section of the project, he takes several steps back in order to capture in broader 
perspective the situation of the arts from the late 16th century to his own time in the early 
19th century.  The legacy of Winckelmann’s work is crucial to, if barely articulated in, 
Meyer’s conception of the history of art – in the Entwurf Meyer consistently postpones a 
more detailed discussion of Winckelmann for the Skizzen that follow.  One finds in 
Meyer’s addition to the Skizzen for the most part a corroboration of Winckelmann’s 
achievement in Winckelmann’s own terms: 
Die schönen in Griechenland und später zu Rom entstandenen Monumente 
betrachtete Winkelmann zuerst unter kunsthistorischen Beziehungen, nach 
Kennzeichen des verschiedenen Geschmacks und Arbeit der 
verschiedenen Zeiten. Wir behaupten keineswegs, daß solches jedesmal 
mit unverbesserlichem Erfolge geschehen; doch zeigte er, und zeigte 
zuerst, wie die Antiken, nach offenbaren Merkmalen, in einer steigenden 
und sinkenden, von dem Geschmack, dem Styl und der Arbeit geregelten 
Folge, zu ordnen sind; auf welchem Wege allein die in schriftlichen 
Nachrichten so mangelhaft auf uns gekommene Geschichte der alten 
Kunst nicht nur vollständiger, sondern auch – und dieses dürfte der 
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wesentlichste Nutzen und Vorzug derselben sein – gleichsam lebendig in 
den Monumenten selbst dargestellt werden kann.13
 
 
Winckelmann first observed the beautiful monuments arisen in Greece and 
later in Rome in an art-historical regard, according to the characteristic of 
varying taste and the work of different times.  By no means do we assert 
that this occurred in each instance with a success not calling for 
improvement.  Yet he showed, and was the first to show, how the ancient 
works are to be ordered according to evident features, in a rising and 
sinking sequence regulated by taste, style and work.  In which manner the 
history of ancient art, come down to us so deficiently in written sources, 
can be depicted in the monuments themselves not only more completely, 
but also – and this might be the most essential use and advantage of it – 
alive, as it were. 
 
Meyer credits Winckelmann for instituting a better understanding of the rise and decline 
of the arts, judged visually in conjunction with literary sources; and with the development 
of a concept of style that helps to place the work in historical time on the basis of its 
appearance.  Winckelmann’s declared method of allying literary research with direct 
visual engagement – the art-historical with the aesthetic – has proven the right 
combination of powers, despite Meyer’s perception of some errors.  More critically for 
Meyer, though, the work of art now, when regarded carefully, declares its own historicity 
– to the trained eye, history lives in its relics.  By extension, through Winckelmann 
Meyer ascribes to the work of art the function of quickening history itself, of reviving a 
spirit of the times past for the later viewer.  Meyer holds the work of art to be a site of 
concentration not merely for a history that might still live and communicate itself, but 
alsofor an eye of the beholder trained to be aroused by such works.  In this respect, the 
work also influences its own time, for its may determine the possibilities for receptivity 
and the prowess of visual perception. 
                                                             
13Goethe et al, Skizzen, 217  
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 Meyer’s historical understanding of art in the 18th century is to no small extent a 
history of the fortunes of visual perception.  Analogously, for Meyer Winckelmann 
occupies a rare position in the recent history of the study of ancient art – he arrives on the 
scene, as it were, between an excess in historical knowledge and an excess in visual 
engagement.  Meyer summarizes the situation prior to Winckelmann with recourse to the 
example of his renowned predecessor Anne-Claude-Philippe de Tubières, comte de 
Caylus (1692-1765).  Problematic for Caylus, the writer about antiquities, is that he was 
in Paris rather than in Rome; despite his perceived feeling for the work of art, he relied 
foremost on texts; he adopted the reigning belief that Etruscan and Greek artists 
borrowed from their Egyptian forebears; and he fell under the influence of art practices 
predominant in Paris at the time, for which Meyer typically reserves only harsh criticism 
– the so-called “mannerist school of painting” (manieristische Malerschule).  In short, for 
Meyer the comte de Caylus, Winckelmann’s most illustrious immediate predecessor, 
enjoyed little chance to overcome the wrong-headedness of the time concerning the arts 
and antiquity.  By contrast, Winckelmann profited from a period of preparation in 
Dresden (Meyer states that Paris at mid-century offered no advantage in terms of the 
study of antiquities, the implication is that Dresden was at least somewhat more 
appropriate) prior to his arrival in Rome, where his subsequent friendship with Mengs 
brought him directly into the world of antiquities.  And yet, although Meyer regards 
Winckelmann’s work as a solid foundation for further research, he does not find that 
Winckelmann’s successors have made much progress.  Specifically, if his predecessors 
suffered inexperience with the work of art, those who follow him display to Meyer an 
excessive sensitivity to exterior characteristics at the expense of the “spirit of art” (der 
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Geist der Kunst), resulting again in erroneous conclusions.  More than merely the matter 
of a successful hybrid of the literary and the visual, Winckelmann’s greatest 
accomplishment seems to be the development of a visual technique drawing upon both 
the history and the materiality of the object, and balancing the exterior and the inner 
essence of art – a technique that has largely been lost since Winckelmann’s death.14
 Indeed, the rare evanescence of Winckelmann’s method bodes ill for the study of 
antiquities and the practice of art. 
 
Ein geübter Geschmack allein wird, ohne hinlängliche Bekanntschaft mit 
der alten Literatur, nicht überall ausreichen, noch weniger sind bloß 
gelehrte Kenntnisse zulänglich, wenn sie nicht durch richtigen Geschmack 
unterstützt und von der Fähigkeit begleitet sind, den Geist der Alten, den 
höhern poetischen Gehalt ihrer vorzüglichsten Kunstgebilde aufzufassen. 
Hätte Mengs literarische Kenntnisse besessen, und minder ängstlich die 
Formen verehrt, wahrscheinlich würde mehr Harmonie zwischen seinen 
frühern und spätern Meinungen, über die berühmtesten antiken Statuen, zu 
bemerken sein.  (WJ/Skizzen 220) 
 
A practiced taste alone, without sufficient familiarity with the ancient 
literature, will not always be enough; less so mere learned knowledge if it 
is not supported by the right taste and accompanied by the ability to 
perceive the spirit of the ancients, the higher poetic content of their most 
best works of art.  If Mengs had possessed literary knowledge and been 
less timid in his respect for forms, it is likely that  more harmony would be 
noticeable between his earliest and later opinions concerning the most 
famous antique statues. 
 
Taste (Geschmack), a sense for the arts activated by the object itself, must be 
accompanied and balanced by the literary, a knowledge of the history of the arts.  This 
good advice applies surely to the researcher into antique art – curiously, it applies to the 
artist as well.  To be sure, Mengs was a theorist of and writer about the arts, but he was 
also a practicing artist and teacher.  Winckelmann’s legacy applies both to the 
theoretician and the practicing artist; the disappointing progress made since 
                                                             
14Goethe et al., Skizzen, 212-219.  
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Winckelmann is evident both in the scholarly work upon antiquity and in the course of a 
general taste for the antique and its reproduction in contemporary art.  Because this 
progress has not been guaranteed, all things from representation and a knowledge of 
proper models, to knowledge about representation as such and the very preference for 
particular images are still troubled and contested territory in Meyer’s time. 
 Whereas the practice of art receives only this final reference in Meyer’s 
contribution to the Skizzen, it is the focus of his Entwurf einer Kunstgeschichte des 
achtzehnten Jahrhunderts (Plan for a History of the Art of the Eighteenth Century).  
Meyer’s rationale for this work echoes Winckelmann’s own propensity for innovation in 
Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums.  Meyer observes for example that any history of art 
aspiring to be more than a chronicle is quickly surpassed, given its indebtedness to the 
reigning taste of the time of its writing.  Meyer’s proposed solution calls for a 
comprehensive history of modern art treated critically in accordance with modern views: 
“die ganze Geschichte der neuern Kunst, neuern Ansichten gemäß, kritisch behandelt.”15
                                                             
15Meyer, Entwurf einer Kunstgeschichte des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts, 17.  
  
Meyer’s own contribution is altogether more specific: to focus on the best known works 
of contemporary art to be found in Rome, the location of the highest European 
achievement in art.  To the extent that Meyer demonstrates “modern views” and a critical 
approach throughout his history, he does not satisfactorily explain at the outset how his 
history will differ from previous histories other than that it will not be merely a chronicle.  
What about his critical approach will effect a lasting change in the way the history of art 
is understood?  A key to the answer to this question may be found subsequently in his 
explanation of his choice of Rome, the center and gathering place (Mittelpunkt, 
Sammelplatz) for the best in contemporary international (i.e. European) art.  Such a 
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selection is most obviously concordant with contemporary interest, he avers:”denn alle 
Angaben, die nicht bloß historisch sind, sondern Kunstwerke betreffen und Urteile 
enthalten, sollen sich auf wirkliche Anschauungen gründen” (“for all information not 
merely of a historical nature, but concerning works of art and their judgment, should be 
based on actual viewing”).16
 Meyer conceived his plan for a history of eighteenth-century art during his trip to 
Italy in 1795-1797, so he writes of his own experience viewing contemporary art in 
Rome.  But Rome as a showcase for antique works surely figures here as well.  Although 
conceived earlier, Meyer’s history appeared in 1805 as part of a larger project that is 
stamped with the efforts of Weimar Classicism.  Indeed, the Weimarische Kunstfreunde 
understood their aesthetic project also as an effort at the salvation of Europe’s antique 
heritage at a time when Europe’s other great nations of art, France and Italy, were at odds 
following Napoleonic conquest.  Weimar thereby becomes the location for the latest 
return of the antique spirit.  This shift in location between Winckelmann and Meyer, from 
the focus on antique art in Rome to the focus on Classicism and Rome from Weimar, 
signals also a shift in historical perspective.  Winckelmann positioned himself in Rome as 
an aesthetic site in an effort to define the nature of a style originating in antiquity and 
recurring throughout the lifespan of Western art.  With Meyer, by contrast, we have an 
effort to gauge the historical progress in a diffusion of style beyond the limits of Rome – 
an effort judged in accordance with the category of taste as a heuristic device for 
measuring the widespread reception of the work of art that Winckelmann himself 
experienced in Rome.  Thus, whereas Winckelmann had positioned himself as a central 
  The critical history of art requires access to and visual 
judgment of the work of art. 
                                                             
16Meyer, Entwurf, 18.  
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point of perspective in the circularity of the historical development of art, the bridging of 
the two centers of Rome and Weimar in Meyer’s work suggests that art is again in motion 
between centers.  Meyer attempts in his plan to trace the contours of this motion.  “Actual 
viewing” describes, then, not merely Meyer’s own credibility as a critical historian of art, 
it also indicates a test of contemporary art’s participation in a history now measured in 
terms of taste. 
 Taste plays a significant role in Meyer’s historical periodization.  It first appears 
in his foreword (Geschmack, Geschmacksbegriffe – taste, concepts of taste), and 
eventually in section headings (for example, “Literatur der Kunst und allgemeine 
Übersicht des Zustandes in Geschmack und Kunst bis gegen das Jahr 1750” – “Literature 
on Art and General Overview of Conditions in Taste and Art to the Year 1750”).  Having 
divided the history of art under his purview, from the late 16th to the early 19th century, 
into discrete blocks of time over the course of which he chronicles and narrates the 
decline of the arts and taste to a low point in the first half of the 18th century, Meyer then 
establishes a caesura at roughly the mid-18th century with what he calls the renewal of 
good taste.  Meyer closes the section on 1750 with the observation that, upon exterior 
evaluation, the condition of art and taste at mid-century proves as poor as at the outgoing 
16th century, yet their inner disposition had improved.  Among other causes for this 
improvement in inner disposition, he includes that “Raphaels Werke wurden schon 
wieder fleißiger studiert und so entwickelte sich allmählich im Stillen der Keim eines 
besseren Geschmacks” (“Raphael’s works were already being studied again with greater 
diligence, and so there developed gradually, in the stillness of the seed, a better taste”).17
                                                             
17Meyer, Entwurf, 93.  
  
Much as for Winckelmann style functioned as a category for gauging the cyclical 
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recurrence of the beautiful as a mark of high quality in artistic achievement, for Meyer 
changes in taste indicate the return to appropriate models for the arts. 
 Not only is taste a central category for Meyer, it is also a foremost concern of the 
aesthetic thought of the 18th century.  But 18th-century discourse on the aesthetic, 
specifically the determination of criteria for the arts, is often concerned with the 
normative determinations of generic limitation and the appropriateness of objects – the 
brunt of its energy is the generation of a proper work of art.  The concept of taste 
relocates inquiry into the aesthetic in the receptivity of the beholder (in the case of the 
visual arts).18
                                                             
18For an overview of the history of the development of the concept taste in its international scope and in 
relation to the development of a concept of art as autonomous, see “Geschmack/Geschmacksurteil” in 
Ästhetische Grundbegriffe. Historisches Wörterbuch in sieben Bänden, Volume 2, Karlheinz Barck, Martin 
Fontius, Dieter Schlenstedt, Burckhart Steinwachs, and Friedrich Wolfzettel, Eds. (Stuttgart: Verlag J.B. 
Metzler, 2003). 
  In other words, within the realm of taste we speak not only of good art, but 
also of a positive receptivity to good art.  As Meyer makes clear in his observation on the 
renewed study of Raphael, for him the taste of the artist is both a receptive and a 
productive category, a vehicle for the imitation and transmission of methods of 
representation and of general attitudes toward the task of art.  For this reason he is 
considerably fretful for the condition of taste – for, it determines to what extent the best 
art of the past will influence the artistic endeavor of the present.  Likewise, it is in light of 
an improvement in taste that Meyer is able, like Winckelmann, to praise Mengs and also 
the sculptor Antonio Canova – although, unlike Winckelmann, he also reserves 
considerable criticism for the limits of their work.  Whereas in terms of production they 
are limited by the circumstance of the historical condition of art at mid-century, the 
import of their work as a whole resonates more positively: 
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Die ganze Geschichte zeigt, wie die Kunst immer nur stufenweise 
Fortschritte gemacht, und wenn wir ihren verfallenen Zustand unter 
Solimen, Conca und den Marattischen Schülern wohl betrachten; so 
begreift man leicht, daß ihr, auf einmal alle mittlern Stufen überspringend, 
die Ausübung des Höchsten nicht ganz gelingen konnte; aber der 
Geschmack, der nicht zu schaffen, sondern nur zu vergleichen und zu 
wählen braucht, hätte kaum besser gefördert werden können.19
 
 
All history shows how art has always progressed only step by step; and if 
we can easily observe its fallen state under Solimen, Conca, and the 
students of Maratti, then we can easily understand that art cannot simply 
leap over all intermediate stages at once in order to achieve success in its 
highest exercise.  But taste, which does not need to create but rather only 
to compare and to select, could hardly have been better promoted. 
 
If the actual work of Mengs and Canova does not yet demonstrate a wholesale ascent of 
the arts back to their former heights under, variously, Raphael and the ancients, still their 
adherence to a proper model in its various historical manifestations reflects hopefully on 
the future progress of the arts.  Taste, not itself creative but discriminating and 
judgmental, in essence serves to purify reception and accustom it to the standards set by 
an ever improving work of art. 
 It is, however, not sufficient to suggest that the renewal of good taste occurs 
merely in the return to acceptable models.  Imitation is but the technical beginning of a 
process that should also include the development of an intellectual and sensual capacity 
for invention in the artist.  Moreover, Meyer’s occasional reference to the “spirit” of art 
amply indicates that the exterior and the mechanics of production are but one aspect of 
the creative process. 20
                                                             
19Meyer, Entwurf, 168.  
  One must look to Meyer’s overview of the general rise and 
20In the first “Nachricht an Künstler und Preisaufgabe” announcing the first Weimarer Presiaufgabe in 
1798, Goethe and/or Meyer clarify that invention (Erfindung) is the process, both intellectual and sensual, 
by which the artist determines the theme of the work – Goethe and Meyer prefer an invention in which all 
is oriented toward the central matter or object of the work, and simplified to appeal to and exercise a 
greater effect upon the mind.  Invention is distinguished in the “Nachricht” from expression (Ausdruck), 
drawing (Zeichnung), and arrangement (Anordnung), the latter two in particular being considered more 
145 
 
decline in the arts in order to understand precisely what transformation is marked by the 
modest shift in taste.  In an early section of the Entwurf, after he has sketched the 
condition of the arts in the 16th and 17th centuries and just prior to entering the 18th, 
Meyer offers some observation on transformation in taste.  According to him, historical 
data suggest that the most productive influence on the arts is “allgemeiner Hang, 
Enthusiasmus, besonders von religiöser Art als der mächtigste und dauerndste” (general 
inclination, enthusiasm, especially of the religious variety as the most powerful and the 
most enduring”).21  This seems initially to be a complicated set of criteria, for Meyer 
notes that with the Greeks such enthusiasm was as much patriotic as it was religious, 
whereas in the case of medieval art his judgment falls more exclusively on the side of the 
religious, even the mystical: “Düstre, mönchische Ideen scheinen dem Künstler wenig 
hinderlich zu sein, denn er bearbeitet, erheitert und verschönert dieselben” (Gloomy 
monkish ideas seem no great obstacle to the artist, for he works them over, brightens 
them, beautifies them”).  Yet what seems to unite the two endeavors is the drive to 
represent – a drive figured among the Greeks as “National-Ehrgefühl und Ruhmbegier,” 
for the Catholic Middle Ages as “Religionseifer” (“a feeling of national honor and desire 
for fame,” “religious fervor”).  Indeed, he argues that the Heilige (saints) of Medieval art 
could not later be replaced with anything comparable after the 16th century.  At that later 
point, Meyer concludes: “Die Künste waren Mode, sie – gefielen vielleicht, doch man 
bedurfte ihrer nicht mehr notwendig” (“The arts were fashion, they – were pleasing, 
perhaps, but one no longer needed them”).22
                                                                                                                                                                                     
matters of technique and scientific knowledge than of talent.  See “Nachricht an Künstler und 
Preisaufgabe” in Propyläen, 529. 
  Mere pleasure and fashion are for Meyer 
21Meyer, Entwurf, 46-47.  
22Meyer, Entwurf, 47-48.  
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insufficient circumstances for the cultivation of proper representation.  On the contrary, 
for Meyer the implication is that pleasure is not a necessity, that a previous drive to 
represent discernible in the patriotism and religiosity of the Greeks and the desire to 
visualize and beautify the conceptual in the Catholic Middle Ages signaled a simple need 
for the arts that vanishes when pleasure becomes their foremost task. 
 One discerns in Meyer’s conclusion, even in his use of the dash suggesting a 
moment’s consideration, his own judgment of taste.  His evidently low estimation of 
pleasure nourishes his severe criticism of what he refers to generally in discussion of 
post-Renaissance art as Manier – a light, quickly executed, even naturalist representation 
suitable for a world lacking that drive to represent that he discerns in antiquity and the 
Middle Ages.  The examples Meyer adduces under the rubric of Manier – virtuosity in 
the superficial representation of emotion, painting by torchlight to the praise of admirers, 
painting with the tips of the fingers rather than with the brush, serve to prove his point: 
Alle diese und mehr ähnliche Beispiele, die überflüssig anzuführen wären, 
zeigen unwiderlegbar, daß die Kunst fortdauernd unter immer drängendere 
Umstände sich beugen mußte, daß der gedeihliche Ernst derselben 
entflohen war, die echte Liebe zum Guten immer lauer, das Gründliche 
weniger gefordert, das bloß Scheinbare hingegen als vollgültig 
angenommen wurde. Die Künstler suchten, so oft es gelingen wollte, 
durch Neuheit zu reizen; und so wurden in der Malerei die besten Kräfte 
bald auf leere Fertiglosigkeiten, bald auf den Pomp reicher Kompositionen 
und schimmernder Farben verwendet, bald auf übertriebene Effekte, oder 




All these and more similar examples, which would be superfluous to 
introduce, demonstrate incontestably that art had to bow continuously 
under ever more pressing circumstances, that its vigorous seriousness had 
fled, the true love of the good grown more lukewarm, the thoroughness 
less demanded, and that by contrast the merely apparent was accepted as 
valid.  Artists sought, as often as it was possible, to stimulate through 
novelty.  And so the best strengths in painting were soon wasted on empty 
                                                             
23Meyer, Entwurf, 55.   
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and incomplete projects, on the pomp of rich compositions and 
shimmering colors, on exaggerated effects or melting softness in 
indeterminate forms, or on laborious, licked smoothness etc. 
 
The image Meyer conjures of Manier is of a representative practice striving to meet the 
demand for virtuosity and stimulation in visual representation (“durch Neuheit zu reizen” 
– “to stimulate through novelty”) through the constant development of an ostentatious 
technique at the expense of conceptual content.  The result for Meyer is an art of the bloß 
Scheinbare – of the merely apparent, with little or no effort to penetrate or overcome the 
phenomenal world.  By contrast, his previous statement on the art of antiquity and the 
Middle Ages suggests what he finds appropriate for visual representation.  Das Heilige, 
düstre mönchische Ideen (the holy, gloomy monkish ideas) – such content is not 
phenomenal, it is rather conceptual, even expressly removed from direct experience, 
occluded, mysterious; and the image of the medieval artist working over and beautifying 
the conceptual is in essence the image of the artist rendering the concept in sensual and 
empirically accessible form.  Meyer’s somewhat inarticulate dismissal of Manier as an 
art of fashion – “sie – gefielen vielleicht” (“they – were pleasing, perhaps”) – suggests 
then also a dismissal of the art of the merely apparent, of novelty, and of stimulation as 
hardly an art, difficult even to define in terms of art, the end of true representation and the 
rise of technique as spectacle.  Thereby he also dismisses the Manierist and the public 
reception that institutionalizes such art, collapsing both into the periodizing category of 
the general decline of taste from the 16th to the mid-18th century.  
 Decline and renewal in the arts and in taste are matters of the reception and 
adoption of appropriate models.  Manier flourishes owing in part to the lack of more 
serious models for imitation and an environment in which technical virtuosity and 
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superficiality are acceptable.  The temptation to imitate and compete with others in the 
virtuoso rendering of stimulating visual effects through unconventional methods 
engenders its own motive energy – what Meyer calls the “Strom der Manier” (“the 
current of mannerism”) easily overwhelms the few, such as the Caracci brothers, Guido, 
and Domenichino, who strive in vain to uphold the standards of the “noblest and highest” 
(“dem Edelsten und Höchsten”).24
Die Kunst der Alten ist erhaben, groß, schön, über der Natur im Reich der 
Ideen schwebend. Und doch läßt sich das Schöne ihrer Formen teilweise 
in der Wirklichkeit wiederfinden. Die Antiken dringen sich daher dem 
jungen Künstler nicht zu unbedingten Mustern auf, sondern setzen ihn 
vielmehr gegen die Natur in Freiheit, zeigen ihm den Weg sich derselben 
zu höhern Zwecken zu bedienen.
  It is against this backdrop that the transformation in 
the inner disposition of the artist, which for Meyer occurs with the turn to Raphael and 
the Greeks as models, can be understood as a true, if quiet, revolution in the progress of 
the arts and of taste, for with this turn the artist chooses, despite public acclaim for the 
novel and for stimulation, a model that bespeaks the more serious representative task of 
art.  With respect to this revolution in taste, Winckelmann appears in Meyer’s hands 
rather as primus inter pares among a generation of scholars and artists turning to 
antiquity for inspiration and opening their collections to study: Caylus, the English artist 
Gavin Hamilton, Winckelmann’s Roman patrons the Baron Stosch and the Cardinal 





The art of the ancients is sublime, grand, beautiful, hovering above nature 
in the realm of ideas.  And yet the beauty of its forms can sometimes be 
found again in reality.  The ancients, then, do not force themselves upon 
the young artist as unconditional models, rather they set him free against 
nature, they show him the way to use nature for higher purposes. 
                                                             
24Meyer, Entwurf, 54-55.  




Here Meyer deploys and reverses the terms of his criticism of Manier.  The latter was 
entirely given over to the superficial and phenomenal, the model objects for the 
development of technical virtuosity geared toward stimulation – Manier was altogether a 
matter of technique, and taste was reduced to delight.  The antique model, in Meyer’s 
estimation, lures the artist back to the conceptual world and promotes an artistic practice 
that aims not merely to represent the natural but the ideal in sensual and empirical form.  
The artist is liberated from the representation of the merely apparent and encouraged to 
pursue a goal that is beyond visual stimulation and delight. 
 The promise inherent in this moment of transformation in taste proves weak, 
however.  As we have seen, in his assessment of Winckelmann’s legacy in the research 
into antique art Meyer discerns a slackening of the standard of Winckelmann’s visual 
method, and he discerns this slackening likewise in the practice of art post-Winckelmann.  
In order best to gauge the stakes of Meyer’s opinion concerning the practice of art, I want 
to return to his statement on Winckelmann’s achievement – specifically that now “die in 
schriftlichen Nachrichten so mangelhaft auf uns gekommene Geschichte der alten Kunst 
nicht nur vollständiger, sondern auch […] gleichsam lebendig in den Monumenten selbst 
dargestellt werden kann” (the history of ancient art, come down to us so deficiently in 
written sources, can be depicted in the monuments themselves not only more completely, 
but also […] alive, as it were).26
                                                             
26Meyer, Entwurf, 217.  
  As I have suggested, this statement is of interest 
foremost as the identification of a method for reading the historical charge of the work of 
art visually in the work itself.  The potential result is that “actual viewing” (“wirkliche 
Anschauungen,” to use Meyer’s preferred term) overcomes defects in the written record 
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of history, indeed surpasses the limits of the written record.  Of course Winckelmann and 
Meyer both advocate the hybrid approach of the literary and the visual, yet this joining of 
forces leads, under the most optimal circumstances, to the possibility of a visual 
engagement that is entirely historically fulfilling.  Winckelmann’s hybrid method entails 
the education of the eye and mind for a constant visual reception of the historicity of the 
physical and cultural world. 
 Meyer places the artist alongside the historian and antiquarian when he charges 
that research and practice since Winckelmann have failed to uphold Winckelmann’s 
standard.  What this means for the artist is, I believe, explicated by Meyer in his 
comments on contemporary history painting and most specifically on the work of 
Jacques-Louis David and his followers – but this must also be placed in the context of 
other contemporary developments of concern to Meyer, including the status of history 
painting, the varying selection of models, and an increasing preference for grandeur.  
Meyer initially notes that after Mengs’ (1728-1779) death there was little history painting 
worthy of attention and few painters possessing the ability to elicit “remarkable 
phenomena” (“merkwürdige Erscheinungen”).27
                                                             
27Meyer, Entwurf, 117.  
  Indeed, toward the end of his Entwurf 
he reiterates that history painting in his time clearly wavers between adherence to 
beautiful form on the one hand and grandeur and energy on the other – two categories 
that cannot easily coexist in the work.  Meyer subsequently predicts the more frequent 
appearance of the colossal both in painting and in sculpture.  How he arrives at the 
colossal is unclear – his previously preferred term has been “the grand” or “grandeur” 
(“das Große, die Großheit”) or “the powerful” (“das Kräftige”).  It seems, at least, that 
the colossal is a compromise of sorts between the preference for beautiful form and a 
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more energetic style demanding form and color incompatible with the beautiful or 
delicate.  Indeed, Meyer sees in the colossal a medium for the “character of greatness” 
(“Charakter der Größe”).  The clear if rather blunt implication is that forms will simply 
swell in size or adopt a more aggressive, ostentatious presentation in order to maintain 
their beauty while mediating greatness.  The threat contained here for the task of history 
painting, the representation of “remarkable phenomena,” is likely the loss of the 
remarkable – and here the German merkwürdig should be emphasized, its meaning 
reducible to “worthy of notice” or “worth remembering.”  Indeed, the verb merken (to 
notice, remember, mark, realize) recurs centrally in Meyer’s discussion of history 
painting: “In der Geschichtsmalerei ist das Hauptaugenmerk der besten Künstler noch die 
schöne Form” (“In history painting the primary focus of the best artists is still the 
beautiful form”).28
 Meyer’s concern about the colossal surely figures in his general anxiety regarding 
the relationship between artist and model.  Indeed, the problem for him is not merely a 
new preference for the expansiveness of the grand at the expense of the subtlety of the 
beautiful – this tendency bleeds into the reception of antiquity and Renaissance art as 
well.  The colossal Juno Ludovisi is increasingly preferred to the “canonical” Belvedere 
  Painters of history devote their attention and reproductive effort to 
the occurrence or phenomenon in a beautiful form not only meriting but even requiring 
attention – the beautiful historical form draws in the eye.  The remarkable as Meyer uses 
the term suggests that which merits concerted attention, a second glance even, an effort to 
realize that one is looking at something of note, a commitment to memory.  The colossal, 
by contrast, expands to confront the eye – not only does it lack remarkability, its visibility 
is the assault of the inescapable. 
                                                             
28Meyer, Entwurf, 175.  
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Antinous, for example, and the energetic and grand style of Michelangelo and da Vinci 
supplant Raphael. 29
 His commentary on French painting makes clear that for Meyer this shift is not a 
matter merely of progress in the development of the arts, but rather that it relates directly 
to the experience and representation of contemporary history as well.  His overall 
assessment of David and his circle is that their warrior-like or even theatrical style – 
mask-like (“maskenhaft’), with the gestures of the actor (“die Figuren sich wie 
Schauspieler gebärden”)
  The return to the beautiful form of canonical antiquity and the 
Renaissance, initiated by Mengs yet never raised sufficiently above the level of imitation, 
now cycles through a historical series of forms, with the result that in Meyer’s time, and 
to his eye, a regression is discernible in the turn to the grand, earlier antiquity, the early 
Renaissance.  In a move reminiscent of the entire visual charge of Manier, the artist’s eye 
in Meyer’s time seems to him to be overcome by an eclecticism that threatens to sever it 
from its proper object, the trace of the conceptual or ideal in the natural and empirical 
world, represented in a manner that forces the eye to work. 
30
 Meyer breaks this down into issues of composition, content, and thought in a 
longer discussion of David’s Oath of the Horatii (1784 – ill. 6), an earlier work that 
 – and their preference for Roman history owes to their 
political affiliations. The contention is two-fold: that the art of David and his circle is 
intimately linked to contemporary history (the French Revolution, the Revolutionary 
Wars, the rise of Napoleon); and that it, like the colossal, is an act of disrupting the eye’s 
power of attention, of overwhelming the eye with gestures and effects geared toward an 
all too visible experience. 
                                                             
29Meyer, Entwurf, 163.  
30Meyer, Entwurf, 163.  
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captured the attention of Rome long before it appeared.  Meyer stages the story of the 
work’s reputation, debut, composition and content in a manner suggestive of a lesson in 
the fragility of taste.  Owing to the positive reception of the previous Belisarius (1781), 
expectation is high for David’s next work; those who have seen the artist at work report 
“miraculous things” (“Wunderdinge”); attention is at a fever pitch by the time the work is 
presented to the public: “Nie ist wohl ein Gemälde mit solchem Zulauf und lauterem 
Beifall geehrt worden” (“It is unlikely that any work has ever been honored with such 
popularity or with louder applause”).31
 Yet Meyer discerns at the heart of the work – at the level of Gedanke (thought), 
slipping into the central event (Handlung) of the image, and even infecting the gesture of 
the figures – the unmistakably theatrical.  His final judgment: “man vermißte ungern in 
einem Kunstwerk von so vielen Verdiensten die schöne Wahrscheinlichkeit, das völlig 
Ungezwungene, die natürliche Einfalt, womit die Kunst ihren Produkten allein wahres 
bleibendes Interesse, welches im öftern Anschauen nur immer erhöht wird, verschaffen 
kann” (“regrettably one misses in a work of art of such merit the beautiful verisimilitude, 
the entirely unforced, the natural simplicity through which alone art can guarantee her 
products that true, lasting interest that will only increase with frequent viewing”).
  Meyer himself concedes that the composition and 
technique merit praise: thorough and solid drawing, clearly expressed forms, an inner 
dynamic of conflicting emotions, powerful color, tasteful depiction of the fold of the 
garment, good distribution of figures in the space of the painting.  The visual effect of the 
work is almost entirely what one should demand. 
32
                                                             
31Meyer, Entwurf, 122-123.  
  
David’s Oath of the Horatii is an attention-commanding tour de force of technique, visual 
32Meyer, Entwurf, 123.  
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stimulation, even knowledge of antiquity, yet it fails precisely because of its ability to 
capture the eye so immediately through an underlying indebtedness to the theatrical.  
Again, Meyer argues for an art that repeatedly draws the eye in to penetrate natural and 
familiar form, the verisimilar or probable, the unforced or unstaged, in order to discern 
what lies behind the phenomenal in the conceptual realm of the work.  In this respect it is 
interesting that he uses the term Gedanke (thought) rather than the equally common and 
roughly equivalent Erfindung (invention) when isolating and discussing the underlying 
organizational dynamic of David’s work.  For, Gedanke allies the basic foundation of the 
work of art to the conceptual, to the thought that is to be rendered in sensually perceptible 
form.  The implication is that for Meyer the theatrical is the foundation of David’s work – 
its quality in terms of content, composition, and technique is entirely betrayed by a basic 
return to simulation, to the “merely apparent” Meyer discerns and virulently detests in 
Manier.  The unfortunate difference is that with David this simulation is no longer 
mediated in a merely superficial technical virtuosity; rather, it has concealed itself in the 
trappings of good taste – even, possibly, in the best taste to be found in contemporary 
painting. 
 How can we define Meyer’s position regarding the representation of history, 
between the repeated “actual viewing” of the beautiful form and the verisimilar on the 
one hand and the theatrical and colossal on the other?  In a previous chapter I argued that 
Meyer advocated a symbolically clear communication in the work of art, not foremost 
beauty and repeated viewing – yet the two need not be considered incompatible.33
                                                             
33One should also bear in mind that Meyer’s earlier Über die Gegenstände der bildenden Kunst was in 
1798 a completed and published text in which Meyer attempted, despite his own innovations, to work over 
Goethe’s ideas; whereas the Entwurf, although conceived even earlier, was finished later at a moment when 
  In his 
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assessment of Winckelmann’s legacy, he highly esteemed the potential for the work of art 
to communicate its own historicity.  Certainly this act of communication has a decidedly 
scholarly side – it implies that knowledge of antiquities so advanced under Winckelmann 
that knowledge of style could accompany the scholar in the field as a tool of 
measurement, as it were, not merely reside in the library.  But the communicative act also 
resonates into the production of new works of art through the very act of turning to an 
antique model for the purposes of creative rejuvenation.  The appropriate style in not 
merely “antique” – rather, it is historically beautiful, the Belvedere Antinous rather than 
the Juno Ludovisi, the pinnacle of Greek style rather than its evolutionary precedent, a 
representation that entices both eye and mind rather than merely exposing itself to the 
eye.  Moreover, the return to this style accompanied a shift away from the mere 
appearance of Manier; naturalism and stimulating effect were to be supplanted by the 
return to and move beyond the limits of nature into the ideal and the conceptual as it 
might be experienced.  Beauty and verisimilitude together are the hallmarks of the work 
of art that embodies the ideal or conceptual, that which is beyond empirical nature, in a 
formally perfect and sensually empirical natural likeness.  It is not colossal but subtle, not 
theatrical but, rather, simply there.  It does not grasp the visual attention of the viewer; 
rather, in its subtle, formal perfection it represents an object presupposing a viewer, even 
demanding a viewer, and challenging any viewer to look.  The return of good taste marks 
a moment in historical and art-historical time at which the eye may be trained to look 
under its own motivation and to recognize what deserves to be seen, whether in the 
historical world or in the landscape of art. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Classicism was already in decline.  Thus, that Meyer could have simply changed his thinking in the interval 
is also hardly unlikely. 
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 The juncture of history, especially contemporary history, and history of art is most 
obvious in Meyer’s treatment of the French school.  As he writes it, the recent history of 
French painting in Rome accompanies the recent history of the French in Rome.  For 
Meyer this means the dissolution and displacement of Roman collections of antiquities to 
France.34  To be sure, among the concluding remarks of his Entwurf he claims to remain 
unconcerned whether, for example, Laocoon or the works of Raphael are in Rome or 
Paris – the presence of good art has never proven to be an unconditional impetus to the 
production of good art.  It is, rather, the damage to the study of antiquity that Meyer 
laments.35  Yet Meyer has argued for much of his Entwurf that the transformation in taste 
at mid-century owed largely to the turn to antiquity, and in fact his understanding of good 
taste resides in the latter’s capacity to promote comparative criticism.  With the removal 
of works of art from Rome, a crucible for the refinement of taste, even for its very 
activation, is lost: “denn die Bequemlichkeit, die bedeutendsten Monumente zu 
vergleichen und aus der Vergleichung Schlüsse zu ziehen, fällt größtenteils weg” (“for 
the convenience of comparing the most significant monuments and drawing conclusions 
from comparison is for the most part lost”).36
                                                             
34Specifically following an armistice between France and the Vatican in 1796 and the eventual Treaty of 
Tolentino in 1797.  See the commentary to Meyer, FA I/19, 795. 
  Moreover, the actual withdrawal of French 
artists from Rome in 1793 occurred during an ongoing dispute between two parties 
Meyer calls the atomists, those whose creative judgment favors the detail at the expense 
of the whole, and the totalists, who privilege the whole to the detriment of the detail.  The 
loss of the best works of antiquity – specifically, the dissolution of their collection in 
Rome and their dispersal as disembodied parts – is part of a series of events amounting to 
35Meyer, Entwurf, 174.  
36Meyer, Entwurf, 174.  
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the fracturing of taste on the level of the reception and production of art, with grave (if, 
curiously, unuttered) consequences for the future of the arts. 
  
Fernow on Carstens: the Classicist imagination 
 Carl Ludwig Fernow’s 1806 biography Das Leben des Künstlers Asmus Jakob 
Carstens (The Life of the Artist Asmus Jakob Carstens) demonstrates an extreme 
sensitivity to the fragility of Classicism in the early 19th century.  Like the Skizzen zu 
einer Schilderung Winkelmanns, Fernow’s Leben recruits biography to elegize the 
passing of a highpoint in the history of the arts – in the case of Fernow’s work, of course, 
it is the very recently deceased German artist Asmus Jakob Carstens (1754-1798), who 
had also been a close friend to the writer and tutor Fernow during their time together in 
Rome from 1794 to Carstens’ early death in 1798 at the age of forty-four.  The two 
works, on Winckelmann and on Carstens, share a depiction of the life of the scholar or 
artist who somehow reaches a pinnacle in his resonance for posterity just prior to an 
untimely death, culminating in a legacy that is belatedly, and then only just, recognized.  
Likewise, both works have been regarded as markers of a fundamental reorientation of 
the Classicist attitude in the first decade of the 19th century: away from the programmatic 
effort to influence taste on a wide-scale, and away from the associated cultural and 
political projects centered on the development of the arts in Germany, the salvation of 
antique heritage, and the reactivation of the individual and social capacity for aesthetic 
receptivity and judgment; and toward the individual as the lone, enduring, even the only 
possible site of the sensual and creative receptivity cultivated by Classicism.  In this 
regard Goethe’s symbolic Winckelmann becomes a model not only of creative humanity 
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but also and foremost of a type of preserved and safeguarded individuality.  Fernow’s 
Carstens similarly demonstrates a retreat into the individual, which bears sweeping 
implications for the image of Classicism as it disappears.37
 Fernow’s biography draws in part on his friendship with Carstens, and so Fernow 
may perhaps rightfully boast a degree of faithfulness to his subject, as he does in the 
preface to the work.
 
38  Yet it is naturally heavily stamped by Fernow’s own concerns.  By 
his own admission he has taken Carstens’ development as an artist and the formation of 
his talent as his primary objects, in accordance with a conviction expressed at the outset 
of the work that the life of the artist consists really only in the development and 
application of his talent – and that all exterior biographical circumstances matter in the 
history of art only to the extent that they influence the artist’s contribution to the 
autonomy of art.  Fernow’s perspective on the place of the arts in contemporary society, 
and Carstens’ role in this vision, become clearer over the course of the preface.  In short, 
the arts are no longer needed, merely propped up for representative exploitation and 
banalization by the aristocracy, while aspiring artists are disciplined in the art of imitation 
at the academies at the expense of their imaginative capability.39
                                                             
37See the essay ““Die Ästhetik des Selbstseins. Goethes Kunstanschauung 1805-1816” in the commentary 
to Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Sämtliche Werke, Briefe, Tagebücher und Gespräche I/19: Ästhetische 
Schriften 1806-1815, Friedmar Apel, Ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag 1998), 727-757. 
  For Fernow, Carstens’ 
individuality, dedication foremost to his imagination, and lack of conventional training, 
promise an antidote to the ailing condition of the arts.  The biography is in intervention 
into the history and current state of art. 
38Carl Ludwig Fernow, Carstens, Leben und Werke. Herausgegeben und ergänzt von Herman Riegel 
(Hannover: Carl Rümpler 1867 – 1975 reprint), 36.  Translations are my own. 
39Fernow, Carstens, 34, 38-40. 
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 The biography is also very much the product of visual acts of judgment.  Fernow 
describes Carstens as a “merkwürdige, wenngleich nur von wenigen bemerkte, 
Erscheinung” (“a remarkable phenomenon, if noticed only by a few”).40  Carstens’ life 
and work are significant events in the history of art, deserving the attention and 
representation that have previously been lacking; and, by implication, Fernow is a special 
person for having taken an interest in Carstens.  Indeed, he strikes a decidedly 
aestheticizing posture toward his late friend: his full attention (Augenmerk) had been 
directed toward the course of Carstens’ development as an artist; his depiction of 
Carstens enjoys a high degree of character and individuality owing to Fernow’s “long and 
intimate acquaintance” (“lange und innige Bekanntschaft”) with his “object” 
(“Gegenstande”).41  Carstens himself is the object of Fernow’s aesthetic and historical 
imagination, an object to be explored intimately and rendered characteristically on the 
page for the benefit of art’s history and social health, his difficult life and early death “an 
arousing spectacle for the beholder” (“ein erhebendes Schauspiel für den Beobachter”).42
 The extent to which Fernow actively refashions Carstens as a model Classicist in 
accordance with his own aesthetic preferences, is revealed in a comparison of the long, 
narrative biographical section of the work and the final section comprising a thematic 
  
Carsten’s life, art practice, and death become the object of an aestheticizing and 
historicizing judgment on the part of Fernow – Carstens must act the part of the 
Classicist. 
                                                             
40Fernow, Carstens, 35.  
41Fernow, Carstens, 36.  
42Fernow, Carstens, 34.  
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overview of Carstens as artist.43  Much of the biographical narrative casts Carstens in the 
midst of a struggle for influence between the models of Michelangelo and Raphael – 
between on the one hand the grand, powerful, energetic, even exaggerated, and on the 
other the graceful, calm, and harmoniously balanced.  That Carstens’ work throughout his 
career bears obvious traces of the influence of Michelangelo (as well, for example, as of 
the influence of the French school, regarded  by Fernow as followers of the 
Michelangelist tradition44) – that, in other words, Carstens’ actual work does not follow 
Fernow’s own normative vision of Classicism – means that Carstens’ productive life as 
an artist must be carefully managed and transformed by Fernow.  The fundamental 
dynamic of the narrative is, then, that Carstens abandons his youthful adherence to the 
grand, energetic, even violent representation symbolically embodied in the work of 
Michelangelo and, once in Rome, turns to the ideal beauty of Raphael.  Correspondingly, 
whereas Fernow applies direct speech from Carstens in the narration of his early life, 
once Carstens arrives for his second and extended stay in Rome direct speech is replaced 
by Fernow’s observations – in Rome Carstens is subject to Fernow’s direct visual 
observation, his gesture matters more than his speech.45
                                                             
43Martin Dönike provides a helpful overview and interpretation of the biography – see Dönike, Pathos, 
Ausdruck und Bewegung, 314-340, 370-374. 
  Carstens’ life is now Fernow’s 
product, and with the fate of Carstens’ art in the balance (between Michelangelo and 
Raphael), Fernow must interpret the period in Rome in accordance with the stated 
ambition of his biography – to demonstrate Carstens’ contribution to the development of 
art’s autonomy.  The result, however – laid out in the final section of the work, an 
44Martin Dönike argues for the influence f Michelangelo and the French school on Carstens’ work in a 
detailed examination of the presence of what he calls das Gewaltsame in Carstens’ work over the course of 
his life as an artist and directly in defiance of Fernow’s often willful reinterpretation.  See Dönike, Pathos, 
Ausdrcuk und Bewegung, 314-340, and specifically 327.  
45Dönike, Pathos, Bewegung und Ausdruck, 316-317, 320-321. 
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overview of Carstens as artist – is a striking collapse of the developmental trajectory of 
the biography into an a-historical series of images of Carstens himself as the supreme 
embodiment of a radical autonomy. 
 Several gestures on the part of Fernow in this final section foreground the image 
of Carstens as a figure of extreme distinction against the historical backdrop of the more 
widespread practice of Classicism.  For example, in the first and third thematic sections 
of the overview, titled “Stil” and “Wahl des Stoffes” (“Style” and “Choice of Subject 
Matter”) respectively, Fernow argues that Carstens adhered more closely than his 
predecessors to the model of pagan antiquity.  Fernow reconfigures the Classicist trope of 
the model in a novel manner: he suggests, for example, that Carstens surpasses even 
Raphael in his dedication to an antique model; and he stresses repeatedly the 
pervasiveness of Biblical themes in such predecessors – the mark of an art practice that is 
now simply outdated, as he argues both here and in his Bemerkung (“Comment”) 
included in Meyer’s history.  Yet he argues further that the biblical as well as the pagan 
antique are equally distant models, in part given their implication in religious 
representation.  They are both therefore essentially out of place in an age in which art 
must stand on its own without the institutional and ideological support of religion.  But he 
returns nonetheless to a defense of the antique model based in its more inherent capacity 
to promote autonomy: antique art, he argues, was more influential on the development of 
religion in the ancient world and thus retains its capacity to act as art should: “Simbolik 
des Übersinnlichen durch die schönsten würdigsten Bilder der Natur” (“a symbolic of the 
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supersensual through the most beautiful and worthiest images of nature).46  Christian art, 
by contrast, has been too enslaved to the “mythology and martyrology” (“Mitologie und 
Martirologie”) of religion, too beholden to the Church’s need to tap into and control the 
popular mind, and steeped in the representation of subjects not suitable for art – the 
foolish, the ugly, the disgusting (“oft albernen, oder häßlichen und ekelhaften Inhalts”).47
 Fernow also argues that Carstens decided largely against models from Roman 
antiquity and in favor of the Greek given the latter’s simplicity, quiet grandeur (“ruhige 
Größe”), and pure ideal beauty, and the former’s penchant for pomp, ostentation in 
costume, and comparative “rawness” (“Roheit”).
 
48  Fernow avers even that Carstens’ 
innovation in the choice of subject matter, in comparison to other artists who allegedly 
reproduce from a more or less fixed series of subjects for historical painting, owes to his 
unique knowledge of antique sources: “Daß Carstens so viele neue Gegenstände 
behandelt hat, war eine natürliche Folge seiner vertrauteren Bekanntschaft mit den alten 
Schriftstellern, die wohl wenige Künstler so aufmerksam und wiederholt gelesen haben” 
(“That Carstens dealt with so many new objects was a natural consequence of his more 
intimate acquaintance with ancient writers, which few other artists likely read so 
attentively and so repeatedly”). 49
                                                             
46Carl Ludwig Fernow, Leben des Künstlers Asmus Jakob Carstens, ein Beitrag zur Kunstgeschichte des 
achtzehnten Jahrhunderts, in Klassik und Klassizismus, 487-488.  Note that this edition contains only the 
final section of the biography, the overview.  Translations are my own. 
  Fernow himself repeatedly returns to the basic 
elements of the Classicist education and arsenal: Greek antiquity, simplicity and beauty, 
the knowledge of antique literature.  Yet in doing so he clearly betrays a tendency to 
detach Carstens from the context of a reigning and oft recommended practice, suggesting 
47Fernow, Leben, 486-487, 493.  
48Fernow, Leben, 492-493.  
49Fernow, Leben, 494.   Fernow concedes later in the overview that other contemporary artists, German and 
Italian, have indeed drawn more from antique literary sources over the course of the preceding decade, and 
acknowledges the increasing translation of classical works into German.  See Fernow, Leben, 509-511.  
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instead that Carstens was the only artist or one among a severely limited number of artists 
thoroughly treating the antique Greek model. 
 The future of an autonomous art thus seems precarious in Fernow’s work, 
preserved as it is almost entirely if not uniquely in the figure of Carstens.  And Fernow’s 
Carstens is a strange vehicle for its transmission, for he consistently flouts the 
conventions of art practice.  His preference for Greek simplicity over Roman pomp and 
ostentation, cited by Fernow as indicative of Carstens progressive style and taste, proves 
also symptomatic of the problem of Carstens’ incomplete training in the arts.  The 
example also showcases Fernow’s method of managing a troubling object, Carstens, and 
fashioning him into a model in his own right.  In a section titled “Beiwerk” 
(“Accessories”) Fernow unfolds a two-part argument concerning the representation of 
costume, prop, architecture: Carstens lacked appropriate training in the rendering of such 
accessories; he also preferred simplicity in such matters.  One implication is that 
Carstens’ preferred a style that helped him to avoid what he had not yet mastered.  
Fernow’s conclusion sublates the two circumstances, Carstens’ lack of training and the 
possible motive for his preferences, and resorts instead to the claim of a distinctive virtue 
that rings almost intentional: 
Nie verfiel er in den bei neueren Künstlern, besonders der französischen 
Schule, die das Theatralische liebt, so gemeinen Fehler, aus 
unverständiger Prachtliebe Szenen aus den Zeiten des frühen, kunstarmen 
Altertums mit einem Grunde von reicher und prächtiger Architektur, z. B. 
Szenen aus dem Zeitalter des Romulus mit Tempeln und Säulenhallen 
korinthischer Ordnung aus dem Zeitalter Augusts oder Hadrians zu 
verzieren. Seine Gebäude waren immer, wie das Zeitalter seines 
Gegenstandes sie foderte […]50
 
 
He never succumbed to that error so common among modern artists 
(especially the French school that loves the theatrical), that 
                                                             
50Fernow, Leben, 508.  
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incomprehensible penchant for the sumptuous that would adorn scenes 
from the times of earliest antiquity, so spare in art, with a background of 
rich, magnificent architecture – e.g., scenes from the age of Romulus with 
temples and halls columned in the Corinthian order from the age of 
Augustus or Hadrian.  His buildings were always as the age of his object 
required them […] 
 
In this passage Fernow groups together several tendencies – a penchant for the 
sumptuous, the theatrical, an erroneous representation or even knowledge of antique 
history, the practices of contemporary artists and the French school – into a generalized 
gesture of decay in modern representation that is both incomprehensible in itself and 
purposefully absent in Carstens’ art.  By comparison, Carstens’ art is purposeful and 
logical – all in the image is as the object requires it.  The previously noted (and thereafter 
still repeatedly noted) lack of a complete formal training is trumped, although hardly 
seamlessly, by the conclusion that Carstens’ shortcomings were of little matter, if not 
actually virtuous and even intentional elements of style and taste. 
 But despite what Fernow considers a distinguishing object-centeredness to 
Carstens’ art, he also praises Carstens for what amounts to a wholesale withdrawal from 
the actual, material object.  Specifically, and with reference to an academic practice he 
regards as debilitating to the artist in training, Fernow emphasizes Carstens’ indebtedness 
to the imagination and to invention over imitation. 
Das Eigene seines Kunststrebens bestand vornehmlich darin, daß er nicht 
den gewöhnlichen Weg der zur eigenen Erfindung allmählich 
fortschreitenden Nachahmung ging, sondern sogleich mit dem Erfinden 
begann; indem er die Kunstwerke, so wie die Gegenstände der Natur, die 
ihm zu Vorbildern dienten, nie nachbildete, sondern bloß, durch 
unablässiges aufmerksames Betrachten, Form und Charakter derselben mit 
der Einbildungskraft aufzufassen, und das so Gelernte dann in eigenen 
Erfindungen wieder anzuwenden strebte.51
 
 
                                                             
51Fernow, Leben, 512.  
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The unique aspect of his artistic ambition was foremost that he did not 
follow the usual path of a gradually progressing imitation in order to arrive 
at his own invention, but rather began immediately with invention – by 
never reproducing the works of art that, like objects of nature, served as 
his models.  Rather, he strove to apprehend their form and character with 
the imagination, through constant, attentive observation, and then to apply 
what he learned to his own inventions. 
 
Carstens took inspiration from the object, but he did not work from the object or model 
directly.  Rather, Fernow argues that he impressed the object upon his imagination and 
drew later from this stock.  Given Classicism’s general advocacy of a correct model and 
its concern for a representation that joins the ideal and the material, it is striking that 
Fernow should decouple the object from representation and require, as it were, that all 
perception be filtered through the artist’s imagination.  Fernow’s  terminology suggests 
more precisely where his thinking differs from that of his peers, for he uses the verb 
nachbilden (to produce an image from, to form from) as well as the more frequent 
nachahmen (to imitate).  Indeed, elsewhere he uses nachzeichnen (to draw from).52
 Direct observation becomes a new intermediate stage in the creative process, 
replacing the process of imitation.  Nachzeichnen and nachbilden conjure their own 
image of a part by part reproduction, whereas Carstens’ constant and attentive direct 
observation seems to concern only one object or model as an entirety and the stocking of 
the imagination with formally whole inspiration.  Fernow clarifies this in an earlier 
  He 
draws attention not merely to the action of working with a model or object, but to their 
technical reproduction in visual or plastic media as the first stage in the progress of 
imitative education from the copy to a new original.  The intervention of the imagination 
permits the artist to avoid the crudest imitation in direct reproduction and move 
immediately to a new original. 
                                                             
52Fernow, Leben, 489.  
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passage in the section “Zeichnung” (“Drawing”): “Er studierte bloß betrachtend, indem er 
den Gegenstand seines Studiums oft und allseitig aufs genaueste beobachtete; die Gestalt 
nebst dem Charakteristischen desselben seiner Einbildungskraft einzuprägen” (“He 
learned merely through observation, by viewing the object of his study frequently and in 
detail from all sides, in order to impress form as well as the characteristic of the object 
upon his imagination”).53  Indeed, Carstens’ adherence to the object and to the production 
as a whole is further evidenced in his errors cited by Fernow: errors in proportion and 
perspective owing, again, to his lack of formal training, resulting in details appearing 
flawed to the “scrutinizing gaze of the judge of art” (“der prüfende Blick des 
Kunstrichters”).54
 Yet, an additional layer in Carstens’ engagement with the object accrues to this 
practice in Fernow’s discussion of Carstens’ talent for expression.  The context is 
familiar: Carstens’ facility in expression, especially in physiognomic expression, 
compensates for other reputed limitations in his scope as an artist.  Fernow describes the 
process by which objects enter Carstens’ sphere of interest: 
  But Fernow balances the errant detail in Carstens’ work against his 
success with larger-scale qualities such as unity of character, significance, and living 
expression of figures (’Einheit des Charakters,” “Bedeutsamkeit,” “lebendigen Ausdruck 
seiner Gestalten”) – qualities Fernow finds seldom achieved elsewhere despite the most 
correct drawing – and concludes that Carstens’ attention to the whole compensates for 
error in the part. 
Fähig, alles auszudrücken was ihn lebhaft und innig gerührt, oder durch 
ein hohes Interesse begeistert hatte, zog er, bei einer vielseitigen 
Empfänglichkeit, Vieles mit Glück in seinen Kreis; und eigentlich lag 
außerhalb desselben nur das, was der natürlichen Stimmung und 
                                                             
53Fernow, Leben, 489-490.  
54Fernow, Leben, 490.  
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Capable of expressing everything that had actively and intimately moved 
him or motivated him through a high degree of interest, he was fortunate 
to draw much into his circle through a versatile receptivity; and in fact 
only those things remained excluded that struck his natural temperament 
and sensibility as insignificant or strange. 
 
The active image of Carstens intensively examining the object is shaded by a curious 
stillness.  Indeed, when the discussion concerns expression, one of Carstens’ talents as an 
artist, Fernow injects into the imaginative and inventive process a stage of mere openness 
to the field of objects that might capture Carstens’ attention and move him.  Moreover, 
this new image of Carstens “fortunately” (“mit Glück”) drawing favorable objects into 
his circle – that which is familiar and meaningful to him and thereby accords with his 
disposition – suggests a more naturalized and even impersonalized process of attraction 
by virtue of which objects are transformed by the inventive imagination only after 
coming into contact with the immobile, receptive artist.  Carstens’ talent is stretched 
between two curious extremes: on the one hand, he remains “actively and intimately 
moved” by objects of interest; on the other, his skill is reduced to a Midas touch of sorts, 
the creative reflex of an artist selectively transforming the world in accordance with his, 
or Fernow’s, imagination. 
 This stillness also informs Fernow’s evaluation of Carstens’ best expressive 
works: still scenes in which action (Handlung) is reduced to “beautiful figures and 
significant physiognomies” (“schöner Gestalten und bedeutender Fisiognomien”).56
                                                             
55Fernow, Leben, 498.  
  To 
be sure, Fernow credits Carstens with other varieties of expressive representation, 
including the heroic and pathetic, and “quiet scenes with a particular moment” 
56Fernow, Leben, 500.  
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(“ruhigeren Szenen mit bestimmten Moment”).  But the category of the quiet scene 
“without a particular moment” is for Fernow the most compelling. 57   Curiously, he 
adduces in greatest detail the examples of Orfeus and Homer (ill. 8) in order to argue that, 
despite the presence of crowds listening to song in the images, “actually nothing is done, 
something merely occurs” (“wo eigentlich nicht gehandelt wird, wo bloß etwas 
vorgeht”). 58
 Fernow’s conception of the imagination is also informed by his preference for the 
still.  Moreover, his preference for the still, and therewith for the reduced expressivity of 
the physiognomic, suggests an inclination toward the sculptural.  His thinking on the 
basic medial distinctions between painting and sculpture is such that the painted scene 
may recede into the illusionistic depth of the canvas and expand to encompass a multi-
  Moment is reducible to action, thus scenes without action (or at least 
without the more expressive actions, the heroic and pathetic, one might more readily 
associate with historical painting) cannot be located in time: “und man kann sie als 
stehende Erscheinungen betrachten, die der Künstler vor das Auge des Betrachtenden 
rückt” (“and one may regard them as still apparitions, which the artist places before the 
eye of the beholder”).  Fernow’s obvious preference for the still and timeless also informs 
his high evaluation of physiognomic expression; for with the physiognomic, the 
expressivity of action (Handlung) may also be reduced to the facial expression as the 
mediator of character and individuality.  Figures in the image then truly become 
Gestalten (forms), radiating an expressing individuality only in the barest traces of 
movement in the face. 
                                                             
57Dönike, for example, cites this high estimation of the still scene, despite a preponderance of the heroic 
and pathetic in the oeuvre, as evidence of Fernow’s very willful reinterpretation of Carstens’ work.  
Dönike, Pathos, 328-330. 
58Fernow, Leben, 500.  
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temporal narrative space before the viewer; whereas sculpture, not a medium for depth 
and the dynamic use of space, manifests the ideally beautiful with a characteristic 
particularity in a single concentrated formal presence.59  The painted acts, or enacts, but 
the sculptural occurs.  Moreover, his references to the sculptural imagination bring into 
full circle his vision of Carstens’ inventive and transformative receptivity.  For, Carstens’ 
is a plastic genius; indeed, his imagination is as a crucible for the production of the ideal 
image: “alles, was er bildend dachte, sich in seiner plastisch dichtenden Fantasie 
kunstmäßig gestaltete” (“everything that shaped in his mind formed itself into art in his 
plastic-poetic imagination”).60
 The visual impact of Carstens’ actual body of work – separated from Fernow’s 
selective interpretation – rubs perhaps closer to Fernow’s estimation than he liked.  By 
and large the oeuvre is dominated by graphic works, many preparations for painting, 
many unfinished.  And as one moves through the catalog of remaining works one notices 
a wealth of portraits and profiles from his earlier years and a preponderance of large-scale 
sketches as Carstens’ life draws to its end (ill. 9).  The crispness and intimacy of the 
earlier production is gradually overtaken by a fragmenting monumental, suggesting that, 
  That Carstens as artist would reveal a particular kind of 
scene to the eye of his viewer, even a “still apparition,” does not necessarily ring as 
incompatible with wider Classicist theory.  It is, rather, the process by which this occurs 
in Fernow’s depiction of Carstens’ practice that is novel: his highest productivity consists 
in the filtering of objects through the imagination and projecting them to the viewer in 
plastic idealization, the rendering still of a world increasingly populated by new objects 
communicating quietly to the viewer in discretely expressive stasis. 
                                                             
59Dönike, Pathos, 370-371 – Fernow articulates this thinking in an earlier (1797) essay, Über den Zwek, 
das Gebiet und die Gränzen der Malerei (On the Purpose, the Sphere, and the Limits of Painting). 
60Fernow, Leben, 489.  
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as Carstens’ “plastic-poetic imagination” receded from the world around him fully into 
the invention of an antique ideal, the sculptural presence withered as well.  This effect is 
perhaps unwittingly referenced in the biography in the role played by Rome as the site of 
the preferred object for Carstens’ inventive imagination.  For, whereas the biographical 
narrative devotes roughly half of its length to Carstens’ residence in Rome  in the years 
leading to his death, in the final overview Rome itself is barely present – introduced 
merely in reference to Carstens’ ability to walk down the street in order to draw 
inspiration.  The literary effect of this shift in the status of Rome as center for Classicist 
inspiration, between narrative and final overview, is the suggestion that once Carstens’ 
was in Rome, he overcame even Rome.  That he himself became the center of what 
remains of Classicism.  The balance of Fernow’s biography is that Classicism withdraws 
from the world and is relocated entirely in the individual imagination, creativity is 
detached from the material demands of the object and cultivated in invention; and an 
image of the ideal is projected, in place of the enhancement of the ideality of the 
particular and familiar.  In Carstens’ life Fernow tells the story of Classicism as a radical 
and autonomous visual transformation of the world, in which the actual history of 
Classicism is reduced severely to the fragmenting body of work of the artist as isolated 




 As we have seen, in his biographical sketch Goethe portrays Winckelmann in a 
symbolic sense as both dead and living, the uniquely creative individual and the 
inspirational model for a type of creativity.  These two tendencies culminate in his 
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allusion to Winckelmann as sculpture, the finished work of art that itself still demands 
imitation.  Yet the biography, despite years of preparation, remains somehow, in 
Goethe’s terms, necessarily fragmentary.  But with the fragmentary biography one has a 
form of representation that remains inadequate – its fragmentary nature need not impinge 
upon the integrity of its object.  Whatever Winckelmann was, Goethe finds himself 
unable fully to say – his image must remain incomplete at the moment of its production.  
It is, as it were, born into decay. 
 The writings under focus in this chapter constitute a series of attempts to come to 
terms with and adequately represent an object.  Moreover, they unfold across half a 
century of Classicism in the form of a chain reaction.  Winckelmann’s search for the 
source and nature of beauty in a visually charged concept of style becomes the center of 
Meyer’s history of the decline, rise, spread and uncertain future of taste.  Meyer’s 
concern for the visuality associated with types of representation is reconfigured in 
Fernow’s biography as an imaginative vision severed from the material world and located 
entirely in the individual, just after Goethe himself relocates Winckelmann’s historic 
achievement more in Winckelmann himself as exemplary presence (even as corpse) in 
the history of Classicism than in Winckelmann’s scholarship.  The history of the rise and 
fall of Classicism becomes a history of vision, of the eye’s seeking out, examining, and 
ultimately abandoning its object in favor of an inward observation of the invention of the 
mind.  Accompanying this is a history of art as a history of motion – from the alluring 
motion of the expressively beautiful as the hallmark of a recurring style signifying the 
cyclical movement of history; to a good taste found both aesthetically in the repeated 
return of the eye to the work of art, and historically in an antique spirit, for better or for 
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worse, transgressing the limits of Rome; to the near absence of motion in a world of 
forms stilled by the mind of the artist. 
 The history of Classicism as a story based in motion and vision means the history 
of Classicism also as a characteristic history – an attempt to grasp and render coherently 
the developing essence of Classicism over time in its own expressive and characteristic 
gestures.  In light of Goethe’s appraisal of his own biography as fragmentary, one notices 
that the central concern for Winckelmann, Meyer, and Fernow is a visual sensitivity to 
the relic, the remain, the fragment of a now vanished (or vanishing) whole, the 
recuperation of that harmony between part and whole taken as the quality of the best art.  
Classicism’s gesture of looking is also the betrayal of desperation for the lost: for lost 












 In this dissertation I have argued that Weimar Classicism is a response to a 
discomfort with the passage of time and the contingency and uncontrollability of history.  
To be more specific: the figures we commonly associate with Weimar Classicism – 
Goethe, Schiller, Meyer, Fernow – acknowledge historical change in differing ways and 
respond to it with representational and cognitive strategies intended to confer a mastery 
over time and a knowledge of processes by which history occurs.  “History” in this regard 
means the changes occurring in European society during the 1790s and the early 19th 
century owing to the French Revolution: the perception of political instability, social 
transformation, and cultural condensation around exclusive national cores.  But history 
also has another meaning here: emerging from the perception of social, political, and 
cultural changes going back decades prior to the 1790s, yet taken as peaking around 
1800, it also indicates a more general and dramatic sense of transformation over time that 
leaves in its wake the destruction of the familiar while promising an open yet also 
unknowable future.  History is not merely the event or a series of events; it is also a 
process by which time passes. 
 The Classicists’ response to the experience of this process is to turn to forms of 
representation drawn from the idealized reception of European antiquity and held to be 
universally valid and even psychically healing in the effect they exercise upon the 
beholder (the viewer, the listener, the reader – also the artist).  My focus in this work on 
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visual representation has been in part a recognition of the status accorded to theater and 
the visual arts among the collaborators of Weimar Classicism.  But the eminent status of 
visual representation in Weimar Classicism is itself also a response to a concern about the 
experience of history and a desire to reproduce images that provide sensory stabilization 
in the face, literally, of the passage of time. 
 The desire for sensory stabilization is also a response to what I have called the 
improbability of a properly aesthetic vision.  In his Über die ästhetische Erziehung des 
Menschen Schiller acknowledged the sheer unlikelihood of the important visual 
transformation that renders the world as object of the subject’s senses.  This moment of 
the individual’s self-detachment and visual distancing from the world is for Schiller the 
birth of humanity’s faculty for formal play with the content of experience.  It is also, 
unfortunately, a moment of such fragile improbability that it becomes the foundation of a 
set of strategies through which the Classicists would stage this improbable moment 
between an aesthetic subject and the world through the work of art. 
 The distinctions between the works of Kolbe and Nahl (ill. 1 and 2) in the 1800 
Weimarer Preisaufgabe drive home the point that the art work is a strategic site.  While 
Kolbe’s Andromache succumbs to the pathos of the moment in a show of emotion 
deemed unbefitting a figure of her stature, the nurse looks away.  Nahl’s Andromache 
seems rather to bask in her husband’s heroism and in the joy of raising a son who might 
inherit this quality; it is the nurse who displays emotion.  These images contain a central 
action (the family scene) and a spectator (the nurse).  We might imagine the nurse not 
only as the spectator to an event, but as an idealized aesthetic spectator.  When, then, 
Schiller praises Kolbe’s nurse for balancing, in a gesture of modesty, the emotionalism of 
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Andromache, he also implicitly praises a gesture expressing taste: the nurse turns away 
from the ostentatious visual display.  Nahl’s nurse, by way of contrast, demonstrates a 
reverential attitude toward the spectacle of confidence and composure provided by 
Andromache and Hector.  The implication is twofold: as central elements of a work of 
art, Nahl’s Andromache and Hector merit a passionate reaction; as figures referencing a 
transitional moment in time, they command attention because they model a discretion 
that almost entirely conceals the import of the moment itself.  They are both the paradigm 
of a visual sign of historical transformation that is difficult to see but must be seen; and 
the reaffirmation of an anxiety aroused by the possibility of sweeping change – an 
anxiety preferring a small-scale, containable, and entirely representable history. 
 That Nahl’s three main figures are rendered with a greater sense of their physical 
dimensions (they display light, shading, a nearly three-dimensional contour) against an 
unfinished and flat backdrop, underscores that this is an exemplary representation.  
Hector, Andromache, and the nurse depart from their historical context and become 
universal, stable, sculptural forms.  The moment captured in the image – a pregnant 
moment in time owing to its being poised on the verge of passage and transformation – 
assumes an additional existence of its own outside of its context.  Its evanescence 
becomes fixed and materialized in universal and commendable gestures that themselves 
reorient its implicit narrative inwards into a closed story that will securely repeat itself for 
the viewer. 
 The story I have told about Weimar Classicism is a story about the importance of 
looking the right way in order to be receptive to such a moment.  It is also about the 
cultivation of images that sharpen the perception for such moments.  To be sure, this also 
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implies the attempt to contrive such instances of visual engagement.  Goethe’s initial 
symbolic experience, for example, occurs at the sight of the destroyed location where his 
grandfather’s house had formerly stood.  Goethe places the current destruction of the site 
into a series of destructive moments that becomes a story of regeneration.  The site’s 
recent destruction during French bombardment of the city is overcome: the ruin now 
embodies a transformative process whereby it already prefigures the structure that will 
replace it – a structure that, as Goethe implies, will be of greater value.  Moreover, 
Goethe attempts to naturalize human history by recasting the destruction of war as a 
matter of cyclical regeneration.  The ruin is removed from the context of martial 
destruction and is now regarded as bearing, in its very materiality as ruin, the elements of 
a larger narrative in which causality – now a cycle of regeneration, no longer the 
transitory instance of a particular destructive act – is already entirely embedded in the 
object itself.  Goethe makes a similarly naturalizing effort with the Laocoon group: to 
read its narrative power not as the climax of a sequence of unusual and violent events, but 
rather in terms of quasi-natural occurrences and causes that do not arouse curiosity 
because they are more of the order of natural law. 
 The tension between the experience of destruction and its re-inscription into a 
symbolic experience increases between Goethe’s experience in Frankfurt and his 
description of Laocoon.  For, in Frankfurt Goethe ponders how one might recuperate a 
poetic object from the symbolic experience – reframed, the question concerns how art 
might be produced from an individual experience that arouses sentiment.  Goethe’s work 
on Laocoon indicates the extent to which the viewer must go in order to safeguard the 
aesthetic quality of the experience – by forcing out particularity and reinvesting the 
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object of vision with a new narrative dynamic that is directed entirely inward towards its 
own harmonious balance within the work of art. 
 Schiller likewise betrays an attraction to the single moment in time in Geschichte 
des Dreißigjährigen Kriegs.  Indeed, his historical narrative becomes a sequence of such 
moments in which great historical actors, whose actions seem to reveal the meaning of 
history, suddenly disappear from the world stage.  Schiller as historian ponders the 
significance of the sudden disappearance of a charismatic agency that seems to make 
history.  The work of the historian, correspondingly, becomes an act of perception – in 
Schiller’s case, this perceptivity is obstructed by a historical actor, Wallenstein, who 
remains almost invisible behind the obscuring glare of his reputation.  With the 
Wallenstein trilogy Schiller adopts a different approach, focusing explicitly on and 
dissecting the problematic moment of representation – Wallenstein’s own disappearance.  
By staging Wallenstein as a figure operating at cross purposes to an accelerating chain of 
events, he is able to focus on physical movements that betray Wallenstein’s unreadiness 
to move at the speed of the narrative.  Wallenstein’s body reveals to the eye that he will 
fail to do what he says he will do.  Schiller constructs the tragedy in such a way – in the 
conflict between expectation, intention, and will – that the historically pivotal moment of 
Wallenstein’s death is prefigured and visibly legible in subtle gesture. 
 Regarded comparatively, Goethe cultivates an ideal and symbolic moment of 
almost neutralized temporality, in which the particular details of uncontrollable 
experience are submitted to a sensually manageable narrative coherence at the expense of 
their original temporal context and causal relations.  Schiller, by contrast, opens up and 
explores the nature of the moment in time, exposing (or staging) its causal dynamics as 
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something potentially visible.   Goethe commends control over time to the power of the 
viewer; Schiller subjects the viewer to time’s hidden details.  Each is a gesture of 
acquiring mastery over the experience of time.  Common to each as well is a concern for 
the passage of time in the dissolution or disappearance of a body.  Goethe’s effort to 
maintain the ideality of Laocoon in a moment prior to death is also a symptom of his 
concern for the dismantling of the “art body” of Europe’s antique heritage in Italy.  
Schiller’s prose historical narrative moves from physical disappearance to physical 
disappearance.  The Wallenstein trilogy reenacts one such disappearance in the drawn-out 
anticipation of death, in which the process by which Wallenstein disappears is manifested 
in his bodily movement on the stage and underscored by Wallenstein’s own language of 
the destruction and reconstitution of his body.  The origin of aesthetic awareness in 
Schiller’s Ästhetische Erziehung occurs in the visual formalization of the subject’s 
physical distinction from the world – a visual formalization that is safeguarded in ideal 
terms in the permanence of Hector’s departure, forever just prior to his death and 
physical mutilation.  Weimar Classicism’s anxiety about time’s passage is itself 
embodied in or projected into actual or sculptural bodies that would populate the lived 
world with instances of time fixed just prior to its passage into a future understood as 
destructive. 
 With its turn to art history in the first decade of the nineteenth century, Weimar 
Classicism begins to stage its itself as a body capable of vanishing into the passage of 
time.  Goethe’s rendering of Winckelmann as both a sculptural, closed form and a still-
living presence (yet already in the grave) betrays an uneasiness about inevitable 
movement into a post-classical future and the loss of the formal stability promised by the 
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model of antiquity.  Meyer’s criticism of the theatricality of French painting reflects as 
well a desire to retain a visual representation that reproduces subtly mobile forms 
emanating from higher, stable, universal ideas – he expresses grave reservation about a 
visual representation he deems designed to assault the eye, preferring instead that which 
discreetly activates, captures, and sharpens the attention of the viewer.  Fernow goes a 
step further in his depiction of Carstens as an artist using the material object as a stimulus 
to the creative imagination.  Fernow revives the late Carstens as an embodied instance of 
the retreat of the physical world of Classicism into the stable confines of the mind.  The 
balance of these historical approaches is that Classicism, perceived to be on the verge of 
dissolution into time, is preserved as an idealizing, if also unstable, projection on to a 
world definitively in the throes of change. 
 Throughout this work I have attempted also to portray Weimar Classicism – 
decidedly, if disputedly, a literary- and cultural-historical category – also as a complex of 
movements and gestures in reaction to the passage of time.  Where there is a disparity 
between Weimar Classicism’s utopian  rhetoric of an aestheticized public sphere waiting 
out the vagaries of history, and the comparatively more tarnished development of its 
thought and practices regarding visual representation, I believe that this disparity reveals 
a fundamental character of Weimar Classicism as a project activated by anxiety about 









1. Heinrich Kolbe, Hectors Abschied, 










2. Johann August Nahl, Hectors Abschied, 





















4. Laocoon (with outstretched arm, 
as the statue was known in the 18th century), 








































5. Johann Christian Ernst Müller, after Conrad Horny, Laokoon 














































7. Asmus Jakob Carstens, Homer Sings to the Greeks, 





















8. Asmus Jakob Carstens, Portrait Miniatures, 
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